FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1968

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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WORLD ORDER AND AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY

By Charles W. Yost

ONE lesson of the last fifteen years, most conspicuous in the Viet Nam war, is that the capacity of even the strongest power to intervene effectively in other states has been eroded by time, space and history. Apparently the only state a great power can still attack with impunity is one of its allies. Even there, as the Soviet Union will no doubt discover, the costs of intervention will in time heavily outweigh the gains.

Far from encouraging the two superpowers to protect their interests or their creeds by the exercise of military force, the consequences of intervention in Viet Nam and Czechoslovakia are likely to make them much more chary of doing so in the future. Indeed, as far as Americans are concerned, Viet Nam risks causing them to revert to their post-World War I fantasy of withdrawal and isolation. The dissidence of Czechoslovakia, like that of China, is another symptom of the disintegration of the communist monolith, which will limit Russia's freedom of action.

Yet the world in the autumn of 1968, despite all the lessons of the past, is no less unstable than it was a few years ago. The appetite for ever more devastating weapons quickens the arms race at all levels and in all latitudes; détente is interrupted and Europe once more brutally shaken by the misuse of the Red Army; peace in Viet Nam seems as far off as ever and China as hostile; the interminable conflict in the Middle East threatens more than ever before to provoke new confrontations among the great powers.

We can argue about what "responsibilities" the United States or any other state must assume in face of this situation. What is not open to doubt is that the United States and the Soviet Union

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at least, however harshly each may condemn the other's behavior, have an overriding national interest in restricting possible occasions for a nuclear war to the absolute minimum, since both would be likely to become main targets and suffer most. It therefore continues to be in the interests of both, as much if not more than before, to prevent or limit international violence in places where both are directly or indirectly involved and where the violence might escalate into wider hostilities and drag them both in.

To what extent does this mean that the United States has a continuing national interest, over and above an international responsibility, to check violence wherever it occurs? In other words, what is the proper mean between, on the one hand, overinvolvement, compulsive military intervention, "policing the world" and, on the other, abdication of responsibility, neo-isolationism, letting the rest of the world "stew in its own juice?"

II

Two preliminary comments come to mind. First, the United States does not confront this question with complete freedom to act or not to act. Over the past twenty years it has entered into treaties and given assurances which involve explicit security commitments vis-à-vis its NATO, OAS and SEATO partners, as well as a number of individual states, such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand, Israel, the Philippines, Nationalist China, South Korea, South Viet Nam, etc. It has also assumed less explicit but significant obligations in other cases. These commitments are not necessarily assumed forever; some should no doubt be revised now, but all are, to a greater or less degree, still binding.

Second, despite its great power and an occasional tendency to use it unilaterally, the United States has on the whole since 1945 preferred to share with others its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace. It endeavored first to share with the whole United Nations and, when that proved infeasible, with the allies mentioned above, grouped in military pacts whenever possible. However, most of these pacts seem at the moment of declining validity. What are future prospects for more effective sharing of worldwide security responsibilities?

In seeking partners to carry such responsibilities the United States would naturally turn first to the Western Europeans who are our traditional friends, who have the necessary resources and talents, and who if united could be substantially equal to us in

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power. Unfortunately, there is grave question whether, over the next decade, they will unite sufficiently to be willing or able to carry security responsibilities outside their own continent.

They may do so. After the passing of de Gaulle the momentum toward European unity may resume and prevail. The United States should certainly encourage such movement. The experience of the last twenty years, however, makes clear the limits to what even a friendly and powerful outsider can do in this sense and the hazards of too warm an advocacy by an outsider. It is plain that European unity must grow out of European imperatives, European convictions and European will.

There seems, alas, an equal possibility that over the next decade Europe will *not* move significantly toward further political unity and international responsibility but that, for a time at least, resurgent nationalism and separatism may prevail. If the great European states remain separate, they all too probably may continue, at least for several years, to retract rather than enlarge their security responsibilities outside the Continent and still further divide and diminish those inside. The experience of last year in the Middle East suggests that even where their interests are deeply involved, close to but outside Europe, European states are unwilling to bear risks and burdens. Thus, unless unification proceeds more rapidly and decisively than we have a right to assume, a significant European role in maintaining international security outside the Continent seems doubtful during the next decade.

In East Asia only Japan among the non-communist states seems potentially powerful enough to play a major security role even in its own region, not to mention elsewhere. It too has the talents and resources; it is already in many ways more competent and influential than China. Yet strong psychological and political factors inside and outside Japan seem likely to inhibit it for a number of years from rearming substantially or being willing or able to play its natural part in maintaining the security of East Asia. The United States would be unwise prematurely to press it to do so.

The OAS has a limited capability to assist the United States in security matters inside the Western Hemisphere; it has none outside. There are no other states or groups of states anywhere capable of playing such a role in the near future, except to a minor extent in their immediate neighborhoods.

The United Nations has demonstrated a limited peacekeeping

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capability during the past twenty years. It has not fulfilled this role in the decisive way the authors of the Charter intended, but through arrangements negotiated by the Secretary-General, at the behest of the Security Council or the General Assembly, with parties to conflicts and with states willing to contribute forces, observers, funds and logistic support. Even this limited peacekeeping capacity has diminished recently: the new Afro-Asian majority in the Assembly practically excludes any peacekeeping decision by that body which is unacceptable either to the United States or to the U.S.S.R.; the Secretary-General's freedom of action has been reduced thereby as well as by the more restrictive policy toward him adopted recently by the U.S.S.R. and France; the absence of Communist China, North Viet Nam and North Korea inhibits the United Nations from undertaking peacekeeping in East Asia; and the dismissal of UNEF by the United Arab Republic reduces its capabilities in the Middle East. The United Nations is therefore in fact limited to such peacekeeping operations as may be approved not only by the Security Council—including of course the United States and the U.S.S.R.—but also by the parties most concerned in an actual or threatened conflict.

One's reluctant conclusion is that over the next decade the effective responsibility for international security may rest very largely with the United States and the U.S.S.R., either in competition or coöperation, or more likely in some untidy combination of the two.

III

What does this actually mean in practice?

It probably means, first, that in case serious international disorder is provoked by communist states, parties or movements, the United States, if it considers that this disorder threatens its own "vital" interests or those of an ally, will have either to work out with the Soviet Union an agreed means of checking or limiting it, or act against it more or less unilaterally with only such help as the state or states directly concerned can supply.

If the Soviet Union has itself either provoked or encouraged the disorder, it will obviously not be willing to coöperate in suppressing it, though it may join in preventing serious escalation. If the disorder has been provoked (after a Viet Nam settlement) by one of the East Asian communist states, particularly China, the Soviets may coöperate in checking it, especially if it violates

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international agreements they have signed, though their action may be discreet and ambiguous.

The degree to which Soviet leaders themselves will in the future encourage or support "wars of national liberation" will depend primarily on developments inside the Soviet Union. But clearly four factors already restrain them from doing so: (1) the fear that such wars may escalate; (2) the strong objection of most Afro-Asian and Latin American states to communist revolutionary movements inside independent nations; (3) the apprehension that the Chinese might gain most from such wars; (4) the decline of revolutionary fervor inside the Soviet Union and its preoccupation with preserving the status quo inside its own bloc. Indeed the intervention in Czechoslovakia, while it was clearly a victory for the reactionary Stalinists inside the Kremlin, may further inhibit Soviet involvement in "wars of liberation," both by the problems it will create within the bloc and by its impairment of the Soviet posture as a "liberator."

The Soviets will of course be more willing to coöperate in checking or limiting international disorders having no significant communist component. They have done so recently in the Cyprus conflict, the India-Pakistan war of 1965 and, to a limited extent, the post-hostilities phase of the Middle East crisis of 1967. Even in such cases, however, domestic preoccupations or conflicting interests of friends of the United States and the U.S.S.R. will often lead to differing assessments as to just when and how peacekeeping should be conducted and the lengths to which it should be carried.

The conception of Chinese national interests held by its communist leaders may still for some time reflect quite esoteric estimates of the hazards and benefits of wars not directly and immediately involving China. Since 1949, and particularly since 1953, Mao and his principal colleagues have shown remarkable prudence in this respect. For some time, however, they may be expected to encourage international violence in the belief that it will not escalate to a point involving themselves. In this judgment they may sometimes prove wrong.

The present time, when the Chinese régime is momentarily incapable of governing effectively and is hostile both to the United States and the U.S.S.R., is perhaps uniquely favorable for these two to commence more genuine coöperation. The United States should remember that if a more pragmatic régime in Peking

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emerges from the present turmoil it might resume coöperation with the Soviet Union and again confront the United States with a communist bloc of over one billion people; in the meantime Soviet suppression of "revisionism" in Prague may narrow the gulf between Moscow and Peking. On the other hand, Moscow is aware that if the radical Chinese Communists consolidate their power and successfully continue their nuclear weapons development, they might constitute a much more serious threat.

Nevertheless, competition with the United States has become a way of life for the Soviet leadership; they are obviously trying to close the "missile gap;" they are desperately trying to stave off disintegration or impairment of their East European empire; they are developing a greater capability to intervene with conventional military forces in areas not contiguous to their own territory; they are determined to be recognized as a "world power" on more or less the same level as the United States. To the extent they succeed, their new capabilities will tempt them to make the same mistakes the United States has made in Viet Nam and elsewhere. They have just made a tragic though traditional mistake in Czechoslovakia. Soon the question will arise whether they will perceive any better than the Americans did that their new capabilities, exercised unilaterally, are just as likely to be damaging as to be favorable to their own interests, not to mention the interests of others.

The other side of the coin of the efforts of the Soviets to achieve status and recognition is their recurrent interest (temporarily in abeyance during Viet Nam) in being in conspicuous association with the United States. "Summit meetings," "hot lines" and similar devices emphasize equality of status; they also facilitate common action in areas which have so far been very narrow but which could be widened. The appalling consequences of direct confrontation between them has long been apparent to both sides; the possible consequences of indirect and involuntary confrontation are also gradually becoming apparent. If we are right in estimating that in the coming decade limitation of international violence may be largely dependent on some coöperation between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the former should be no more inhibited in seeking it because of Czechoslovakia than the Soviet Union has been because of Viet Nam. After twenty years of bitter hostility and still unimpaired ideological incompatibility, coöperation will at best be precarious and partial. It still seems so es-

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sential, however, that the new American administration should promptly undertake to explore whether it is feasible and how extensive and reliable it might become.

The Soviet leaders should be aware, however, that, if they persist in suppressing all liberalization in Eastern Europe by force, they risk once again so antagonizing American public opinion that all coöperation between the two countries, even that which is much in the interest of both, will for a further period of time be politically out of the question. After all, the cold war was born in Eastern Europe and will have eventually to be buried there.

The main areas requiring urgent examination are: (1) the nuclear arms race and its impending escalation, which poison the relationship between the two states, limit their ability to deal with grave domestic problems and make the whole balance of international order and peace precarious; (2) the security situation in East Asia where, after Viet Nam, the two states may be able to find a limited common interest in preventing the outbreak of further hostilities from which China could profit; (3) the security situation in the Middle East where the aggravation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the withdrawal of Britain and the increasingly active Soviet policy create a likelihood not only of more local conflict but, unless precautions are taken, of more great-power involvement.

A hazard involved in such far-reaching American-Soviet consultation, and perhaps limited agreement, even for such unexceptionable ends, would be the anxiety created on the one hand in Western Europe and Japan and on the other among the "developing" states that the two superpowers were setting up a dual hegemony to police the world. Unhappily there is little likelihood that they could reach wide enough areas of agreement in the foreseeable future to give substance to such anxiety. A much greater danger would be that their agreement would fall far short even of maintaining basic international security. Nevertheless, the United States should seek at all times to bring its allies and friends into the nexus of negotiation and agreement whenever their interests are involved and they may be willing to participate and share responsibility. If any are excluded from peacekeeping, it should be only because they exclude themselves. It is the regretful thesis of this article, on the basis of the evidence so far at hand, that over the next decade many are likely to do so.

In cases, however, where the United States, the Soviets and

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whoever else may be willing to share responsibility are agreed that some immediate exercise of peacekeeping force is required, the appropriate instrument will usually be the United Nations. Exercise of force properly authorized and conducted by the United Nations has the sanction of more than 120 member states; it avoids unilateral intervention by either superpower, reaction by the other, or the appearance of dual hegemony by both; it can be carried out through procedures elaborated and accepted over the past twenty years. At the present time any such U.N. peacekeeping would have to be conducted under those procedures; that is to say, it would have to be sanctioned by the Security Council, would also require the consent of the government or governments within whose territory the operation is to take place, would be manned by ad hoc contingents from states other than the United States and the U.S.S.R., and would be supported by funds voluntarily contributed by a minority of U.N. members.

If, over a period of years, the two superpowers and others should decide that it is in their common interest to use the United Nations systematically for peacekeeping, it might be possible gradually to activate the more decisive procedures for the maintenance of international security laid down in the Charter, that is, to revive the Military Staff Committee and to negotiate among member states special agreements providing armed forces and facilities to the United Nations on a regular and permanent basis.

IV

So much for the first alternative by which serious international violence might be curbed over the next decade, namely, by limited coöperation between the United States, the U.S.S.R. and others both inside and outside the United Nations. But what if even sincere and persistent efforts to work out this coöperation prove abortive? What if the legacies of the cold war prove still to dominate thought and policy on both sides?

There will certainly, at the very least, be cases in which the Soviet Union refuses to coöperate in peacekeeping, either because it or one of its friends has provoked the violence, or because it expects to extract some political capital from the conflict, or simply because it does not want to become involved. In these cases—if our conclusion is correct that no other state will be willing to play a significant security role outside Europe and Latin America during the next decade—the only alternative to per-

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mitting the violence to proceed unchecked would be unilateral intervention by the United States, assisted only by those closely involved. In the light of our recent experience, when would such unilateral intervention be justified and when would it not?

We have referred to treaty commitments which the United States must respect if it is not to lose all international credit. These commitments are not necessarily for all time. Some, such as those to SEATO and implicitly to CENTO, are in many respects out of date and in need of early review. Those to NATO and the OAS, on the other hand, while evolving, still have solid justification. Under existing circumstances the United States would no doubt have to join in resisting an attack, if requested by the party attacked, on Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. It would also probably feel obligated to assist, though it is not clear to what degree, certain other states, such as India and Iran, if they were attacked by communist neighbors.

The most important twilight zones, where the United States most needs to clarify its obligations, interests and intentions, would appear to be Southeast Asia and the Middle East. We have already suggested that, after Viet Nam, the United States and the U.S.S.R. jointly endeavor to sort out their interests and commitments in these areas and to work toward stabilization there. While one could not be sanguine about the response, Communist China should certainly also be offered the opportunity to take part in such stabilization. What, however, if this joint reëxamination proves unproductive or, because of the limited influence of the United States and the U.S.S.R. in these areas, inconclusive?

The most decisive lesson of Viet Nam would seem to be that, no matter how much force it may expend, the United States cannot ensure the security of a country whose government is unable to mobilize and maintain sufficient popular support to control domestic insurgency. It can assist by checking external invasion or massive aid to insurgents, but only the local government can suppress the insurgency itself. If indigenous dissidents, whether or not communist, whether or not supported from outside, are able to mobilize and maintain more effective popular support than the government, they will eventually prevail. The United States cannot prevent them even if it so desires and even if it is willing for a time to pour out lives and resources to that end. Under such circumstances, unpalatable as it may be, the United

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States will have to reconcile itself to the "loss" of the country in question, either to the communists or to other effective insurgents. (Of course the United States should not put itself in the position of always opposing insurgency and supporting the status quo. After all, its principles are revolutionary even if its political action outside its borders cannot often be.)

The problem of violent insurgency, wherever it arises throughout the underdeveloped world, will essentially be solved or not solved by the will and capacity of the government and the élite to meet to a sufficient degree the political and economic imperatives of their evolving society. The role of the United States, to the extent it wishes and is asked, will be to assist these governments and élites to meet these imperatives before armed insurgency has broken out or at least before it has reached unmanageable proportions. If the local government and the élite are unable or unwilling to meet these imperatives, the United States will certainly not be able to do so.

These principles of course apply to the states of Southeast Asia, including the Philippines and Indonesia. The survival of their governments will depend upon their success or lack of it in meeting the above-mentioned imperatives. They can be given, if they wish, military "guarantees" and economic aid, but their fate will be determined by their will, their capacity, their sophisticated concern for the "hearts and minds" of the people.

It seems improbable that China or North Viet Nam will undertake overt aggression against Southeast Asian states (after the end of the present conflict), at least for some time, because of domestic conditions. The United States would be justified, however, in giving new or renewed assurances of support in case of *such* aggression to any Southeast Asian state or group of states that asked for them. Particularly if the outcome in Viet Nam proves to be unfavorable or ambiguous, such assurances might be required to block a rapid exploitation of the "domino theory." Great care should be exercised, however, to ensure that any assurances, other than those having to do with overt invasion, are not open-ended and are strictly dependent on appropriate performance by the recipient government.

One means of reducing unilateral American peacekeeping responsibilities in Southeast Asia after a Viet Nam settlement might be what is loosely called a "neutralization" of the area. The means would be a treaty guaranteeing the independence and territorial

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integrity of some or all of the states there on condition of their "nonalignment" with any military bloc. Such "neutralization" would, however, hardly be meaningful unless underwritten by Communist China and North Viet Nam, which may or may not be inclined to coöperate. In any case the area's conspicuous vulnerability to communist misbehavior presents a further compelling argument, in addition to many others, that the United States should persistently seek accommodation of its differences with Peking and support all feasible means for drawing China back into the community of nations. The most obvious first means of doing so would be a change of American policy regarding Chinese representation in the United Nations.

In the Middle East the situation is different because the United Nations has long been and still is deeply involved there and because the chief great power concerned, other than the United States, is the Soviet Union rather than China. Moreover, the state in the area to which the United States is most heavily committed, Israel, has shown a remarkable capacity for taking care of itself.

Indeed the chief problem for the United States arising from the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the danger that Israel may be overrun but the fact that the rigidity of both sides perpetuates the conflict and sucks in the two superpowers. The commitment of the United States to one and the U.S.S.R. to the other has long embroiled the United States with the Arabs, and now risks embroiling it with the Soviet Union over interests not really "vital" to either side. In this sense the Middle East could, with even less reason, come to play a disastrous role between the two superpowers similar to that which the Balkans played between the two European alliances before 1914.

In view of the passionate nationalism of most of the states in the area, as well as its fragmentation and the crisscross of rivalries among the countries involved, it is most unlikely that either the Soviet Union or the United States could hope to dominate the area or any significant part of it. New intruders into the Arab world cannot expect, particularly in this day and age, to be any more permanently successful than old ones were. It can hardly be doubted that their aid will be used by their respective clients more in the interests of the clients than of the patrons.

If this analysis is correct, both the United States and the Soviets should firmly forgo unilateral military intervention in the area or indeed other competitive measures which could lead to

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confrontation between them. The traditional involvement of the United Nations creates a convenient cushion, to the extent they use it, between the interests of the two superpowers and their respective friends. Before new disasters occur, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the Europeans should exert every ounce of leverage they possess to achieve whatever elements of settlement can be extracted from the Security Council resolution of last November. If multilateral peacekeeping fails again in the Middle East, there is little we can do unilaterally that would not entail greater peril than profit to ourselves and our friends.

Only a few words need to be said about the expediency of unilateral American military intervention in areas outside East and Southeast Asia and the Middle East. As far as Latin America is concerned, the machinery of the Organization of American States is available. It would seem to be a sound principle that the United States should not intervene militarily in Latin America without the approval of a substantial majority of the OAS. One can imagine cases of massive intervention by an external power, as the introduction of missiles into Cuba, which might require a response by the United States even in the absence of OAS sanction, but such cases will occur very rarely if at all. In Latin America as elsewhere, the proper emphasis of our policy will be to assist Latin American states, if they wish us to do so, in meeting the political and economic imperatives of modernization and, where necessary, in dealing with incipient insurgency. As in Southeast Asia, if and when insurgency should reach massive proportions in any country and the local government should lose the support of most of its population, it would be beyond the power of the United States to maintain the status quo.

As to Africa, while the state of the continent is in many ways tragic and violence seems almost certain to proliferate, there is little chance that American military intervention would be either attractive or useful. What can be done, the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations will have to do, though neither can do much until the developed states decide that it is contrary to their interests to permit a whole continent to stagnate.

There are at least three potential threats to international security in Africa. One would be an outbreak of violence between the "radical" and "moderate" Arab states on the North African littoral, with one side (as in the Middle East) being backed by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States and some of

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its European allies. A second would be the outbreak of large-scale racial war in South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies. A third would be a comprehensive and successful Chinese exploitation of retarded development, frustrated expectations, violence and despair. None of these eventualities seems probable within the next few years, but the existence of all of them is further evidence of the need for creating over the next decade more effective multilateral peacekeeping machinery.

V

To sum up, what conclusions in regard to U.S. responsibilities for the maintenance of international security during the coming decade emerge from the above analysis?

1. There will be substantial international violence, particularly in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa and perhaps in Latin America. Much of this violence may not be of overwhelming international concern, but some will involve the interests of great powers and will risk escalation into more general war.

2. Allies of the United States are likely to be unwilling or unable during this period to assume significant peacekeeping responsibilities outside of their own region. Only in Europe and Latin America will such allies be able to assume a major role in peacekeeping even inside their own region.

3. The United Nations will be able to play a significant peacekeeping role only in cases where the United States and the U.S.S.R. are agreed that it shall do so.

4. Only the United States and the U.S.S.R. are therefore likely during this period to have and to be willing to exercise significant worldwide military capabilities and responsibilities. Peacekeeping during the decade may therefore be largely a factor either of competition or coöperation between those two states.

5. To the extent that Western Europe might be united or—even disunited—that its separate states might be willing to assume some worldwide security responsibilities, it should be constantly encouraged to do so. This would apply also to Japan, if and when it chooses to rearm significantly. Even in the absence of willingness to assume such responsibilities, these states should be given the opportunity to participate in U.S. negotiations on security matters with the communist powers.

6. Despite their ideological incompatibility and their unresolved confrontations, mostly indirect, in Europe, East Asia and the

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Middle East, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have a strong common interest in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, hence an interest, which is also strong but difficult to define and delimit, in checking international violence which might escalate into nuclear war. They may have a further common interest in containing any Chinese aggressiveness which might develop if and when Peking again consolidates its authority.

7. There are significant external and internal pressures operating on the Soviet Union to diminish its enthusiasm for provoking revolution and upsetting the status quo. There are also internal pressures constraining it to match the military capabilities of the United States and to compete more aggressively with it in some parts of the world.

8. All these considerations call for an urgent and vigorous effort by the United States and U.S.S.R., after a Viet Nam settlement, to reëxamine their relationship and to determine to what extent they can coöperate rather than compete in maintaining international security. They should concentrate particularly on limiting the arms race, on the two most critical areas, East and Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and on more effective utilization of U.N. peacekeeping capabilities.

9. Whatever the degree of success or failure of this bilateral reëxamination, the United States will nevertheless continue to be saddled during this decade with substantial unilateral responsibilities, arising from previous commitments or from continuing interests, for the maintenance of international security. They will apply particularly in the two above-mentioned critical areas but also to some extent elsewhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

10. These unilateral responsibilities should nevertheless be held within the narrowest compass consistent with existing treaty commitments and with "vital" interests strictly defined. The emphasis should be on assisting competent and representative governments to meet the political and economic imperatives of modernization, through giving them economic aid, preferably via multilateral instruments, and through limited military aid where a serious threat exists. The presumption should be against direct unilateral military intervention, unless an ally is subject to overt aggression across frontiers. Finally, the United States cannot suppress insurgency in a country whose government is itself incapable of competing with the insurgents.

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SHOULD THE U.S. WITHDRAW FROM ASIA?

By Owen Harries

LET us make two assumptions: first, that the Viet Nam war has reached the beginning of the end and that it will be over within the next year or two; second, that the settlement will involve an American defeat and the extension of communist power to South Viet Nam. Events may falsify both these assumptions, but they may not; it is worth thinking about what the situation will be like if they do not.

Among other things, it is worth thinking about the effects which such developments will have on the debate about American policy in Asia. After all, it has been said often enough that this debate is itself crucial in determining the future of Southeast Asia. If this is more than rhetoric, and surely it is, it is important to consider how the arguments will look and where the participants will stand if events move in this way. What answers can be expected to the questions: Will the United States withdraw from the whole region, at least in the military sense? Should it do so? Would the countries of the region be able to maintain their independence if it did so? Would it matter if they did not?

If the situation here envisaged comes about, one of the important consequences will be the enhancing of the influence and authority of those who have been critical of American policy. They will be in a position to claim, or to have claimed for them, that the fact that they predicted the failure of American policy testifies to the soundness of their analysis of the general situation and their prescriptions for future American policy. Such a claim would be persuasive but not necessarily justified. People are sometimes right despite their analysis; sometimes a part of their analysis is sound while another part is not. In an exchange between Hans Morgenthau and McGeorge Bundy during the C.B.S. debate in June 1965, Bundy pointed out that in the early sixties Morgenthau had wrongly assumed that the communist domination of Laos was a foregone conclusion. Morgenthau answered, "I may have been dead wrong about Laos, but it doesn't prove that I am dead wrong about Viet Nam." This was true; but it is also true that if it turns out that Morgenthau and the other critics are right about Viet Nam, it does not follow that they must be

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right in their analyses and prescriptions concerning the rest of Southeast Asia. The danger that this may be overlooked, that defeat in Viet Nam may lead to an uncritical acceptance of the whole of the case put forward by the critics, makes it particularly important to look closely at their recommendations and the arguments used to support them.

Among the more prominent critics of U.S. Viet Nam policy there is substantial agreement that American military power should not be committed again to the Southeast Asian mainland. Some are more explicit than others on this, and some accept that the process of extrication from Viet Nam may require the continuing presence of American troops during a transition period. But there is pretty general agreement that ideally and ultimately the United States should withdraw from the mainland.

This conclusion is supported by a number of arguments. The most far-reaching of these—and, if it is accepted, the most compelling—is that neither in terms of American interests nor the world balance of power is the region important enough to justify such an American commitment. George Kennan was expressing the view of many when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "Viet Nam is not a region of major military and industrial importance. It is difficult to believe that any decisive developments of the world situation would be determined in normal circumstances by what happens on that territory;" and when, on another occasion, he made it clear that this evaluation applied to the whole region by advising Americans "not to worry so much about the remote countries scattered across the Southern crescent." Kenneth Galbraith, Richard Lowenthal and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. have expressed similar views; the last of these, immediately preceding a chapter on "The Inscrutability of History," opined that "the conception of the United States as an Asian power violates the logic of our own history."[1]

As far as I can discover, the comparative unimportance of Southeast Asia has been simply asserted rather than demonstrated in any detail. This is surprising, for there is a prima facie case for considering the region to be of great strategic and political importance. Over the last two decades, not only the United States but China, Great Britain and France have certainly behaved as if they had very important interests in the region and have entered into major commitments in relation to it. Russia, too, has

[1] A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Bitter Heritage." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, p. 77.

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behaved as if great issues were at stake there. In so far as the British and French interests in the area have declined, they have done so because of a reluctant recognition by those countries of their inability to sustain commitments there, not because of an acceptance of the view that the region is unimportant. Three important secondary powers—India, Japan and Indonesia—whose fates are certainly a matter of great concern to the major powers are adjacent to the region, and their futures can hardly be unaffected by developments in it. Two of the major international crises of this decade have centered on the region. When all this is borne in mind, statements that the area is unimportant in world politics can hardly be accepted as descriptive statements based on the interests actually pursued by the great powers; they seem more concerned with changing than with assessing the importance of the area.

Apart from the assertion that the Southeast Asian mainland is not worth a major American military commitment, a number of arguments have been advanced to show that such a commitment, if entered into, must fail. Although these support the same conclusion, not all of them sit well together. Walter Lippmann, for example, has been concerned with stressing the military disadvantages facing an American presence on the mainland and to bring this out has emphasized the importance of the military strength of communist forces. The mainland should be abandoned because it is "where the masses of Vietnam and China can march against us. . . . The controlling fact about the Chinese and Vietnamese military forces is that they can march but not swim."[2] Others, Hans Morgenthau for example, concerned with establishing not the disadvantages but the inappropriateness of a military response, have played down what Lippmann emphasizes: "The threat here is not primarily military but political. Weak governments and societies are exposed to communist subversion . . . military containment has no bearing upon such a threat."[3] This line of argument has been developed further: not only is a military presence inappropriate but it is counterproductive. It attracts the communist aggression and subversion it is meant to counter, and it weakens and compromises the forces of local nationalism it is meant to sustain.

[2] W. Lippmann, "Should U.S. Withdraw to Australia?" *The Washington Post*, Oct. 22, 1967.
[3] H. J. Morgenthau, "Vietnam and the United States." Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965, p. 57.

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The division between the approach which emphasizes the military aspect of the Chinese Communist threat and that which depreciates it runs deep through the ranks of the critics. It is reflected in the two diametrically opposed conclusions which have been advanced by the more extreme among them in the course of debate: that Southeast Asia must, inevitably, fall under Chinese domination (and that it is therefore futile to try to prevent this from happening); and that the "Chinese threat" is a myth propagated by anti-communists and devoid of substance (and that it is therefore unnecessary to take measures to counter it). In so far as either view is valid, it detracts from the force of the other. If it is a question of "the masses of Vietnam and China" on the march, then a military response is not inappropriate, whatever else it may be; if local social and political conditions are what are decisive, then the spectre of those masses on the march cannot be introduced to establish that a military presence must fight under decisive disadvantages.

Three further observations may be made about the line of argument that a military presence is ineffectual, irrelevant or counter-productive. First, this view seems to be based very largely on the Viet Nam experience and to generalize from that experience. Yet in denouncing the rigidly deterministic version of the domino theory many of those who generalize in this way have been adamant in stressing the uniqueness of each Asian country and the importance of local conditions. They have insisted that what is true of one country need not be true of another. If this is accepted, it is difficult to see why it should not apply in assessing the effects and effectiveness of an American military presence in the various countries as well as in assessing the chances of successful insurrection. Secondly, these views seem to ignore important relevant evidence, in particular that provided by the long-standing British military presence in Malaya and later Malaysia. In retrospect this does not appear to have been ineffectual, irrelevant or counter-productive. Unless it is assumed that an American military presence *must* be different from the British presence in ways which would produce radically different results, this evidence would seem to undermine substantially the line of argument. If such a difference is assumed it should be made clear and elaborated on. Thirdly, some formulations of these views seem to polarize the issues unnecessarily and misleadingly, presenting the issues as if a clear choice must be made between a military response and a

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nonmilitary one. One can accept the view that the struggle is primarily a political one without concluding that a military presence therefore has no bearing upon the threat. The nature of the American military commitment in Viet Nam and the course which events have taken there should not obscure the fact that various kinds of military commitments, combined with various kinds of economic and political initiatives, are possible.

II

The arguments and beliefs so far outlined seem to constitute the case for ending the American commitment to the mainland. How persuasive or unpersuasive one finds them is likely to depend not only on their own force but also on one's assessment of the consequences of withdrawal. What have the critics to say about these? It is possible to discern, at least for purposes of analysis, three distinct viewpoints. There are those, like Lippmann, who accept that withdrawal will mean the domination of the mainland by China, or possibly by China and North Viet Nam. How this conclusion will affect one's attitude to withdrawal is likely to depend on how persuasive one finds the arguments that the fate of the region is of no great importance in terms of international politics, and that in any case Chinese influence must prevail in the long run as a kind of geopolitical necessity. The first of these has already been examined. As to the second, it is open to the same decisive objection as the rigid, deterministic version of the domino theory: it asserts the inevitability of one particular outcome in a situation where there are too many variables to justify doing so.

The more optimistic, who maintain that the independent states of Southeast Asia could survive an American withdrawal, may be divided into those who lay stress on maintaining an international balance of power and those who stress other factors. There are two versions of the balance-of-power thesis. In the first it is maintained that the offshore presence of the United States either in the form of the Seventh Fleet or of an island base or of some combination of the two could maintain a balance. In the second it is maintained that a purely Asian balance of power is possible.

As for the first of these, the American experience in Viet Nam surely speaks decisively against it. If the use of American airpower on a massive scale, with the advantage of land as well as sea bases and in conjunction with land forces, was not decisive there, it is difficult to see how it could be so elsewhere when it would not

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enjoy similar advantages. One cannot simultaneously insist on the ineffectiveness of the bombing of North Viet Nam over the last few years and argue that offshore air power could maintain a balance in the future. Unless, that is, the use of nuclear weapons is envisaged. If one believes that the United States is unlikely to use such weapons in a Southeast Asian conflict, this argument is not convincing; it is similarly unpersuasive if one believes it should not use them.

The case in favor of a purely Asian balance of power has been stated most fully by Alastair Buchan.[4] Buchan explains that what he has in mind is not an integrated military alliance of non-communist states but a diplomatic coalition built around India, Australia and Japan. Its object would not be to deter a full-scale "Hitlerian onslaught" by China against her neighbors (which he thinks unlikely) but to prevent the isolating of individual states and the exploitation of internal strife and of quarrels between states. He points to the advantage of "de-coupling" centers of tension so that a crisis in one of them does not lead immediately to a great-power confrontation. He believes also that China would be more inclined to come to terms with the rest of Asia if such a coalition came into existence and the United States was no longer involved.

Buchan recognizes some of the difficulties facing the implementation of such a concept: the suspicion of Japan among other Asian states, the unpopularity of India, the shortage of investment capital in India and of manpower in Australia. He recognizes the problem posed by the existence of Chinese nuclear weapons and concludes that either Asian countries will have to acquire nuclear weapons or they will want to involve the United States more closely. He prefers the dangers of proliferation to those of an American umbrella.

Two questions pose themselves in relation to the concept of a purely Asian balance of power: Could the necessary coalition be constituted and, if it could, would it do what is claimed for it (*i.e.* stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia)? On the first, an honest appraisal of conditions in Southeast Asia can surely lead only to considerable skepticism. The concept of a balance of power presupposes the existence of stable and effective units which can be organized into alliances and coalitions. The states of this region

[4] Alastair Buchan, "An Asian Balance of Power?" *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, August 1966. See also *Encounter*, December 1966.

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are characterized neither by stability nor effectiveness. Furthermore, as one commentator has pointed out, in assessing the chances of such a coalition coming into existence, "non-material factors like political will" are of overriding importance.[5] The will for decisive action, action requiring steadfastness of purpose over a long period and the willingness to forego short-term advantages, seems conspicuously absent in the proposed members of the coalition. Neither India nor Japan has shown the slightest inclination to play the role allotted to it, and the current Australian attitude seems to be that it will act in conjunction with the United States or Britain, but not on its own. A serious attempt to create a united will would be likely to involve the United States even more intimately in the affairs of the region than it is at present, and for a considerable period.

If a coalition were created, one's judgment as to whether it would be a stabilizing factor is likely to depend very much on one's assessment of the consequences, both outside and inside the region, of its members' acquiring the nuclear weapons which Buchan realistically concedes would be necessary in order to create an effective balance to China. To the extent that the prospects of nuclear proliferation appall, the coalition will be unattractive.

We have been examining views which stress the importance of maintaining or constructing a balance of power as a necessary condition for the continuing independence of the non-communist states of Southeast Asia. Some put the emphasis on the other factors; for example, internal stability and order. Those who do so see the threat almost exclusively in terms of subversion and guerrilla uprisings. Dismissing the domino theory as an "artificial nightmare," Lowenthal, for instance, stresses that successful indirect aggression depends on the political weakness of the attacked régime, not merely or principally on the will of the aggressor.[6] Many others have made the same point. Accepting it as true, it is difficult to see what comfort can be drawn from it.

Political weakness is endemic throughout the region. Unstable central governments with only very limited capacities to mobilize support, neglected outer provinces, sharp discontinuities between city and countryside, dissatisfied minorities, institutions with

[5] Coral Bell, "The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents," *Adelphi Papers No. 34* (Institute for Strategic Studies). The whole of this paragraph is indebted to this excellent paper.

[6] R. Lowenthal, "America's Asian Commitment," *Encounter*, October 1965.

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shallow roots, military establishments with a keen interest in politics—these are standard features of most of the countries concerned. Indeed, awareness of these political conditions is a major reason for pessimism. To take a current example, if one believed that the Chinese were "importing revolution" into Northwest India and Burma rather than exploiting the preëxisting grievances of the Nagas, Mizos and Shans, one would probably view the situation less seriously.

Moreover, it is true and relevant, as the case of Viet Nam shows, that political and social conditions are not simply given factors. To a degree, subversive movements can in time create the conditions that favor them—by the assassination of key figures in the rural administration, by disrupting communications between the center and the provinces, by levying taxes and forced recruiting, and by sustained propaganda.

III

Many of the critics put their faith in the emergence of "Titoist" régimes which would resist any encroachments by China. In view of the importance of the policy decisions being advocated, one would expect such a faith to be sustained by a much more searching discussion of the conditions required for the emergence of Titoist régimes than has been evident. As the history of Eastern Europe makes clear, the mere existence of strong nationalist sentiment is not enough. Such a spirit was never absent through the forties and fifties, even within the various communist parties. In fact it was probably stronger there than in the parties of Southeast Asia, several of which—particularly those of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand—have a very strong Chinese component which one would expect to draw them toward Peking rather than away from it.

One condition which one might assume was conducive, if not essential, to the emergence of a Titoist régime is the presence of two major and competing powers between which the potential Titoist can manœuvre with some freedom. If this is so, then the chances of Titoism may be much better if the United States maintains an effective presence, which means a military presence. It would be ironical if the possibility of Titoism were used to justify a course of action which would itself seriously diminish that possibility.

One further point about Titoism is worth making. In the con-

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text of international politics the term implies two characteristics: independence and nonaggression. While these two have gone together in the case of Jugoslavia, there is no reason to assume that they must always go together, that an independent communist state in Southeast Asia will, by definition, be nonaggressive and non-threatening. If the behavior of the North Vietnamese régime is any indication—in Laos as well as South Viet Nam—there is little cause for regarding the emergence of Titoist régimes as an occasion for relaxation and good cheer; and if the PKI had succeeded in Indonesia in 1965, there is little reason to suppose that it would have been a docile, peaceful régime, whatever its relations with China.

It is clear that certain assumptions about the nature of China's foreign policy play a key role in one's view of the post-Viet Nam situation in Southeast Asia. There seems to be substantial agreement among critics of U.S. policy that China's ideological stance does not have much operational significance; that, in the words of one of them, "the basic direction of her policies is determined primarily by her traditional national interests, and that communism only adds a new dynamic dimension to the means by which the policies are to be achieved."[7] That is, ideology is conceived more as an instrument than a determinant of policy. This view is also likely to lead to the conclusion that China is a regional power with limited ambitions, rather than the world power she claims to be. There is agreement, too, that the régime is rather cautious ("innately cautious" in Buchan's view) and is prepared to settle for half a cake or less rather than to insist on outright domination of Southeast Asia. Its motivation is taken to stem largely from fear and hatred of America rather than from a positive drive toward expansion or imperialistic ambitions.[8] And there is considerable confidence that she will restrict herself to indirect methods, to subversion and support for national liberation movements, apparently regardless of how the situation changes.

I think it is fair to say that under the pressure of debate there has been a tendency for views of China's foreign policy to polarize —for ideology to be seen as all important or to be regarded as mere window dressing; for her to be seen either as implacably adventurist or innately cautious.

[7] Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[8] See, for example, Schlesinger's eloquent paragraph on "the view from Peking," *op. cit.*, p. 36–37.

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As far as the importance of ideology is concerned, it is notoriously difficult to establish criteria which would indicate conclusively what role it does play. One interesting piece of evidence supporting the view that its role is an important one may have been provided inadvertently by Professor C. P. Fitzgerald in an article which, ironically, was concerned with establishing the continuity between traditional Chinese policy and the policy of the present régime.[9] According to Fitzgerald, one of the central principles of traditional policy was contained in "the axiom that it is unwise and very dangerous to quarrel at the same time with the Power which dominates the northern borderlands and the Power which rules the Pacific Ocean." It was an important part of his thesis that this was accepted by the present régime: "It has been evident from the early years of the Communist regime that the first great reality, the geographical facts of China's long land frontier and long exposed coastline, has been clearly understood by the new government. Russia controls the north of Asia; the United States, succeeding Japan, controls the western Pacific. China should not quarrel with both at once." Unfortunately for this thesis, at about the time the article was published, the Communist Government of China, already bitterly in conflict with the United States, was deliberately pushing its differences with the Soviet Union to the point of an open and probably irrevocable breach. That is, if Fitzgerald was right about traditional Chinese foreign policy, it was acting in a way which was inexplicable and indefensible in terms of traditional policy and interests, but which *was* understandable if China was regarded as a communist state for whose decision-makers ideological factors were extremely important.

Important does not mean all-important or consistently crucial. The relationship between ideology and policy is not fixed, and surely the degree of caution or boldness, which may seem "innate," will change with circumstance. How boldly or cautiously a régime behaves is likely to depend on how it calculates the rewards and dangers of boldness.

If this is true, it seems unwise to base one's expectations of how China will behave in a Southeast Asia from which the United States is absent on how she has behaved when the American presence was very real. If the Chinese régime has avoided frontal at-

[9] C. P. Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations," *The World Today*, January 1963, p. 9, 12.

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tacks, contenting itself with stimulating and aiding local guerrilla movements, may this not be due to a healthy awareness of the danger of acting otherwise rather than to innate propensities or the persistence of traditional styles of behavior? The argument that the indirectness of China's strategy is dictated by ideology has some force, but it is not an argument available to those who deny the importance of ideology.

While some are sanguine because they are convinced that China has little desire to expand southward, others base their optimism on the alleged military incapacity of the Chinese. It is ironic that as Chinese military power has increased the respect paid to it by Western commentators has tended to diminish. Ten years ago it was usual to exaggerate its significance; now it might well be that it is taken too lightly. Much of the argument seems to depend on the logistic difficulties which would face a Chinese move south. If, however, one remembers the success of the Japanese in moving through the region in World War II, of the North Vietnamese in the present war, and of the Chinese themselves in the incredibly difficult terrain of Tibet and on the Sino-Indian border, these difficulties may appear less decisive—especially in circumstances in which the military opposition would be for the most part negligible.

This article has concentrated on a critical examination of the views of those who advocate ending the American commitment on the Southeast Asian mainland. It has not attempted to put forward the positive case for continuing the commitment. Even without bringing this into the reckoning, however, the case for complete withdrawal does not appear strong. Many of the arguments are little more than unsupported assertions; others do not necessarily support the conclusion that withdrawal is wise. As in other areas of the Viet Nam debate, the momentum of the argument itself has tended to polarize the issues and therefore to diminish the options considered. Between another "Viet Nam commitment" and total withdrawal there are many possibilities. The time has come to focus attention on these.

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FORCE AND COUNTERFORCE IN EASTERN EUROPE

By James H. Billington

ASTONISHING events in Czechoslovakia were only the latest in a series of changes in the communist world that took the outside world by surprise. The thaw and Hungarian rebellion of 1956, China's break with the Soviet Union and immersion in internal convulsion, and even the rejection of Russian control in Rumania—all were largely unforeseen (with only a few exceptions) even by expert opinion in the West. Like military planners who prepare for the last war, commentators on communist affairs in their preoccupation with accounting for the last surprise have often left the public unprepared for the next one. The concept of monolithic totalitarianism, based on parallels between Hitler and the later Stalin, ill prepared us to expect rebellion in Hungary; preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet split (which was only belatedly thought to be important, and then rapidly promoted into being the controlling factor in the divided communist world of the sixties) distracted us from any expectation of liberal deviation in Czechoslovakia.

There are many reasons for our continuing failure of perception besides simple unfamiliarity (too often disguised and in high places) with either Eastern cultures or communist politics. But two enduring intellectual prejudices are worth pointing out: the tendency to look for political factions rather than underlying forces to explain events; and to make short-term predictions of what national leaders will do rather than seek a strategic perspective on where they stand or an inner understanding of who they are.

Preoccupation with short-term political analysis has been particularly marked in the study of Eastern Europe; but recent events there have demonstrated the inadequacy of many of the familiar guides to factionalism—such as the simple juxtaposition between "Stalinist" and "reformist." Both the bête noire of the Czech reformers, deposed Premier Novotný, and one of their principal foreign foes, Polish Premier Gomulka, have been basically Khrushchevian "reformers," while the Rumanian party, which supported Dubček, has been among the purest creations of the Stalin era and a most faithful guardian internally of "Stalin-

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ist" emphases on heavy industry and police discipline. Nor is there much validity in the once-useful equations: training in Moscow equals subservience to Moscow; or a partisan background means an inclination toward independence. Dubček was Moscow-trained, while Gomulka and a number of other East European opponents were "nativists," many with partisan experience. Attempts to identify pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions have always been largely beside the point. There are probably more convinced Maoists among the *people* of Western than of Eastern Europe. A Rumanian critique of Soviet action against China—like a Chinese critique of Soviet action against Czechoslovakia—is largely a ploy in dealing with the Soviet leaders. The idiosyncratic Albanian alliance with Maoism is a tactic for survival against Jugoslavia after that country's partial rapprochement with the U.S.S.R.

As a preliminary to some needed fresh thinking about Eastern Europe, it might be useful to consider (1) the controlling *forms* of power conflict in the area, and (2) the underlying *forces* at work on the political process there.

II

Since communist Eastern Europe is recognized by the West to be a Soviet sphere of influence and since Soviet physical power in the area remains overwhelming, one must look first to the U.S.S.R. to determine how long-quiescent client states on its borders, like Rumania and Czechoslovakia, were able to mount their remarkable recent moves toward independence. There are, of course, interesting parallels with the concurrent inability of the other superpower, the United States, to translate preponderant physical power into effective political pressure. But there is a special series of problems that has arisen throughout communist Eastern Europe as a result of radical changes in the political position of the U.S.S.R. since the mid-fifties.

Briefly (and necessarily somewhat overstated and oversimplified), the Soviet Union has moved (1) from being the recognized leader of revolutionary forces in an essentially bipolar world to being a centrist and increasingly traditional great power in a world with many new power centers; and, at the same time, (2) from one-man dictatorship within the U.S.S.R. and direct control over foreign communist clients to rule by committee at home and through consultative bodies abroad.

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(1) How is the U.S.S.R. a centrist power in world affairs? It has, first of all, returned again to its old fear of simultaneously facing enemies in both East and West. In his historical subconscious, every Russian knows that the only time Russia fell apart politically (the descent into the 200-year "appanage" period in the thirteenth century) was when the Teutonic knights and the Mongol hordes assaulted simultaneously. He remembers that even a generation ago Russia might not have survived had the Japanese (who had brought disaster and revolution to Russia in 1904–05) joined the Germans (who had brought a second wave of the same in 1914–18) in simultaneous assaults on Russia during World War II. In ways that foreigners can hardly appreciate, Russians fear the threats they see developing simultaneously from an ideologically resurgent China and an economically resurgent Western Europe—both regions confronting Russia with a cultural self-confidence which she envies and potential population pressure that she fears.

Ideologically, the long use of Leninist language for perpetual political rationalization has created an addiction to the *chiaroscuro* technique of using darkened "left" and "right" deviation to set off the contours of their own changing party line in pure and unmistakable white. The Soviet leaders' self-image has always been one of steering the true course between left adventurism (or dogmatism) and right opportunism (or revisionism). This centrist image now offers a new kind of psychological consolation at a time when passionate commitment as well as inner integrity have vanished from ideology. The image has also derived some plausibility from the relative stability of Soviet society, which has enjoyed an unprecedented quarter-century free from foreign war or internal convulsion.

Its leaders may now see their country as a kind of fulcrum supporting an increasingly teetering international seesaw. On one side are the forces of revolutionary change (China, Cuba and the unpredictable revolutionary extremists in both underdeveloped areas and overdeveloped universities) with whom they share rhetorical and historical links as well as many common enemies. On the other side stand the United States and its allies, with whom they share an increasing similarity of practical concerns, growing common interests and a greater sense of ethnic and cultural identity. Nevertheless, both China and the United States seem to represent too much social change and internal

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violence for a nation whose aging, conservative leaders have seen more than enough of both.

(2) Most important for Eastern Europe is the way in which the U.S.S.R. has become a centrist power within its own area of control. By its inertial drift into committee rule at home and coordinating councils abroad, the current Soviet leadership has in many ways become the object of conflicting pressures within its own sphere of influence rather than a center of clear policy delineation. The very determination of Khrushchev's successors to break with his subjectivism and arbitrariness has subtly helped many in the Soviet empire to adopt a new attitude toward the Muscovite center of power. Rather than pliantly reshaping themselves in accordance with unpredictable pressures from the hard dictatorial center, local leaders are now tempted to harden their constituencies in order to become shapers of pressure on the soft oligarchical center.

The ability of local leaders to sustain pressures on the power brokers in Moscow depends on their maintaining a solid front internally. To do so, they must resist the traditional Muscovite tactic of opening up divisions within any force that seeks to exercise discomforting pressures upon the Kremlin.

Thus, in the early sixties, a united (albeit crypto-Stalinist) Rumanian leadership was able to establish an independent position within the bloc that a more independent-minded but less united Hungarian leadership had been unable to sustain five years earlier. Thus, in 1967 and early 1968, a dwindling but purposefully united secret police establishment was able to gain new power and influence first in Russia and then in Poland in defiance of a much larger and ever-growing intellectual community which was, however, unable to coalesce into a united pressure group.

To be sure, pressure for repression probably also came from the secret police and military constituencies within the U.S.S.R.; but some elements of (or impulses within) the Soviet leadership were probably not altogether unhappy to see these pressures being combatted by an historically friendly country within their sphere of influence.

What happened within the Soviet leadership to tip the precarious balance in favor of invasion of Czechoslovakia may never be known—and can hardly be assessed on the basis of scattered reports soon after the invasion. But the drastic, unprecedented decision to invade without either a credible pretext or a prepared

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political alternative seemed to indicate a sudden collapse of confidence in the leadership's ability to find a middle road between conflicting pressures. Failing to wrest major concessions from the Czechs in peaceful confrontations, the Soviet leaders had lost stature, credibility and—perhaps most important—their own collective self-image as the controlling arbiter of events. Having focused international attention on the confrontation, the Soviet leaders were made to realize that the Czech leaders had simply stolen the spotlighted position. All eyes were now on the Czech effort to steer a course between authoritarian Russian pressure from without and liberalizing popular pressure from within. Soviet power was simply being balanced against popular pressure within Czechoslovakia; and the urge to regain the initiative by applying Soviet force against the countervailing popular force in Czechoslovakia became irresistible. Deprived of their own political role, the Soviet leaders sought simply to cut out their frustrating political rivals; and to move directly against the "objective forces of counterrevolution" which already were apparently counterpoised against Soviet power in the Czech political equation. Vacillating moderates may well have been converted to this course at the eleventh hour through the classical Leninist hope that forceful action would create a situation in which some of the Czech reform program could be taken over and repackaged as Soviet largesse, after killing or humiliating politically those who had granted reforms as concessions to uncontrolled popular pressure.

III

If the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia brought into focus the crisis of centrist, conciliar political rule within the Soviet empire, the Czech experiment that preceded the invasion brought into focus the workings of three trans-national—in some ways even trans-political forces—in Eastern Europe. All of these forces operate within the U.S.S.R. and the other invading powers as well, and help account for the extreme sensitivity of orthodox communist leaders to the Czech evolution. They also resemble and at times interact with forces at work in Western Europe and even the United States. Having arisen in a decade of relative peace, increasing boredom and suddenly rising expectations, these forces are not clearly encapsulated in organizations and parties; they spread more by contagion than by conspiracy or conscious de-

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sign; and, for these reasons, they are as hard for the outside observer to chart as they must be for a politician within to control, canalize or combat. But they were all involved in helping create a new political climate in Czechoslovakia before the Soviet invasion and they remain the stuff out of which the new politics of Eastern Europe will have to be forged.

These forces can be roughly categorized as psychological, economic and philosophical; more concretely, they can be defined as the rebirth of nationalism, the drive for economic efficiency and the search for new ideals; or stated in simpler, universal terms, they represent a new determination *to be* someone, *to have* something more, *to believe* in something higher.

The foremost force for change in Eastern Europe is the striking revival of nationalism, even within countries subject to traditional internal divisions such as Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia. Communists have been underestimating the appeal of nationalism ever since Marx wrote in his "Communist Manifesto" on the eve of the passionately nationalistic revolutions of 1848, that "the working men have no country . . . national differences and antagonisms between people are daily more and more vanishing."

Nationalism is not a fixed ideology, but a psychological compulsion that is compatible with a variety of different policies and approaches. What is common to nationalism in Eastern Europe—and in some of the more neglected sections of Western Europe as well—is a shared feeling of having been treated as semi-colonial, faintly inferior and—worst of all—historically irrelevant second-class Europeans. Like the advocates of Black Power who argue that a period of separate identity and development is a prerequisite to full and dignified participation in the broader community, each East European country is anxious to exercise full self-determination for a time, in order to feel fully able to participate in the broader European community. There is no definite pattern for achieving this sense of having become somebody, but in recent years the Albanians, Rumanians and Czechs have each experienced this awakening under differing banners.

Interestingly enough, the struggle to achieve national identity in asserting past tradition and present independence seems in many ways just as strong in the Soviet Union as it is in the small East European states. Having lost their prized role as the vanguard of a world revolutionary movement, Soviet leaders have

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tried to establish a kind of national identity in outer space; and now, in this period between the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1967 and the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth in 1970, they are lifting the veneration of Lenin to almost trinitarian proportions.

There is a near-universal search for national identity throughout Eastern Europe. After nearly twenty years of Soviet-enforced uniformity, people are discovering traditions in their pasts as different as the economic resources they possess in the present. The Czechs have rediscovered Masaryk and a national democratic tradition; the Poles, on the other hand, have in a sense rediscovered Pilsudski and the tradition of romantic authoritarian dictatorship. Thus, the tendency to turn back to national tradition for sources of fresh inspiration can lead to a new conservatism rather than to the Czech example of liberalism. The Czech tradition of liberal democracy was an exception rather than a representative example prior to World War II. The outlines of a new reactionary nationalism can be seen in the revival of anti-Semitic appeals in the anti-Czech propaganda of Poland and East Germany; and more subtly in the xenophobic anti-intellectualism recently cultivated by Soviet and Bulgarian youth leaders, partly as an antidote to youthful admiration of the West. At the ninth congress of the Bulgarian Party late in 1967, the first party secretary, Todor Zhivkov (who two years earlier had faced an unprecedented attempt at a military coup within his country), expounded a crudely nationalist set of "theses on youth." He scored the prevalence of "national nihilism" within his party and insisted with a crudeness reminiscent of an earlier era that "admiration for everything foreign . . . must be eradicated with a red-hot iron."

In the long run, the fact that almost every group in Eastern Europe seeks a new sense of dignity and self-respect will probably work against the forces of conservatism and centralized control. There are too many nationalities for total control to be exercised by any one. Nationality tensions encouraged some federative decentralization and liberalization in two of the three multinational states of Eastern Europe—Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The situation of the last and mightiest of the multinational empires, the U.S.S.R., is of course far different in view of the numerical preponderance of Great Russians and much older traditions of Russian imperial hegemony. Nevertheless, sympathy with the Czech experiment among Ukrainians and the quiet re-

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surgence of the desires of many minority peoples for distinct self-generated patterns of development may have been a factor in inducing Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The present Soviet policy of token concessions will probably prove increasingly unacceptable to many ethnic and national constituencies throughout Eastern Europe as they are exposed to increased communication and rising expectations.

Another striking fact of life throughout Eastern Europe is the growing popular demand for consumer gratification and economic efficiency. The demand for what Khrushchev called "goulash communism" is partly the result of the decline of ideological ardor within the Soviet communist empire and of less tense relations with the West. The new, more pragmatic and anti-ideological attitude toward economic problems is also, however, partly the unintended result of Stalinist policies. For the massive imposition of forced-draft industrialization on Eastern Europe and of a new, technological education has produced a no-nonsense technocratic mentality among a group that might be called the efficiency-seeking intelligentsia.

Count Henri de Saint-Simon, who fought in the American Revolution and became in the early nineteenth century the first utopian visionary of the industrial revolution, believed that the beaver rather than the lion should be the king of the beasts for the future technocratic society; and that the only class division would be between the *oisifs* (the lazy and parasitic soldiers, priests and politicians left over from outmoded controversies) and the *industriels*, by which he meant those who were both industrious and committed to industrialization.

Under their new leadership, the Czechs were the beavers and *industriels* par excellence of the communist world. They are not a dramatic people, but a deeply industrious one who watched their advanced industrial state slowly run into the ground over a period of twenty years by one of the most parasitic and *oisif* of all communist bureaucracies. The Czech experiment began with the sweeping economic reform of 1967; and the high intelligence and comprehensive thinking of the leading Czech reformers clearly raised throughout Eastern Europe as many hopes among innovators as it raised fears among entrenched party bureaucrats concerning their own technological irrelevance.

In the long run, one may perhaps harbor doubts about the liberalizing effect of the desire for more goods and more eco-

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nomic efficiency. But for the immediate future in Eastern Europe, the rise of an efficiency-seeking intelligentsia remains one of the most hopeful agents of change. This is, in many ways, the anti-ideology of the first postwar, post-ideological generation. It is probably not accidental that the two most politically restive as well as economically ambitious East European states in early 1968, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, were the only two communist states in the world led by men in their forties. Nor is it beyond hope that the U.S.S.R., which was immersed in mass technological education two decades earlier than most East European states, may well have the deepest thirst of all for shedding remote goals and doctrinaire planning methods.

A final force at work in Eastern Europe which transcends not only national but continental boundaries is the vague longing among young people for a new humanism. Turning sometimes to the young Marx and his early writings on alienation, sometimes to older literary and even religious traditions of Eastern Europe, the student generation has sought to bring fresh poetic ideals to a prosaic age. Student protest in Prague in the fall of 1967 began the chain reaction that led to the establishment of the new régime in Czechoslovakia, and student leadership was at the forefront of both the new journalism and initial passive resistance to the Russian occupation.

Within the student generation one sees more than just an extreme example of the general revolution of rising expectations. There also seems to be a revival of some of the characteristics of the old "truth-seeking intelligentsia" alongside—and at times in conflict with—the aspirations of the efficiency-seeking intelligentsia. The longing for a new spiritual freedom (rather than a new efficiency in material production) is an infectious enthusiasm of young people in the overdeveloped world generally, and moves easily from nation to nation in Eastern Europe. An important catalyst in the Czech ferment was the dramatic decision of the Czech Writers' Union to read and publicly endorse the appeal for repeal of censorship that the Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn had addressed in vain to the Soviet Writers' Union. The reaction to the Czechs' action critically escalated when the once liberal Polish leadership was panicked into an anti-intellectual pogrom by the sight of Polish students striking and demonstrating in support of the Czechs.

If the ferment of youth is unpredictable in its short-term po-

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litical consequences, its long-term effect will almost certainly be to erode if not erase the authoritarian features of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe. Lenin claimed that the future belonged to those with youth on their side; and this is the group most profoundly alienated from official ideals. It is probably not accidental that a principal bastion of reaction in the Soviet Union in recent years has been the former leaders of the massive but moribund Young Communist League—Shelepin and Semichastny—who then "graduated" into leading positions in the secret police. The ability of such men to increase their power in recent years serves as testimony to the possibility that the long term may be a long time in coming; that every revolution of rising expectations produces what might be called a counterrevolution of increasing resistance. The simultaneous existence of youthful rebels in the West, moreover, serves to remind one that the disquieting impact of this new and unpredictable force—and indeed of the other two —will not be confined to Eastern Europe in the years ahead.

A final force that will affect all the others in Eastern Europe will be the policies of the West itself, which needs to broaden its range of perceptions if it is to respond creatively to new opportunities. Whatever political problems arise, cultural and economic contacts should be maintained and wherever possible expanded. They will help us keep in touch with underlying forces of change and avoid becoming prisoners of preconceived geopolitical grand designs or mere voyeurs of political intrigue.

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JAPAN LOOKS BACK

By Marius B. Jansen

OCTOBER 23, 1968, is the date on which Japan will mark the Centennial of its modern transformation. On that day one hundred years ago it was announced that the era designation would henceforth be "Meiji," enlightened rule. The régime of the Tokugawa shogun had fallen, but the new forces grouped around the boy emperor were still struggling to assert control; they had to promise and persuade, for they could not force. Yet it was soon clear that the Meiji Restoration was a political overturn whose consequences for Japanese history were incalculable. By the end of the century it was apparent that its significance for world history was scarcely less great.

Despite this, the Meiji Centennial is receiving little commemorative attention in the West—certainly nothing comparable to that which was accorded the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. More striking still is the way its commemoration is surrounded by controversy within Japan. The mass media have not let it be forgotton, and publishers have seized the opportunity to unloose a torrent of publications for the occasion. But important groups of historians have organized to oppose the manner and content of the commemoration. A recent writer goes so far as to bracket the Centennial with Okinawa as two major political issues for 1968. The Restoration seems as political and controversial in 1968 as it was in 1868. Its events and the recollection of those events can tell us a good deal about the historical present in which Japanese live.

In 1868 Japan was disunited, poor and weak, its people compartmentalized in an outworn social structure topped by an hereditary military caste. The country was divided into some 250 domains ruled by *daimyo*, feudal lords who enjoyed degrees of autonomy that varied with the definition of their vassalage to the shogun. The samurai had experienced little challenge during the two and one-half centuries of peace, and their preference for swords over more modern means of destruction gave the military advantage to the few areas that had profited from trade with Western arms dealers after the ports were opened in 1859. It was especially Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa, the great baronies of the southwest, which provided the core of the "imperial troops" ad-

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vancing against the Tokugawa vassals that still resisted in 1868. Recent scholarship makes it clear that developments in the Tokugawa period had done much to prepare for Japan's late nineteenth-century modernization through education, bureaucratic rationalization, urbanization, the development of a central economy, and literary and philosophic preparation for nationalist and scientific thought. But in 1868 there were few signs of the achievements ahead. The old was collapsing, but the new was far from clear.

The future did not inspire very much trust. To many the warfare of 1868 seemed unnecessary and unfair. The Restoration had begun in October 1867 with a request from one of the feudal lords that the shogun resign his powers. When he did so in November in the full expectation that he would be the central figure in the new and more national government, he was confronted with an abrupt demand that he surrender his domains. From January 27, 1868, into 1869 the Tokugawa partisans were defeated in a short civil war. Most daimyo did their best to avoid taking part in it because they saw it as a private fight engineered by the southwestern lords bent on creating a new shogunate.

The shogun's complaints drew sympathetic echo from some of the foreign representatives. A. R. C. Portman, reporting to Secretary of State Seward from Yokohama, saw so little principle and so much treachery involved that he warned in March: "The real sovereign of this country is not the Mikado . . . , neither is it the Tycoon; . . . the ruler is the Spirit of Evil, which appears to be all powerful, and to control every nobleman in this country." With reference to the American Minister's proclamation of neutrality and consequent refusal to deliver the ship *Stonewall,* a naval ram which had been purchased by the shogunate, he went on to warn that "in view of the utter unreliability of the ruling classes in Japan, such terrible engines for mischief as ironclads should never be permitted to get into their possession. . . . The supply of rifles cannot well be stopped . . . that of ironclads, I sincerely hope, may not be a difficult matter, as they can only be built in the United States, England, and France." The American Minister, R. B. van Valkenburgh, predicted that the shogun was likely to be reappointed as first minister. He wrote in May that "a Government in Japan under any other than the Mikado as chief is now an impossibility, and it is almost equally certain that the chief of the Tokugawa clan will remain the most powerful personage in

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this Empire." But he was unable to account for the shogun's failure to resist his enemies. He confessed himself hampered by the fact that "it is next to impossible to find out with positive certainty what is actually going on in this country;" and described a report that the shogun would accompany the emperor into Tokyo as "very doubtful, though not in the least improbable."

In retrospect the astonishing thing about the months of 1868 is that so much stability was maintained. Daimyo remained in control, and taxes continued to be collected. The principal Tokugawa families never really contested the issue. The shogun foreshadowed this in a document he addressed to the foreign representatives in January: "As to who is the sovereign of Japan," he admitted, "it is a question on which no one in Japan can entertain a doubt. The Mikado is the Sovereign." But a second reason for stability is that most Japanese were not very much concerned with what was going on. This left those who were, free to concentrate on each other and on the foreigners. Van Valkenburgh's descriptions of Tokyo stressed the perfect domestic order that prevailed even during periods of substantial evacuation when fighting loomed. He reported the feeling against the imperial troops as "intense. Yet there appeared to be a power somewhere to control it, as there was no outbreak of any kind." In June he wrote that the troops "levy in the name of the Mikado contributions on the people for their substance, and these requisitions are promptly met. In other respects they remain isolated and exercise no authority whatever." But most of all he stressed the "indifference" of the townsmen.

Indifference did not rule out respect, or even awe. A fine example of this in verbal and graphic imagery is found in the emperor's entry into Tokyo in November 1868. The shogun's capital of Edo had been renamed on September 3, and the emperor's journey (an act of some courage in the confusion of the time) began November 4. The progress and appearance of the procession, which included some three thousand men, are familiar from the famous print which shows the phoenix-topped palanquin being carried across Kyōbashi by a swarm of yellow-robed bearers. Formally gowned horsemen precede and follow it, and in the van are large numbers of strangely dressed, rifle-bearing soldiers. The *Japan Times* reporter described the way the great palanquin was carried on a frame that raised it a full six feet above the ground. Its sixty bearers,

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all dressed in bright yellow silk, wore a curious ornament of feathers at each ear eight inches in diameter, like two outspread fan frames placed together . . . the effect of the group, with the brilliant sun lighting up the sheen of the silk and the glitter of the lacquer, was very gorgeous and indescribably strange, comparable to nothing ever seen in any other part of the world. . . . [As the palanquin approached] a great silence fell upon the people. Far as the eye could see on either side, the roadsides were densely packed with the crouching populace. . . . As the phoenix car . . . with its halo of glittering attendants came on . . . the people without order or signal turned their faces to the earth . . . no man moved or spoke for a space, and all seemed to hold their breath for very awe, as the mysterious presence, on whom few are privileged to look and live, was passing by.

It will be granted that this is not the stuff of which modern revolutions are made. No Lexington, no Bastille, no Lenin; only silence. But for those who led, the needed dynamic and reminder of the urgency of it all had come two days before, when the procession passed through Kanagawa. For a hundred yards or so covered stands had been erected there for the Yokohama foreigners so that they could watch in comfort. A foreign correspondent of that day reported that "it was something wonderful, that crouching crowd from whom not a sound was heard . . . and the more striking, as contrasting with the hum and laughter all along the line of foreigners . . . who expressed their disappointment in strong language. Many questioned whether in fact His Majesty was there at all. Secondly, the whole turnout represented such a miserable aspect." He thought that the guns were old and the horses poor; what drew awe from the Japanese brought derision from the foreigners.

Restoration documents and proclamations are full of language emphasizing the need to avoid shame and win respect. It was just such weakness and derision that proved the need for reform. And indeed nothing happened in quite the same way again. The emperor returned to Kyoto and came back to Edo the following year, but without the same fanfare. Such trappings were soon among the "uncivilized customs of former times" that had to be abolished. Eight years later, when a Korean embassy came to Tokyo with comparable pomp and dignity, another reporter wrote that the Tokyo crowd "laughed immoderately" at the very things that were meant to be most impressive. In a sense, the Japanese moved over into the covered stands they had put up for the foreigners.

The Restoration fits few conventional categories of social

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change. Like the peasant whom the educator Fukuzawa had to threaten with a thrashing before he would remount his horse in the presence of a samurai, the masses often had to be cajoled, promised and threatened into the patterns of behavior and participation which the modern state required. At numerous points archaic symbolism was used to sanction sweeping innovation. This applies even to the selection of the era name, for the characters "Meiji" were selected in a Shinto ceremony that combined mystery and majesty to promise modernity. Throughout, the Meiji leaders realized that it was easier to sell a new idea by describing it as an old one.

Already in March 1868, an announcement had pointed to the diplomatic intercourse with China in antiquity as offering a precedent for the international society that lay ahead. At that time navigation was not highly advanced, so that "our intercourse was restricted to Korea, China, and other adjacent countries." But now it becomes necessary "to adopt such measures as the ancient constitution of the Empire and the public law of the world may jointly suggest." In April the famous Charter Oath was phrased with the same sweeping and skillful generality. It would, in fact, be used again to provide support for the changes that followed World War II. Its promises of "public councils," of "all classes" fulfilling "just aspirations," of abolishing "uncivilized customs" of "former times," and of seeking knowledge "throughout the world" portended both tradition and change, for this was all to the end that the "foundations of the Empire" might be made firm.

At first these promises were issued chiefly to reassure. But they remained as an outline for a program of modernization that remade Japan. Within a short time it proved that the "uncivilized customs" of the past included the divisions of feudalism which had proved unworkable in the face of Western imperialism. Foreign policy decisions required a single administrative center. The daimyo, who were burdened with debts, were let down by degrees until they found themselves rewarded with government bonds and eligible for a modern peerage.

With the end of decentralization came an end to feudal society, and the "just aspirations" that had been promised in the Charter Oath became more inclusive than most had foreseen at the time. If samurai were no longer to rule the land, it made no sense to support them in idleness. Their privileges disappeared; they were

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first permitted, and then ordered, to give up their swords. Their incomes, already modest, were changed to pensions and then to bonds. Farmers were given freedom of cultivation, of occupancy, of sale and of residence. They received the dignity of family names. Merchants lost their legal and social disadvantages. And within a half decade measures calling for universal education and military service made it certain that the commoners would never again be as indifferent to the political structure of their society as they had been in 1868. Local assemblies led to national; in 1890 a constitutional structure was implemented to permit a slow but steady increase in representation and participation.

The Meiji leaders worked carefully to develop national goals of industrialization and economic growth, and their papers reflect their determination to affect and channel economic development through industrialization. They were not easily discouraged. Kume, the official chronicler of a mission that sought "wisdom throughout the world" (1871–73), learned from his travels that Europe's modernization was of fairly recent date. "If," he wrote, "you compare the Europe of today with the Europe of 40 years ago, you can imagine how great the changes are; then there were no trains, no steamers, no telegraph; small boats were pulled along the roads; soldiers using brass cannon and breach-loading muskets fought at close range. . . ." Japan was not so far behind; it could still catch up. And so the same embassy divided its complement of nearly forty top-level government leaders into specialist teams to survey Western patterns and institutions.

This embassy is worth a further glance, for in broad terms it is the political basis for the economic growth that now impresses us. Stability was central to the Meiji story. Despite changes in the leadership group, most of whom were from Satsuma and Choshu, their continuity of purpose and policy was impressive. The Iwakura Mission left home only three years after the Meiji Restoration, and it was abroad almost a year and a half during a period of strong disagreements about foreign and domestic policy; yet the members of the mission returned home to find their jobs waiting for them. The importance of the non-political emperor above and the non-political commoners below was very great, but this sustained ability to work together was perhaps most important of all. At no point in Japan's modern century have the taxes stopped being collected; has the administrative structure come close to collapse; or a substantial portion of the community or

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country withdrawn the consent that is required for forward motion.

The Meiji revolution thus came after the Meiji Restoration. It was guided, and popular participation was initially limited. But there was steady growth in response to the themes and slogans that official and unofficial leaders set for their countrymen. For it was impossible to "Establish a Rich and Strong Country!" without the diffusion of "Civilization and Enlightenment!" and a zeal to "Make Something of Yourself!" Samuel Smiles' "Self Help," first translated in 1871, became a best seller, and his examples of poor boys who overcame adversity and converted it to fortune were full of relevance to national as well as personal needs. Indeed the first political party, formed in 1874, called itself the "Self-Help Society." Without a dynamic and increasingly large-scale response the Meiji story would have been a very different one.

All this made of Japan a modern nation, one in line with the egalitarian trends of the nineteenth century and the modern world. A quarter-century later the diplomatic and political rewards came into sight. Treaty equality with the West, victory over China and Russia, and alliance with Great Britain; by the end of the Meiji Period in 1912 Japan was one of the world's great powers, the envy of some of her neighbors and the master of others.

There is understandable pride of achievement in the centennial statement that was drawn up by a committee of leading Japanese convened by Prime Minister Satō. It points to the Meiji change as a period of achievement without parallel in world history. The very speed of Japan's recovery from the war, it continues, testifies to the soundness of the work. This generation is under obligation to take up this heritage and challenge. Japan has now completed its work of catching up with the West, and is looked to for leadership and help by its neighbors. And, in view of the disruption that the development of material culture has caused in the relationship between man and nature, it would not be inappropriate to call for a reappraisal of East Asian and Japanese values. In short, the wheel has come full circle. Japan can contribute as well as benefit, and the "search throughout the world" for wisdom of a century ago gives way to a "youth ship," fitted out to sail to Southeast Asia to symbolize friendship and international coöperation.

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II

The gratification of the centennial celebrants is matched in volume and exceeded in intensity by those who write in opposition. Associations of historians and educators have formed a coalition to oppose the manner and content of the centennial. One might expect professional historians to take a jaundiced look at official history, but the nature of the Tokyo dissent is interesting because of what it shows about contemporary Japan; for it is charged that bad history is being put at the service of bad politics.

Many objections focus on the treatment the Meiji emperor is receiving, and charge that this is purposeful. The Meiji emperor is in fact making up for the neglect he has endured in the last quarter-century of historical writing. He will be the subject of a thirteen-volume biographical account compiled in the Imperial Household Ministry; he will be immortalized in bronze, dwarfed by memorial halls and museums, and his memory, indeed all Japan, will be forever green in Meiji parks and forests. The protesting historians think they see the phoenix palanquin being carried into the city once again, past a multitude whose heads bend low, this time not to the ground in awe but to their television screens in unconcern.

Whatever the difficulties in finding alternate heroes, it has to be granted that there is little justification for giving the Meiji emperor a personal role in the formative decades of his reign. To do so is to ignore the way in which the Meiji leaders engaged in emperor-building as well as in nation-building. For the emperor had to be explained and sold to the masses by the élite in nineteenth-century Japan. Thus *Yomiuri* instructed its readers in these terms in 1881:

> Tomorrow, the third, is Tencho setsu. Tencho setsu is the birthday of Japan's emperor, his majesty Mutsuhito. Formerly the shogun ruled our country, but now it is different. Tenchi Sama himself rules. People born in Japan must extend their greetings and everybody must be joyous, for it is a great holiday. . . . There are a good many people who do not know the name of Tenchi Sama. But to be born in this country and not to know it is like not knowing your parents' age. This is unforgiveable. It must be carefully remembered. . . .

It required effort to acquaint the commoners with their emperor's virtues, and it was the task of the modern education system to diffuse this throughout the populace. One result of this was that the twentieth century saw the emperor receive a much more

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structured worship than the breathless adoration that crowds had given him in 1868.

But the historians' complaints go well beyond this. They point out that centennial statements and ceremonies focus on early Meiji, when not a great deal had been achieved, and that they ignore the uses to which modernization was put when it did begin to take effect—that mass education was used for emperor worship, industrialization for armaments, and national power for imperialism. They note also that the official statements say almost nothing about Japan's democratization since World War II, and conclude that plans are afoot to undo as much of this as possible. Anything that stresses only the "plus" factors of this century's experience, they argue, will contribute to a new orthodoxy as misleading as was the prewar praise of famous men and emperors. Today's distortions are tomorrow's dangers.

In its most extreme forms the argument goes farther still. The centennial effort to boost national pride, it is charged, is a transparently political effort on the part of the Satō cabinet to get Japan ready to play its part in a scheme of world politics developed by Mr. Satō's American backers. And the opposition group warns that the foreign praise the centennialists court is actually a trap prepared by American intellectuals with their fashionable concept of modernization. The whole point is really to "talk up" Japan's accomplishments for 1970, the date the Security Pact with America comes up for reconsideration.

Thus the centennial argument becomes another chapter in the long battle between Japan's intellectual Left and the conservative government. It is a contest that has focused on controls over the school system, on educational authorities' efforts to contain the Japan Teachers Union and on government control over textbooks. A leading historian and author of a popular history text is today battling the Education Ministry in the courts in an argument more than ten years old. Efforts on the part of the Government to encourage patriotism draw fire from the same groups, and because so much of the institutionalization of patriotism was tied in with the mystique of imperial mythology it is usually the historians who lead the opposition. That the protesting organizations are dominated by men who adopt a Marxist framework of analysis encourages both sides in each dispute to resort to extreme statements. Nor, of course, do such controversies come as a setback to publishers' and editors' plans for exploitation of the Cen-

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tennial. The recent resumption of observances of February 11 as National Foundation Day (for the supposed accession of the legendary emperor, Jimmu, in 660 B.C.) climaxed one vigorous battle. The Meiji revival is thus seen by some as part of a much larger scheme of restoration.

It has to be granted that there are groups of whom this is true. The historians' alarm stems in part from the fact that many right-wing organizations, eager to capitalize upon an expected surge of radical action in connection with the Security Pact, are also, for their own counterrevolutionary purposes, pointing to 1970 as a crisis date. Their aim and language are unambiguously revisionist; Japan must revise its postwar Constitution, recover its lost morality and carry out that ill-defined goal of the military extremists of the 1930s, the long-delayed Showa Restoration. Yesterday the restoration of National Foundation Day, today the Meiji Centennial and tomorrow the showdown. And so private schools, institutes, corps and fund drives prepare for the task ahead. The Japan Alliance stresses the importance of "Japanese remaining Japanese," while the Greater East Asian Academy and the Fuji Poetry Society see in the present the opportunity for first a national, and then a world, restoration to get under way, though a full reconstruction program may require thirty years to complete. In the language of some of these statements are traces of the fevered pledges of the Meiji Restoration's anti-foreign loyalists with their talk of reactivating the Japanese spirit and bringing about a rebirth of patriotism and purpose.

All this can serve as a useful reminder that the legacy of the Restoration years was not only progress and enlightenment; there were also intolerance and parochialism. Few of the activists of the Meiji Restoration survived its coming, but many of those who did became ideal ethical types, inspiring the official patriotism of the modern state. They felt deeply and thought simply about the problems of their country, and combined scorn for authority as corrupt and self-seeking with affirmation of the total purity of imperial devotion. They have served as models for political fanatics of many persuasions in more recent Japanese history. Even today, what they stood for has one meaning to rightists indignant over Japan's forsaking of its imperial tradition, and quite another to leftists who lament their government's acceptance of American leadership, somewhat as their forebears complained about the Tokugawa treaties with the Western powers.

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Yet this is an argument about the present and not the past. Considered as a whole, the Meiji Restoration constitutes a significant chapter in the revolution of modern times. Deflected or distorted as it may have been by the urgencies of the situation, influenced as it was by a tradition radically different from those in which the modern revolutions of the West unfolded, and seldom as it was justified in terms of larger human rights or individual dignity, the Meiji revolution nevertheless made possible a radical increase in individual freedom, equality and opportunity within Japan. Herein lies one of its principal paradoxes. It is one that seems to be overlooked by both the centennial planners and their critics.

III

In this journal recently, George Kennan described as one of the principal aspects of the Russian Revolution an altruism of purpose that, he suggested, made it of very broad and universal importance. It is appropriate to ask whether there was in the Meiji Restoration anything of significance and benefit for the world outside Japan. Was all this entirely, as the stock phrase of Meiji times had it, "for the sake of the country," or was there something of importance for all countries?

One must begin with the admission that the Japanese were so obsessed with the danger to their own land that they had little time to worry about others. The fact that the Meiji developments seemed forced upon Japan after a long period of isolation affected their nature and emphases. Meiji Japan began with the conviction that imminent danger threatened from the West, and for decades it retained that belief. At first there was a genuine fear of foreign conquest. Later this gave way to a more reasoned approach in which Japan's danger was seen as less unique; there was therefore much to learn from the experience of others. The Restoration activist, Nakaoka, wrote his friends shortly before the Restoration that he was no longer in favor of immediate expulsion of the foreigners, but favored learning from them first. "Exclusion has been practiced everywhere," he wrote. "When the American people suffered . . . a man named Washington . . . carried out exclusion and drove out the barbarians." Japan should "cross the seas, learn from other peoples, adopt their spiritual unity, master their technology, study their military science and bring about true exclusion."

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Writing shortly after the Restoration, Prince Iwakura shared this gloomy view of the society of nations as a jungle: "We have no choice in having intercourse with countries beyond the seas, but in the final analysis they are our enemies. Why? Because they develop their arts and their technology with a view to growing in wealth and power. Every country tries to become the other's superior."

In view of the urgency of the danger and the silence of the masses that crouched in the dust along the emperor's route, it was probably inevitable that in setting priorities social justice should take second place to international equality. A united effort in the face of pressing foreign danger was the universal desire; it had also been the reason for the shogun's decision against resisting the new régime. This meant that most political controversy would be about means rather than ends, and that the most important criterion of governmental performance would be the way national honor and strength were advanced.

Perhaps the one escape to a less particular and nationalistic Japan lay in the idea of partnership with nearby Asian countries in resistance to Western strength. If not domestic justice, regional coöperation might still have produced some measure of altruism of purpose. A dream of Asian partnership did in fact provide the purpose in life for a number of courageous and idealistic Japanese, and revolutionaries in China particularly owed much to their help. And yet within decades it became a dream to lead and finally to dominate. The Tokyo historians who oppose the Centennial tend to see in this sure evidence of basic structural faults in modern Japanese thought and society.

But it is equally possible to emphasize two other reasons: first, the weakness and disorganization of the régimes in neighboring lands; second, the gradual conviction of Meiji Japanese that it would be necessary to join the West in order to equal it. The Japanese reluctantly concluded that affiliation with Asia would mean association with backwardness and weakness, and that they would risk being permanently handicapped in their unequal contest with the West. Fittingly enough it was Fukuzawa, the apostle of modernity, who called for his countrymen to part with Asia after the Chinese lost a war to France and reformers failed to seize power in Korea. He argued that it was hopeless to wait for Japan's neighbors to modernize. "When judgments of China and Korea are applied to our country," he wrote, "it hurts our foreign

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policy. We do not have time to wait for neighboring countries to develop and then to join them in the revival of Asia. We ought instead to get away from them and join the company of Western, civilized nations. If we keep bad company we will get a bad name." And so association with Asia was put off until Japan had secured its national goals. When diplomatic equality was reached in 1894, Minister to England Aoki exclaimed in jubilation, "With this treaty Japan enters the ranks of civilized countries." The very next year Japan forced from a defeated Manchu empire the diplomatic inequality it accorded other "civilized countries."

But Japanese influence on modern Asia was also profound in more constructive ways. For at least half a century would-be modernizers elsewhere in Asia associated Japan's achievements with their hopes for their own countries. The Chinese revolutionary movement in particular was powerfully affected by the Japanese example, and Japan's victory over Russia brought thousands of Chinese students flooding into Tokyo to make of it the seedbed for the revolution of 1911. Years later Sun Yat-sen remembered how, as he returned to Japan through the Suez Canal in 1905, the people along his path had been excited by the Japanese victory. An Arab, he recalled, asked him, "Are you Japanese?" Even after Sun, who was travelling as Mr. Takano, said he was Chinese, he could see that "the joy of this Arab, as a member of the great Asiatic race, seemed to know no bounds." Japan became, by example, a factor in change elsewhere, and the Meiji Restoration found echo in the modern Asian revolution. Soon the Japanese image became marred by selfish and shortsighted interest. Yet the Japanese example contributed to freedom, nationalism and modernization throughout East Asia despite the best efforts of the Japanese to limit and control that response in the areas subject to their control. Tokyo leaders never fully comprehended why a response they had helped stir should not be pro-Japanese. This is another of the paradoxes of the Centennial and its significance —and again it is one that seems overlooked by both the planners and their critics.

IV

The debate about the Meiji Centennial is then only partly a debate about Japan's recent past. It is much more a debate about the nature and direction of Japan's present and future. And the argument about the past is really less about the Restoration it-

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self, about 1868, than it is about the Meiji modern state. The Restoration years were a period of relative openness. The structured Tokugawa hierarchy came apart, and Japanese discussed the response their country should take to the modern world with imagination and courage. The Meiji state, on the other hand, which represented the final response to this, was completed in 1890 with the constitution, the educational system, the powerful military establishment and the newly formulated ideology of imperial divinity and national uniqueness.

For many, 1890 cancels out 1868; at the least, it conditions it and links it to 1941. The government spokesmen, and the Japanese Establishment generally, are the least disturbed by this; they are the most willing to emphasize the undeniable contributions and achievements of the modern order, and are understandably anxious to stem the tide of self-criticism and lament that has saddled Japan with an almost paralyzing inability to form a consensus since the war. The authorities move cautiously with the mercurial tides of public opinion, avoiding both extremes, and seem to ask only that Japan rediscover its pride and confidence. The right wing, on the other hand, without any of the institutional or financial support that once made it so potent, represents a constant nuisance but has little real potential. Its nostalgia for a non-capitalist social unity and imperial purity is not accompanied by any practical program for getting there. The men of letters, however, and the Left generally, while they share some of this utopianism and nationalism, remember the pre-surrender state chiefly for its stultifying restrictions and police controls, which are described in ever darker tones for those too young to have experienced them. The one consensus that emerges, in fact, is a determination uniting almost all groups that it shall happen "never again."

Many writers and intellectuals would prefer to see 1945 recognized as the date for the commemoration of a truly modern and democratic Japan. Their opposition to any degree of rearmament, to government control over teachers, schools and textbooks, and to ties with the United States, makes them quick to charge the Government with planning a "return" to the unacceptable. From this perspective the Centennial represents an insidious effort to promote reversion. The Meiji Centennial will and should be commemorated. But the larger argument will be decided by the generation that has had its education since 1945, and which re-

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calls neither a divine nor a defeated monarch. The 23 years since the present order began represent the same time span that brought the Meiji state to its fruition in 1890. There are many lines of comparison that suggest themselves. Japan is infinitely stronger today in organizational and economic power than it was then, and it is a far more diverse and interesting society. Then, as now, there was much alarm about an uncommitted younger generation that took its gains for granted and thought of self over country. There was uneasiness then as well that representative government did not seem to lead to that perfect harmony in which money and party played no role. Then, too, the establishment was alarmed because it saw military and political challenges ahead, and felt the need for united effort.

Other comparisons are even more pointed. In 1890 young Japanese who had no recollection of the crisis of their country in late Tokugawa times were resentful of Japan's second-class standing in international society, tired of the unequal treaties and increasingly suspicious of their leaders. Today, despite the cost advantages of the Security Pact, there are comparable stirrings, discontent and calls for self-assertion and autonomy. In 1890 a few states still served as models, and allegiance to the Western camp was a clear condition for full independence. Today, after the Cultural Revolution and Viet Nam, the model states decline in prestige and influence, and there is a new interest in the nature of a polycentric world that beckons. Fukuzawa could write that it was necessary to "depart from Asia" to secure true independence, but his successors today demand a bridge to Asia as Japan's only hope of freedom.

The fervor, innocence and simplicity of Meiji Japan will not return a second time. In retrospect the past seems contentious, divisive and suspicious. It is almost as though things were reversed; as though the emperor's palanquin, a century later, drew silent respect from the foreigners, while the Japanese crowd provided the hum, laughter and indignation.

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY

By Francis M. Bator

MISS Prism, instructing Cecily Cardew to read her Political Economy, added a warning to omit the chapter on the Fall of the Rupee: "It is somewhat too sensational. Even these metallic problems have their melodramatic side." And so they do; but my story will not do it justice. I believe that the story of international money, and of our own balance of payments, allows no place for villains and little, even, for fools. To be specific: my contention is that the difficulties which we have faced in international finance have not been the result of American wickedness or irresponsibility or foolishness, or, indeed, of the wickedness of mythical short men in Zurich or mystical tall men in Paris.

The standard view, I recognize, is otherwise. It holds that the leading cause of the trouble has been the deficit in our balance of payments: the flow of unwanted deficit dollars into the hands of foreign central banks. There is a school solution: the United States must move promptly to eliminate its deficit. This version makes the U.S. Government if not the villain, at least the heavy.

One suspects that those who hold this view—that we should have done whatever was necessary to eliminate our deficit—are following the example of the man, who, when judging a contest between two singers, thought it necessary to listen only to the first competitor before awarding the prize to the second. The truth is that the international monetary arrangements in force until very recently—before the agreement on Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and before the institution on March 17 of the two-tier system for gold—were almost certain to land the world in hot water irrespective of the behavior of the U.S. payments deficit. Moreover, it is very likely that surgical action by the United States on a scale sufficient to eliminate the deficit would have compounded the trouble. Given the choices open to us during the past few years, the right policy has been, in my judgment, to avoid any such surgery, to live with the deficit, and in the meanwhile work hard to reform what I will call the rules of the game.

One would be foolish to assert that the U.S. Government has done everything just right in its balance-of-payments policy. It

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has not. Some things we did could have been done better. As one example, the original version of the direct-investment program (February 1965) should have had more bite. More to the point, some things that should have been done were not done at all. As everybody knows, there was a powerful domestic as well as an international case for a tax increase to cool off the economy in late 1965 or early 1966. Failing that, the 1968 surcharge certainly should have been put into effect long before it was.

For what it is worth, I think the blame belongs with the Congress. But the point of substance is that even if these necessary things had been done, and the domestic economy kept on an even keel, with quarterly increases in total demand kept to some $13–14 billion (in line with potential output) instead of $20 billion as in the first quarter of 1968; with the wholesale price index behaving more in the way it did between 1961 and 1964 instead of in the way it behaved during the winter of 1965–66 and again during the past several months—that even then, with the domestic economy just right, we would still be suffering a large *underlying* payments deficit. A significant portion of that underlying deficit would be hidden by the costly, if appropriate, temporary measures the Government has adopted since 1961 to keep the visible deficit within tolerable limits: tying of aid, "Buy American" policies, voluntary restraints on direct investment and bank lending, and the like. Still, it is more than likely that a deficit of significant size would have remained on the books. To eliminate that remaining deficit, further severe measures would have been necessary. In my judgment, they would have been a mistake. The remedy would have been more dangerous than the disease.

II

Having half followed the rule of exposition most recently propounded by Mr. Acheson—start off with your conclusions, never mind about protecting your flanks—I must make the case for the central proposition that the primary fault lies not in the dancers but in the music—in the arrangements, the set of rules and practices, that have governed international finance since Bretton Woods. After attempting to explain why these rules and practices spell trouble, I will try to sketch the possible shape of a reformed system and then come back to the choices we have faced in picking a U.S. strategy designed to move the world from here to there while breaking as little crockery as can be managed.

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The elements of the system which, in combination, have given rise to the problem are as follows:

The commitment to fixed exchange rates, with any change in cross-rates between major currencies generally regarded by politicians and financial people both as evidence of failure and as a massive gamble—and, in one critical instance, the case of the dollar, probably unacceptable to most governments.

The practice of holding reserves largely in the form of gold and in dollars and sterling, with gold the only external source of new *net* reserves for the world as a whole.

The U.S. commitment to maintain the price of gold at $35 an ounce.

Why will these conditions, taken together, give trouble?

First: With fixed exchange rates, there is no built-in mechanism of balance-of-payments adjustment such as would avoid persistent deficits and surpluses. In a world subject to rapid changes in technology and in consumer tastes—a world, moreover, in which there are legitimate differences in the domestic economic objectives of countries—deficits and surpluses are bound to arise, and they are not likely to be self-limiting. Correction is likely to require purposeful action by governments.

Second: Except under fortuitous circumstances, when the economics of adjustment seem painless or even enjoyable—perhaps because the steps needed for payments adjustment happen to coincide with the needs of the domestic economy—governments generally regard the need to take action to correct their balance of payments as a painful prospect, whether in terms of their domestic or international politics. Not enough consensus exists on who should do what and when to protect against retaliation a government that imposes economic discomfort on its citizens, or on the citizens of other countries, for balance-of-payments reasons.

Third: Governments tend to regard the prospect of being forced to take action to cure a payments *deficit* as much more unpleasant than the prospect of facing a surplus. There are a lot of reasons; some are sensible in terms of economics, others are not, but still make good sense in domestic or international politics. Underlying all the reasons is the implicit power relationship between deficit and surplus countries. In terms of the choices open to it under the present rules, the deficit country is in much more trouble than the countries with the corresponding surpluses. Reserves can be run down only so long as they are there, while the accumulation

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of reserves knows no limit. Given the presumedly greater cost of having to fix one's deficit—as against the lesser cost of being subjected, while in surplus, to the adjustment actions of others—it is not surprising that governments of the advanced industrial countries are scared to death by the prospect of a persistent deficit, but smug about a persistent surplus. The nightmare of running out of reserves (while being lectured by those in surplus as they happily build up their nest-egg of reserves, rejecting corrective action for themselves)—that nightmare would be enough in itself to make governments subject to deficit-phobia. But it is reinforced by the political bite of the morality play which equates deficits and devaluation with sin, and surpluses with virtue. In terms of the moral scoring system which is in vogue in this business, the proposition that it takes two to dance—as well as danceable music—is generally ignored. The deficit country is invariably regarded as the sinner.

Fourth: Governments do not merely desire to be spared deficits; they wish to hedge against future failure by building up their reserves in some relationship to output and trade. Everyone wants his reserves to grow; everyone wants to be in balance-of-payments surplus. That some are bound to fail is an arithmetic truism, even apart from the deficit bias in the way governments tend to keep their books—unless, that is, the sum of the desired surpluses, worldwide, should be no greater than the increase in the externally provided supply of owned reserves: under pre-SDR rules, the increase in the stock of monetary gold. With consistent accounting practices, and leaving aside errors purely of measurement, if one adds together the surpluses and deficits of all countries one arrives at an algebraic total which will be a surplus figure just equal to the increase in the supply of net reserves, that is, monetary gold. To take an example: if the increase in the stock of monetary gold is just $1 billion in a particular year, and gold is the only source of new net reserves, then the sum total of all the surpluses of all the surplus countries, less the sum total of all deficit countries' deficits, will add up exactly to $1 billion (ignoring inconsistency and statistical error). This is merely a consequence of the definition of surplus and deficit. If, then, governments seek surpluses totaling more than $1 billion, some will fall short.

Fifth: Precise quantitative knowledge of the reserve or balance-of-payments targets of governments is lacking. Even less is

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known about how particular governments, when put to it, would trade off reserves, or protection of the exchange rate, against other goals having to do with employment, growth and the like. But there is powerful circumstantial evidence that, as things are, the balance-of-payments target of all governments taken together—the total desired annual increase in net reserves—is in fact a good deal larger than the overall supply of new monetary gold, even in the absence of any speculative absorption of gold by private hoarders.[1] The balance-of-payments objectives of governments are in the aggregate inconsistent. Everybody wants to be taller than the average. This is not just a matter of exchange rates between currencies being out of kilter. There does not exist any infrequently adjusted set of exchange rates between currencies which would eliminate the excess demand for gold, even in the absence of private speculation, as long as gold is the only source of external net reserves to the world as a whole, the price of gold remains at $35 per ounce, and the U.S. commitment to purchase gold at $35 per ounce makes that price a credible floor.

III

Two questions come to mind. Is it really so? And if so, is it bad? To begin with the second: Why should it be bad that the balance-of-payments goals of governments, taken together, are inconsistent? Is it not good for the soul to have built into the system some competition for reserves? To make a judgment one must look at the likely consequences—will it be a competition in virtue or in sin? What will tend to happen in a world where governments tilt against each other for inconsistent surpluses and extra reserves—some by choice, others because, lacking finance, they have no choice but to try to protect themselves against deficits?

A parable may help. Imagine a world of just two countries, in which the increase in the supply of external reserves is zero. Assume that initially the two countries are in exact payments balance, and that there are no artificial barriers to trade. Last, as-

[1] The arithmetic, though not *by itself* conclusive, is revealing: The annual supply of new gold has been close to $1.4 billion. With industrial demand taking about half, $0.7 billion has been left over for speculators and central banks. If it were all available to central banks, it would constitute about a 1 percent addition to the stock of world reserves. With trade growing at 7 percent, money income growing at about 5–6 percent, real output and income at close to 4 percent, it seems evident that a 1 percent rate of growth in total reserves is likely, as a matter of trend, to result in unsatisfied demand For fuller analysis and evidence, see Chapter 8 in R. N. Cooper, "The Economics of Interdependence." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968, and Willis and Springborn, "The Need for International Reserves," U. S. Treasury Department, 1967.

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sume that, one day—and in the face of growing income, output and trade—each country wakes up to the possibility that it may face periods of heavy deficits and hence decides, in self-defense, to build up its reserves. (Each government has come to accept, as a moral law, that its first obligation is to protect the exchange rate.) What will happen?

Each country will try to jockey itself into a surplus position. It can try to do so by taking restrictive measures at home to slow down the growth of domestic demand, and/or by directly restricting imports, subsidizing exports, closing off its capital market, reducing foreign aid to nonexistent third countries. But whatever each country may do, they cannot *both* succeed in achieving a surplus and building up reserves. On the other hand, and as long as neither throws in the towel, they *can* both succeed in creating progressively severe deflation at home and going thoroughly protectionist. The prospect would be for an open-ended competition in trade and capital controls or deflation or both—a cumulative sequence of beggar thy neighbor tit for tat.

The parable has no natural, self-ordained ending. What is clear is that, over time and most of the time, the "winner" will be the government that is relatively more willing and able to impose and sustain deflation and unemployment at home, or more willing to go protectionist or to impose capital controls. Not merely will it tend over time to gain reserves at the expense of the other country. Far more important, it will win in the sense that its values and preferences will tend to dominate with respect to the rules that govern trade and payments, and/or with respect to the inflation-unemployment trade-off—not merely within its borders, but also in the other country, that is, in the rest of the world. This is, I believe, the really fundamental point; it goes back to the earlier reference to the power relations between deficit and surplus countries. In a fundamental sense, in this kind of world, the country less willing to tolerate unemployment and slack for the sake of balance-of-payments surpluses, or more persistently committed to liberal trade and payments, will have imposed on it the more restrictionist or protectionist preferences of its adversary.

Some will argue that the anti-inflationary discipline built into this sort of situation is desirable. They believe that fiscal and monetary policies are apt anyway to be too loose, that the natural inclination of governments is to let total demand run way ahead

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of potential output, with rapid inflation the result. In this view, if the process of tilting for inconsistent payments surpluses forces governments to compete in restraining demand at home—with the most Calvinist-minded government calling the tune—that is all to the good.

Looking at the economic history of the advanced industrial countries since the recovery after World War II, and contemplating the social and political consequences of stagnation and substantial unemployment, it is not clear to me that the bias in the Atlantic world has been in the direction of too much inflation and not enough slack and unemployment. To be sure, it would have been nice to have less inflation—other things equal. But other things would not have been equal. And I for one would have voted against paying the necessary price in terms of unproduced output, unused capacity, lost real profits and wages and jobless labor. (Admittedly, this is in important part a matter of personal values as well as of one's apprehensions about social and political consequences. Admittedly, also, when it comes to the United States, I have in mind not the last year or so, but the period between 1957 and 1964, during which we lost in unproduced output and in real profits and wages some $34 billion per year, with the overall unemployment rate fluctuating between 5 and 7 percent, and the associated Negro unemployment rate between 9 and 13 percent.[2])

In reality, however, the relative distastefulness of unemployment and lost output, on the one hand, and of inflation on the other can be left on one side. The odds are overwhelming that the principal outcome of a competition in pursuit of irreconcilable payments goals would be a competition not in domestic deflation, but rather in protectionist restrictions on international trade and on capital movements, leading straight to autarky. The likely result is not a world without inflation, but rather a disintegrated, chopped-up world of comprehensive trade and exchange controls —an economic world of jungle warfare.

Some will respond—and this takes us back to my first question above—that events have not in fact gone that way at all. The economic history of the industrial world since the early 1950s shows rapid expansion in income, output, trade and the movement

[2] $34 billion was the average annual gap between actual and potential output during 1957–64, measured at 1967 prices. The total loss during the eight-year period came to some $276 billion. All this is based on a conservative definition of potential output. For a detailed discussion, see any recent *Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers.*

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of capital: the very opposite of my bleak picture. So it does, and for good reason. Until recently, the real world has differed in one enormous respect from the assumptions built into the above model and the parable. The biggest player of the lot, the United States, has simply not played the game according to the above five-step description of the way governments behave. Through most of the postwar period the problem of inconsistency has been masked—and the world spared the damaging effect—because the United States, with the coöperation of the rest of the world, has been prepared not merely to stay out of the competition for reserves, but to play the role of world central bank, pumping out liquidity, letting others satisfy their desires for surpluses and reserves, while at the same time running down its gross reserves and increasing the nation's liquid liabilities.

The system worked precisely because the United States was so long immune to deficit phobia. Until the early 1960s we barely noticed our balance of payments. More recently, while feeling increasing pain, we have nevertheless resisted the temptation and the pressure to take drastic action to move into surplus and build up our own reserves.

The moral is not that we should keep on trying to do in the 1970s what we did in the 1950s: running deficits indefinitely and thereby providing the world with the liquidity it needs. That is not feasible under the present rules.

Economists usually discuss these matters under three headings: adjustment, liquidity and confidence or stability. During the 1950s and the early 1960s the flow of deficit dollars provided, more or less, the liquidity that was needed to lubricate the international economy in the absence of a workable, acceptable mechanism of adjustment. Over time, this very mode of lubrication was bound to give rise to a problem of confidence. The reasons are familiar: The process of providing the rest of the world with reserve assets in the form of dollars involved an increase in U.S. liquid liabilities relative to U.S. liquid assets, notably gold. Eventually, this was bound to raise doubts about our capacity to make good on the commitment to convert dollars into gold for all monetary authorities at the fixed $35 price—the more so because of the free-ride feature of the U.S. commitment, which enabled central banks, when scared, to shift into gold relatively costlessly (at least for short periods) without any risk of a capital loss. In part because $35 was a credible floor, it became an increasingly

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non-credible ceiling, and in this sort of situation non-credibility tends to be self-confirming.

As an aside, one mildly paranoid but not inaccurate way to describe the history is this: without in any way intending it, the United States found itself playing surrogate central bank to the world, doing what banks do: borrowing short and lending long, providing liquid assets for savers abroad and long-term money for investors. Monday through Thursday the world approved. But on Friday it discovered that our liquid liabilities were running ahead of our liquid assets and proceeded, encouraged by our own pronouncements of guilt, to lecture us about living in deficit sin and to threaten us with a run on our gold.[3] This is not a game we can or should be prepared to play much longer; something has to give. What have been and are the choices?

IV

They are of two kinds: choices that have to do with the design of a new reformed system—Bretton Woods Mark II; and choices pertaining to American strategy: how the United States should conduct itself to help move the world from here to there with minimum cost and risk.

Let me first comment on the likely shape of a reformed system, under the three headings: adjustment, liquidity and confidence.

1. Adjustment will prove, very likely, the hardest problem to crack. Yet eventual improvement is vital. There will never be enough liquidity—indeed, there should not be—to void the need for more workable mechanisms for correcting surpluses and deficits. Some of my academic colleagues would argue that adjustment is *the* problem, that the only way to get out of the corner defined by the five-step model is drastically to reduce the *demand* for reserves by building in a quasi-automatic mechanism of adjustment. They have flexible exchange rates in mind.

The central truth about a system of flexible rates, whether fully flexible or managed, is that no one can be certain how it would work in practice when applied widely between major currencies. One can list the standard arguments in favor: all the advantages of letting prices do their job of mediating supply and demand,

[3] The problem has been compounded by the widespread use of the U.S. "liquidity deficit" as a measure of disequilibrium. *No* accounting definition will by itself provide a satisfactory measure. But the liquidity deficit is entirely unsatisfactory. It completely ignores the U.S. role as a financial intermediary and the foreign private demand for growing dollar balances which is a direct consequence of the role of the dollar as the paramount trading currency.

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of clearing markets. Equally, one can cite the arguments against: the double risk of destabilizing speculation and of inhibiting trade and international investment if exchange risks cannot be fully covered. But in the end we still do not know how well or badly such a system would work.

The case for giving thought to permitting exchange rates to move is that it is not clear where else we can turn. Domestic fiscal and monetary instruments are just barely a match, even on paper, for domestic objectives pertaining to the balance between demand and potential output (and between inflation and slack); the division of demand and of output between personal consumption, public consumption, private investment and public investment; and, last, the distribution of income.[4] Limiting travel is distasteful and, in the long term, intolerable. Trade controls are miserable economics and poisonous international politics. Capital controls are apt to have a relatively short half-life in terms of effectiveness: they tend to get leakier with use; and they, too, are wasteful. That a country as rich as the United States should feel itself hobbled, by the sheer mechanics of the process, in transferring some small fraction of its own real resources to the rest of the world, especially to the very poor countries, is ridiculous.

Sadly enough there are no other cards to be played. We are back where we started: with rigidly fixed exchange rates, there is no efficient instrument for correcting payments imbalance. The system is over-determined. In terms of the formal linear mathematics of economic theory, the number of independent equations, each representing a constraint or goal, exceeds the number of variables.

If, after exploring what might be accomplished by way of exchange-rate arrangements—*e.g.* by much wider gold points or devices such as the so-called "crawling peg"—we do not want to go down that road, then the alternative lies not in the status quo, but in a determined effort to work out some international code of adjustment behavior that will command wide acceptance, and to have built into it incentives and sanctions less one-sided than the present rules, which put pressure on deficit countries and let surplus countries go scot-free.

[4] I do not believe that the usual qualifications involving twisting yield schedules, changes in the tax structure, etc., significantly weaken the point. To be sure, domestic objectives will on occasion call for the same kinds of fiscal or monetary medicine as the balance of payments. But even then, the appropriate dosages are likely to differ. In general, no reason exists for expecting payments deficits to coincide with excess demand at home and payments surpluses with short-falls in demand.

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The trouble with this route is that it calls for advance agreement on rules to govern domestic economic policies—rules with sharp teeth with respect to fiscal and monetary policy. One should be clear about this. Negotiating a code of adjustment behavior that goes beyond declaring for virtue and against sin involves striking international bargains in advance on matters such as, for instance, the rate of increase in prices that it is right to suffer for the sake of reducing the unemployment rate by a given amount. (To be sure, no adjustment mechanism will be workable in the long pull unless it reflects a measure of implicit political consensus on how to reconcile conflicting goals. Not even a flexible rate system can avoid the underlying issue of conflicting goals, if —as it would have to be—it is subject to management.)

Thus it continues to make sense to leave the question of adjustment reform to the last, and to deal with liquidity and confidence first. Adjustment reform will be hard to negotiate, at best. Moreover, any attempt to agree on greater exchange flexibility would raise the problem of "how to get there," especially while supposedly unwanted dollars exist in the hands of foreign central banks. In this respect, too, dealing with adjustment reform last, in a setting where liquidity and confidence are in better shape, will be much easier.

2. With no easy way to reduce the *demand* for reserves by facilitating the process of adjustment—indeed, with near certainty that even following reform in the mechanics of adjustment the world will still need extra reserves—the alternative has been to do something about increasing the *supply*. The main choices have been three: raising the price of gold, crowning the dollar and inventing a new kind of international money.

Raising the price of gold was judged by the U.S. Government, rightly I think, a medieval expedient, inefficient in providing for the need (which is for a continuous, relatively smooth expansion in reserves); inequitable in its first-round benefits; and last, given the history, politically out of the question.

What about crowning the dollar? If not more gold, why not more dollars? With the rules as they are (or as they were before March 17 of this year) the reasons are plain. But why not change the rules and insulate the system against gold conversion by central banks? There are good reasons why not. However, lest anyone is tempted to dismiss this option as outrageous on its face, it is worth recalling that a journal as comfortably on the middle-

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aged side of the generation-gap as the London *Economist* has labeled this the "first and best" solution. Evidently, as *The Economist* recognized, some of our Continental friends do not like the idea and will regard *The Economist's* soft spot for the dollar as an Anglo-Saxon aberration. The United States could override their dislike by taking unilateral action to induce most of the world to shift fully to a dollar basis, simply by demonetizing gold. Those who demurred would have the option of letting their currencies float against the dollar, perhaps in a residual gold bloc; not many would take up that option. But it would be a bad thing for the United States to do, unless absolutely forced to it by others. As long as there is a chance for a reasonable, coöperative solution by consensus, it is wrong for a great power to settle matters by *force majeure.*

Indeed, even if all governments were eager to shift to a dollar standard, it would still be a mistake for the United States to consent. As a short-term response to a crisis forced on us by others, yes. As a transitional arrangement invulnerable to instability, maybe. But as a long-term arrangement, no. We should not accept the responsibility of exclusive American control of the printing press—of really serving as central bank to the world. Not that I worry much that we would misuse the power from domestic economic motives. We would probably do as well or better than any other control system one might dream up. But it would be very unhealthy in terms of international politics, if for no other reason than that we would be constantly subject to accusations of misuse. No single nation should accept that sort of unilateral power over the affairs of the world—if it can responsibly avoid it.[5]

What is left is the solution the United States finally came to in 1965: a new reserve asset. In fact, the Special Drawing Rights or SDRs are just what is needed. In terms of the orderly provision of liquidity in the future, I would regard the agreement, which resulted from nearly three years of hard negotiation, with Secretary Henry Fowler in the lead, as a triumph of international good sense.[6] With parliamentary ratification of the appropriate amend-

[5] For a fuller discussion of the dollar-standard possibility, and also of a two-bloc dollar/gold world, see "Taking the Monetary Initiative" by C. Fred Bergsten in *Foreign Affairs,* July 1968.

[6] When the full history is written, Henry Fowler's role will loom very large indeed. It was he, encouraged and supported by President Johnson, who got the U.S. Government to move. He personally invented the "contingency planning" formula, without which the negotiations would never have gotten off the ground. Time and again during the bargaining his nerve and judgment, and his persistence and courtesy, saved the day. Throughout, he was ably seconded by Under Secretary Frederick Deming.

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ments to the IMF Articles of Agreement in sight by early 1969, the new machinery for generating reserves is almost fully built. Needless to say, the trick will be to get it operating soon, and at the right speed.

3. Having dealt with adjustment and liquidity, what about confidence or stability? Here the long-term structural problem centers on the difficulty of operating any system that contains more than one kind of reserve asset. If there are several kinds of reserve instruments, and if central banks are free to change the composition of their portfolios by shifting from one kind to another, it is a good bet that instability will result. In this respect, simply adding SDRs to gold, dollars and sterling will not be of much structural help (although it should relieve some of the speculation in gold).

Together with adjustment reform, this is the second major problem on the agenda of negotiation and action for the period following the activation of the SDR. There are many possible solutions. Some, for instance, have advocated a blend of gold, dollars and SDRs in fixed proportion. My own preference would be to crown the SDR as the only reserve asset. Central banks would deposit their existing dollar, sterling and gold balances with the IMF, and get and use SDRs instead. The IMF would move one step closer to being a full-fledged world central bank.

I venture to think that this in fact will be the outcome. But again, the time is not yet. Unless there is a crisis first, which would force a telescoping of the schedule, we should concentrate first on activation of the SDR. (Professor Triffin and others advocate a faster schedule. My own sense of things is that, in the absence of a crisis, no new major step will be negotiable until the SDR is activated. Attempting it would simply increase the chance of a crisis.)

This judgment brings us to the question of strategy. How should the United States conduct itself to try to move the world into this brave new state of a single reserve asset and a more workable system of balance-of-payments adjustment?

V

The central question of American strategy goes straight to our balance of payments. The mere disappearance of the U.S. deficit would not solve the world's monetary ills. But a strong case can be made that nothing would so speed up the pace of reform as a drying up of the supply of deficit dollars. The central problem of

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inconsistency would be with us still. The shoe would still pinch. But it would pinch the European instead of the American foot for a change. We would have good reason to be pleased—not because of their pain, which would, in itself, be dangerous and might easily lead to economic warfare—but because, one suspects, our European partners would quickly develop a more vivid sense of the need for quick reform.

Powerful as it is, this argument misses the point. It is plain that an armchair is a more comfortable place to sit than the back of a tiger. But that doesn't tell you what to do when you are on a tiger. Trying to jump off may be the worst move. So it is with our deficit. If it just went away, fine; but that is mere fancy. Should we do what is necessary to make it disappear—or, more precisely, to reduce it to an equilibrium level, where the accumulation of dollars by foreign central banks just matches their stable long-term demand for extra dollars for transactions or reserve purposes?

There are two possibilities. If one believes that, in order to achieve that end, it is sufficient to eliminate *excess* demand at home (excess in terms of our domestic objectives) and to continue the existing tolerable controls on various components of the balance of payments—if one believes that, then the answer is easy. Even then, the problem of correcting the underlying deficit, now masked by the various temporary measures adopted since 1961, would remain. But at least no deficit would be left on the books —no piling up of excess dollars in foreign hands.

If one suspects, as I do, that the combination of existing controls and a fiscal-monetary policy appropriate to our domestic objectives will not suffice to eliminate the visible deficit, then the choices are stark:

1. To try to devalue the dollar relative to the currencies of countries in persistent surplus. We would fail. The evidence is overwhelming that no government is prepared at this stage to accept a revaluation of its currency against the dollar.

2. To deflate the U.S. economy severely into actual recession and sustained slack, with painful consequences for economic growth throughout the underdeveloped and developed world. Even in the absence of incipient revolution in our cities, the cost, in my judgment, would be too great. Given the relation between aggregate unemployment and Negro unemployment, it would be a social and political disaster.

3. The alternative to deflation or devaluation would involve

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some combination of even more severe capital controls, locking up of American tourists, going protectionist and making major changes in U.S. foreign policy.

Whatever one's view of Viet Nam or of the need for U.S. forces in Europe, to make major changes in U.S. foreign policy to protect the exchange rate or the gold conversion privilege would be to let the tail wag the dog. Moreover, it is well to remember that, with the current tying and offset arrangements, to make a net saving of as much as $200–300 million a year would require, for example, virtually scuttling the aid program or almost total withdrawal from Europe.

On private capital controls, I think we have been right to do what we have done. Indeed, if anything additional has to be done about the balance of payments, I would tighten up even further on direct investment in industrial countries outside the de facto dollar area, notwithstanding all the golden-egg arguments (which reflect incomplete analysis and too little time-discount of the future). The reasons are as much political as economic. In the international politics of balance of payments, direct investment has been our Achilles heel. There is some truth to the European charge that, in a fit of absent-mindedness, the United States has been using short-term money borrowed in Europe to buy up Europe. This is an area where we and our European friends really will have to get together to sort out our partly coincident, partly conflicting interests: their desire for long-term money and advanced American technology and management; our need for balance-of-payments protection and for fair treatment of past investments made in good faith; and their legitimate concern about the ownership and control of their advanced industries. But these are dicta. At this stage I would vote against any significant tightening of capital controls by the United States acting alone (assuming the New Year's program is working properly).

Trade and tourists remain. Any protectionist move on our part would be a terrible mistake. The forces of protection in the world at large are exceedingly powerful. American leadership in the movement toward freer trade has been crucial; serious American backsliding could easily result in a progressive collapse of the world trading structure, culminating in jungle warfare. One need not attach excessive importance to the mere economic losses from a slower growth of trade—though it is important to distinguish between the case of the United States and that of, say, Belgium or Japan—to believe that the effects on international poli-

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tics are likely to be poisonous. The principal justification of the fixed exchange-rate system is that it provides a hospitably stable environment for international trade. Significantly to damage the trading system in order to protect a particular set of exchange rates would be upside-down economics and very bad politics.

The coin has another side. The cost of a strategy of living with our residual deficit for the time being—of sweating it out—consists in increasing the probability that, before the slow process of reform is complete, we will be faced not merely by recurrent flurries of private speculation, but by a massive, irreversible bear-raid on the dollar, with the big central banks joining private speculators in a scramble for gold.

I myself think the probability of such a blowup low, even if we follow the balance-of-payments strategy I have proposed. It is entirely up to some nine or ten major central banks and governments. As long as they don't panic, as long as they stand ready temporarily to absorb and hold any dollars dumped by private speculators or small central banks, the system will hold. They have the power to make it hold. Their performance during the past few years, and especially the remarkable March 17 agreement, suggest that they have the will, too. They have demonstrated their preference for gradual reform. They have no reason to be scared into pulling the house down.

The possibility of a collapse nevertheless exists. My conclusion is that to accept the increment of extra risk is the lesser of evils. To anyone who thinks that a collapse would mean the end of the world, that is not an acceptable conclusion. I do not believe that it would be the end of the world. What I believe would happen is that the whole sequence of reform would be telescoped into a matter of a few hectic weeks, and we would emerge with the world I sketched in the previous section. It would be unpleasant; financial markets and international trade would be perturbed. But the notion that we would face really serious and sustained economic trouble seems to me exceedingly unlikely. In any case, I would much rather live with that risk than with the likely consequences of balance-of-payments surgery by the United States.[7]

[7] The above does not address the possibility of a crisis triggered by a decision of a major European government to devalue. Such a decision would certainly force an immediate negotiation with, one suspects, the entire structure of exchange rates (though not the dollar price of gold) on the table. The probability of such a crisis would of course be increased by any substantial U.S. action to fix our deficit. In the absence of such U.S. action, much will depend on developments in France. Regarding sterling, there is every reason for the central banking community to defend the $2.40 rate. In terms of Britain's *basic* balance-of-payments position there is absolutely no case for a further devaluation.

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What then should be our strategy? We should not just sit still.

At home, we must use fiscal and monetary means better than during the past two years to match the growth of total demand with the growth of potential output. As a matter of international politics, the strategy of living with the deficit while reforming the rules is defensible only if the deficit is not the consequence of poor domestic management. Our domestic performance directly affects our ability to enlist the coöperation of the surplus countries in the short-term measures that are necessary to hold our visible deficit to manageable size. It also affects our bargaining power in the negotiations about long-term reform.[8]

We should maintain our existing controls on various balance-of-payments components, improving their efficiency where possible. For the time being, they are a necessary evil.

We should keep urging the surplus countries to dismantle any restrictions on imports, to encourage capital exports (especially to the underdeveloped countries), and, if they have let total demand fall behind potential output, to use their fiscal and monetary instruments to accelerate growth at home. The right sort of exhortation is not useless in these matters.

We should continue to cultivate the close coöperation of the important foreign central banks which resulted in the March 17 arrangement, and, in general, keep up the effort to insulate international reserves from fluctuations in the private gold market.

We should keep pushing for early activation of the SDR.

Our objective is not a dollar world of endless U.S. deficits, but an orderly transition to an internationally managed SDR system, with improved procedures of adjustment. We have come a long way since 1965. This is no time to lose our nerve.

[8] In this connection, it would be a big step forward if the Congress could be brought to adopt some variant of the 1962 proposal of President Kennedy for standby Presidential authority to vary income tax rates within specified limits and for a limited period of time, subject to Congressional veto.

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CENTRALISM AND NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

By Claudio Véliz

FOR the last century and a half, Latin America has been a faithful echoing chamber for every political noise uttered in the more civilized regions of the northern hemisphere. It now appears that this period may be drawing to a close, partly as a result of domestic developments, and partly because the source of models deemed worthy of imitation is drying up. This is not the end of ideology, but it certainly suggests that the era in which Latin America accepted blindly the political experiences, aspirations and recommendations issuing from the shores of the North Atlantic is coming to an end.

Practically every major political ideology which found a sympathetic echo in Latin America during the last hundred years was produced by the impact of the Industrial Revolution upon a European social structure which in turn was fundamentally modified by historical events like Feudalism and the Reformation that had no counterpart in the Luso-Hispanic tradition. Thus, under different names and guises, conservatism, liberalism, radicalism, communism and social democracy (and its Christian Democratic variant), all with deep European roots, have dominated the political life of this part of the world. Even conservatism, which could perhaps claim to be timeless and pre-industrial, never succeeded in clearing the awesome frontier of 1810; it retained a distinct republican flavor which placed it closer to modern European conservatism than to any irredentist monarchial movement with Hispanic roots.

The European origins of liberalism, radicalism and communism of course need no documentation. The aura of modernity and originality which currently adorns the Christian Democratic and Christian Socialist movements in Latin America is more than faintly similar to that which graced their European precursors, not only in recent times but also when they provided Chancellor Bismarck with some of his livelier political difficulties or when they shattered the complacency of the Bishops' Conference of 1908 at Lambeth.

The modern political arrangements of the so-called Western world—which most certainly includes the Soviet Union—are to

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an important degree the offspring of the transformations brought about by industry during the nineteenth century. But Latin America has been bypassed by the Industrial Revolution: industry has indeed come to these countries, but without the great changes which attended its earlier appearance on the shores of the North Atlantic. Moreover, the Latin American social structure, which has received the benefits of modern industrial technology, is different in essence from the European one which produced it.

The complex of cultural differences makes it hard if not impossible to establish priorities or hierarchies of significance. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest three fundamental differences which may account for the apparent inability of Latin America at present to provide a fertile soil for European ideological models and which indicate the type of development likely to dominate its domestic and international political life in the near future. The three differences are the absence in Latin America's historical experience of feudalism, of religious nonconformity and of industrial development which is individually initiated as opposed to that which is centrally encouraged. Conversely, I would suggest that it is precisely in the vertebral centralism of the Latin American tradition that an explanation of recent developments and perhaps even the key to the political future of the region will most probably be discovered.

II

The feudal experience is not part of the cultural tradition of Latin America. Of course the word has often been used pejoratively to describe the relationship between landlord and peasant in Latin America as elsewhere, but in fact feudalism as a political structure never existed in this part of the world. It is important to realize this, because the balance of power between a weak center and a strong periphery, which was characteristic of feudalism, was evidently a major ingredient of European liberalism and all its social-democratic variants.

In spite of the quaint efforts by Mexican revolutionaries, the founders of APRA and others to establish direct lines of descent from the centuries before the coming of the Spaniards, the fact is that Latin America was born into the modern world during the sixteenth century, at least three hundred years after feudalism had disappeared from Western Europe; its institutional structure was

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fashioned wholesale in Madrid by the strongest monarchy in Christendom and on the Renaissance model of a centrally controlled polity. It hardly needs pointing out that Columbus discovered the New World precisely the year that the last Moorish stronghold of Granada was taken by the Spaniards, bringing to an end a military campaign which had lasted, with varying intensity, for seven centuries. The victorious Catholic kings ruled unchallenged and the faint attempts by regional military orders or aspiring warlords to contest their authority are of no more than anecdotal value. A full generation before Henry VIII started his quarrels with the Vatican, Ferdinand of Aragon secured from Pope Julius II the famous bull *Universalis ecclesiae regimini* which, together with earlier generosities of Rome, laid the legal basis for the absolute power, temporal and ecclesiastical, which the Spanish rulers were to exercise with considerable efficiency over their vast American territories.

The institutional structure devised for the Indies naturally reflected this unqualified centralism, and no effort was spared to ensure that distance would not facilitate the development of peripheral sites of political power; even to fill a minor post at the Viceroyalty of Peru, consultation with Spain was required, and whoever attempted to depart from the strictest reading of the colonial legislation was punished with severity. Even the most exalted colonial rulers had at the end of their mandate to make the lengthy voyage to Spain to sit at the dreaded *juicio de residencia.* Madrid's power gave muscle to the longest administrative arms in Christendom.

This system survived for three centuries and when it finally collapsed, its legalistic, centralist and authoritarian tradition passed on undiminished to the republican régimes, which had the advantage of shorter lines of communication. It must be remembered that the revolutions of 1810 were not popular uprisings but rather independence movements after the fashion of the one led by Mr. Ian Smith in Rhodesia.

The institutional habit of compromise between alternative centers of political power is not, then, part of the Latin American tradition. The feudal experience of northern Europe, where the central monarchy had to negotiate with a number of lesser centers of power, is simply not known in this part of the world. Here the center has never been decisively challenged and even its major revolutionary experience—that of 1810—was initiated in the

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name of legitimacy and against the French, who by then represented egalitarianism.

Political centralism remained virtually unassailed during the nineteenth century. No doubt instances can be found of uprisings by local chieftains but, apart from the fact that these were generally unsuccessful, close examination will show that even the most outspoken regional *caciques* were often feeding on the crumbs of political power which fell from the table of the central government.

The centralism of the past four centuries has survived well into our times. The three major modern revolutions in Latin America —perhaps the only real ones—have reconstructed society according to strikingly different ideas, yet they have all resulted in single-party systems: the Mexican PRI is unique in the ramifications of its centralist control; the Cuban government party, I would suggest, rules from an authoritarian center because it is Cuban rather than because it is communist; and the Bolivian MNR, although eventually unsuccessful, made a determined attempt to monopolize political power and was later replaced by another régime at least as centralist. The trend that can be perceived in other countries—without considering the outright tyrannies—is clearly toward the establishment of a dominant political party identified with the government. This is seen even in the most sophisticated and democratic states in the region.

The weight of this historical tradition has lately been reinforced by the well-nigh universal trend toward increased participation or intervention by the central government in all aspects of national life. While in, say, Britain, the United States or Sweden, this trend clashes with the prevailing pluralistic and generally liberal concept of political responsibility, in Latin America it reinforces the existing drive for greater central control.

If political centralism has worn well over the last few centuries, the same can also be said of the Catholic Church. It is a moot point whether nonconformity is, or is not, a basic ingredient of European liberalism, but it is difficult to imagine political liberalism in Britain, France or the United States, for instance, without a concomitant attitude in matters of religion. In Latin America the problem would hardly arise: there has never been anything which could reasonably be equated with nonconformity; the religious authority of the Catholic Church has never been challenged from within. No doubt priests have been shot, churches burned and

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anticlericalism has become an established political and social attitude, but the spiritual authority of the Catholic Establishment remains untouched. Even in a country like Mexico, where from Juarez to Zapata the major revolutionary movements have been staunchly anticlerical and where it is easier to sustain normal diplomatic relations with Cuba than with the Vatican, the Catholic Church remains the only significant national religion.

There is, of course, ample evidence of dissent within the Catholic Church in Latin America today, but this stems from anxiety over social and political issues, not over the fundamental religious tenets of official Catholicism. The inroads of Protestantism are also not to be minimized, but so far, even in Chile, where they have been most noticeable, less than 10 percent of the population is registered as belonging to the numerous Protestant sects.

In Europe and North America it was but a short step from religious dissent to political dissent; it does not take exceptional scholarship to trace the nonconformist ancestry of many of the most active reformist parties.

III

As might be expected, political and religious centralism was accompanied by economic centralism, which is not only the product of a long Hispanic tradition but also the result of the way in which industry came to this part of the world. In Europe, industrial activity arose out of a complex cultural situation which resulted in the conscious accumulation of industrial capital over a long period of time. This process owed little or nothing to the intervention of the central government and it led to a dispersion of power. That the central state later came to represent these industrial interests is beside the point; for it to happen, the new industrialists had to challenge the traditional ruling groups and wrest power from them.

Further, the growth of industry ran almost parallel with the growth of cities, and urbanization was a consequence of industrial activity. Industry then was labor intensive and for it to function efficiently a sizeable labor force had to be organized in urban centers. As a result the workers acquired a new political consciousness. Thus it can be said that the impact of industry on traditional European society was revolutionary at least in that it was spearheaded by a newly formed industrial bourgeoisie and it resulted in the formation of a new industrial proletariat.

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None of these considerations would seem to apply to the industrialization of Latin America. Here industry has been stimulated largely by external factors such as the great crisis of 1929 (principally affecting Brazil) and the Second World War, which began the process of import substitution. It owed relatively little to domestic determinants. And urbanization in Latin America did not wait for industrialization, which was instead grafted onto a sophisticated, self-conscious, relatively urbanized society. A remarkably large proportion of the population was already living in cities for reasons other than the development of industry. More important perhaps, industrialization owed a very great deal to the direct intervention of the central state—through tariff protection, subsidies, credit policies or straightforward programs of industrial development carried out directly under the aegis of public development corporations. Lastly, the social changes generally associated with industrialization have not occurred in Latin America; there have been many changes but not the ones that scholars and politicians were prepared for.

Latin America has industrialized rapidly, but this has not been the result of the exertions of an industrial bourgeoisie; nor has it produced an industrial proletariat. In the 1870s, Britain was the first industrial power on earth and was producing her first million tons of steel. To achieve this, over 370,000 workers were employed. In Latin America today, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are well over the million-ton mark (Brazil is moving close to four million tons per year) and a rough estimate shows that only seven or eight thousand workers are needed to produce each million tons of steel. Peru is the first fishing nation on earth, but the total labor force engaged in the fisheries and processing plants does not exceed thirty thousand men. Such examples abound and they all point to a fairly obvious development: industrial technology has changed; it is now more capital than labor intensive. The industrial labor force in Latin America is not the modern equivalent of the traditional proletariat. Working with an advanced industrial technology, it is smaller, better trained and better paid. It is in fact an aristocracy of labor with incomes which all too often rise above those of vast numbers of white collar workers in the tertiary sector.

As the capacity of industry to absorb large numbers of workers is limited, the massive transformation of peasants into industrial workers has not come to pass. With luck, the average migrant to

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the cities will find employment in the building industry, but more often than not he will somehow drift into the service sector, which is by far the best organized as well as the most politically active. The coming of industry resulted in a sharp decrease of self-employed artisans and craftsmen and a spectacular rise in the number of people in service occupations, but this increase was only the continuation of a process that had been going on for well over a century. These professionals, white collar employees, bureaucrats and domestic and service workers are not the Latin American equivalent of, say, the rising English middle class of 1832; for the most part they are directly or indirectly associated with, or dependent upon, either the central government or the traditional social structure. Few are involved in industry, and their political activities have been directed principally toward securing greater participation in the existing social organization rather than in seeking to demolish it and replace it with another.

The pre-industrial urbanization of Latin America is a significant phenomenon in its own right; its intensification during the last three decades has resulted in the steady depopulation of an already sparsely settled countryside. At present Latin America has a greater proportion of its urban inhabitants living in cities of 100,000 or more than does Europe; in Argentina, Cuba, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela the proportion of the population that is urban is well over 40 percent. It is neither the "landless peasant" nor the "exploited" industrial worker who epitomizes the politically significant Latin American; it is rather the underpaid bank clerk with social aspirations.

As for the Latin American equivalent of the traditional industrial bourgeoisie—forward-looking, adventurous, willing to take risks, ready to innovate, anti-aristocratic and reformist—it simply does not exist. The force for dynamic change has been the central government. Domestic private enterprise has seldom performed with distinction except when instigated and assisted by the government. If all state subsidies and financial commitments were to be withdrawn from private industry, precious little would remain in operation. This has come about partly by default; the so-called industrial bourgeoisie and their clientele have been agile opportunists and mediocre imitators rather than adventurous challengers or originators of new ideas. With remarkably few exceptions—mostly foreign immigrants—they owe their newly achieved economic prosperity more to their social or political

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proximity to the government cornucopia in the years between 1940 and 1960 than to any impressive exertions on their own part.

For them, industry is just one of many ways of making money: they own industrial capital, they often have a controlling interest, but they are not industrialists in the meaningful sense of the word. More often than not they are prepared to exchange the risks inherent in effective responsibility for an agreement with a foreign company which will guarantee royalties, expert advice and a numbered bank account in Europe. Their docility has prevented them from becoming an effective pressure group except in a negative sense. This is shown, for instance, in the opposition of Ecuadorian and Venezuelan businessmen to plans for regional integration. There is in Latin America no counterpart to European industrial liberalism.

In Europe and the United States it was the dynamic industrial groups that for various reasons became the mainstay—both political and economic—of a development policy aimed at the satisfaction of national aspirations; in Latin America, however, the owners of industry are largely responsible for increasing our external dependence. They have not been innovators, nor have they challenged the established social order or provided political alternatives. Instead they have fallen with remarkable ease into the patterns of imitation and emulation characteristic of social climbing. In fact, it would not be surprising if their major contribution to the contemporary life of Latin America turns out to be the efficient institutionalization of this process; far from weakening the traditional structure, they have become its most loyal and enthusiastic upholders.

To sum up, then, there appears to be no substantial evidence indicating that the tradition of centralism characteristic of Latin American culture is in any significant way being challenged from within. Furthermore, the pressure groups which in Europe and the United States played such an important role in forcing through the changes demanded by the incorporation of industrial technology are either not fitted or not prepared to play a comparable role in Latin America. What sector of society, then, is likely to fulfill this function in the future?

IV

Marx and Lenin have not been the only ones to accept the notion that the state is an instrument, a tool to be used by one

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group or another to defend its own interests. This concept of the state has figured prominently in the historical tradition of Western Europe (though perhaps more significantly in Britain and the United States). From it derives the conceptual framework which informs much of contemporary sociological and historical analysis —including the study of Latin America. Learned northern observers of the Latin American situation have thus spent much time identifying the pressure groups which are expected to be vying with each other for the control of that supposedly inert instrument, the central state. In their writings, various groups are favored as most likely to assume the leadership of the process that is vaguely described as "modernization." Some place their bets on the rising urban bourgeoisie; others hope or fear that the peasantry will march on the cities and transform everything; others are impressed by the vociferous political activity of the students; while others still stress the reformist aspirations of the "Nasserist" groups in the armed forces.

This type of analysis does not seem to me helpful, largely because it starts from the mistaken premise that the central government in Latin America is at least as "instrumental" as that typical of the European tradition and as likely to respond to the pressures, civilized or not, coming from more or less powerful groups. In Latin America the central government itself is the most powerful pressure group. It extends its power and influence through a highly centralized civil service and through complex and all-embracing systems of social security and patronage which have transformed most of the vast urban service sector into an institutionalized clientele; it controls the major centers of learning and is capable of exercising almost unrestricted control over economic life. The only institutions which could perhaps be regarded as likely rivals, because of their relatively self-contained nature, are the Church and the armed forces, but in either case the rivalry would not be counterbalancing or pluralistic; rather it would tend to emphasize the central and national responsibilities of the government. Whenever pressures from these two sectors are exerted, they encourage the state to exercise still more all-embracing power from the center.

If this powerful and self-conscious pressure group did not earlier exert its potential force to the fullest, it was because the domestic and international conditions prevailing during the hundred years which preceded 1929 were such as to discourage or at

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least make unnecessary an activist role for the state. Conflicting interests were few. The ruling groups of the time enjoyed a more than reasonable degree of prosperity; those influential in forming political and intellectual attitudes were clearly identified with European liberalism, while the expansion of world trade and a growing demand for the primary commodities of Latin America tended to make acceptance of the tenets of laisser faire financially profitable as well as socially and intellectually agreeable.

It was not external pressures, therefore, which forced the state to accept an apparently passive role, but rather a decision made for reasons of expediency. It is worthwhile remembering that the same uncritical admiration of everything European which contributed to making Manchester liberalism so attractive to the exporters of mineral and agricultural products also eased the introduction into Latin America of English fashions, German militarism and French positivism, European tastes and methods of education. Sarmiento was not alone in thinking that for Latin America to become truly civilized, it had to become European.

The crisis of 1929 and the Second World War marked the end of the lengthy period of prosperity based on the export of commodities. It also established the conditions for the massive introduction of industrial technology, if only through the doubtful channels of indiscriminate import substitution. Yet the full political impact of the ensuing changes was postponed as a result of circumstances imposed by the Second World War and the pressures of the cold war.

Apart from other important considerations, the Second World War introduced a virtual moratorium on political development in Latin America. With the world divided into warring factions and the countries of the region more or less in the Allied camp, traditional alignments were redrawn to fit external demands. Even the communist parties and their close associates of the time postponed their struggles against capitalism and loyally collaborated in the efforts to keep the Allies well supplied with raw materials. The hope was also widely entertained that the end of the conflict would bring, as a well-earned reward, a veritable flood of assistance, which would in some undefined way bring back the plentiful days of the past.

Although the nationalistic movements in Latin America had little or nothing in common with Germany save a shared suspicion of the United States or Britain, they were often sympathetic to

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the Axis, and it required considerable coaxing before they declared for the Allies. It would be facile and mistaken to think that Villarroel in Bolivia, Ibañez in Chile, Vargas in Brazil, Péron in Argentina, Arnulfo Arias in Panama and so many others were simply stooges of an international Nazi conspiracy. It would be closer to the truth to say that these various nationalist movements were essentially domestic and reflected the basic aspirations or dissatisfactions of important urban sectors. The issue of the Canal Zone was foremost in the minds of those who supported Arnulfo Arias at that time; economic imperialism and the Falkland Islands were ever present in Péron's oratory; Villarroel came to power as a result of the frustrations of the Chaco War but also on the assurance that Bolivia would not remain forever a colonial appendage of the tin industry; Vargas represented the drive toward industrialization and economic autonomy. These movements, under whatever name, represented a nationalist alternative to the traditional programs presented by the established parties of Right and Left. At their most successful, they provided the basis for what in the postwar period has generally been described as Latin American populism—perhaps the most revealing portent of the political future of the region.

The widespread feeling that rampant nationalism was the ultimate cause of World War II tended to make the domestic nationalist movements in Latin America appear like the villains of a new black legend. Internationalism became the new religion and international coöperation the accepted morality. But with the slaughter and destruction of the war still fresh in mind, a weary world plunged into yet another total struggle. Mr. Truman's doctrinal declaration dividing the world into two oddly defined camps presented Latin America with a formidable false dilemma. It was clear that Mr. Truman had not really meant each country to choose between democracy and tyranny; there were enough despotic régimes on the side of the angels to make this a doubtful proposition. On the other hand it was apparent even then—and it has since become obvious—that the communist parties in the Latin American countries had no intention of leading revolutionary movements to overthrow their respective governments. In this respect they reflected the pragmatic attitude of the Soviet Union, which accepted Latin America's being within the sphere of influence of the United States. Yet the urgencies of the international situation forced a decision, and anti-communism

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was raised to the status of dogma by able politicians; although these men were well aware that the local communists did not constitute a serious threat, they kept their eyes fixed on the flow of aid which was invariably directed toward those countries whose loyalty to the Western world was beyond dispute.[1]

In the anxiety of the Soviet Union and the United States to marshal their allies into supranational political and military arrangements, the Organization of American States was created. The OAS, which became the Latin American branch of the cold-war policy of the United States, can validly claim to be one of the least impressive of the many postwar pacts. For a time internationalism apparently was defined in Washington and Moscow as a willingness to accept the validity of these arrangements, and the good favor of the superpowers depended on the degree of zeal with which these treaty organizations were supported. But to those Latin Americans who were not absolutely committed, the cold war was less an ideological confrontation than a struggle between two obsessively nationalistic powers intent on defending or extending their respective spheres of influence. Neither was seen as a particularly attractive model and neither received more than tepid gestures of popular support—except from the notoriously servile tyrannies.

Yet a most important consequence of the coming of the cold war to Latin America was the emphasis it placed on the dependent nature of both domestic and international political life. Political activity became largely subordinated to the vagaries of the great world confrontation; neutralism was unacceptable and nationalism severely frowned upon, while friendly internationalism was most definitely encouraged. Any reformist program, any criticism of the United States, however justified, any attempt to steer an independent policy became suspect, and more often than not was publicly tinged in deepest red. It finally required an initiative by the United States to make agrarian, fiscal and administrative reform respectable political aspirations.

[1] "In other parts of the world it may be merely ridiculous to claim that the communists are not revolutionaries, but in Latin America it is a fact that the communist movement has no vigorous revolutionary tradition. There is probably no conservative or liberal party in all of Latin America that has not staged more insurrections and incited more civil wars than the communists. In a continent racked by civil strife the communists' record has been one of remarkable quiescence. Their one major attempt to seize power by force was the 1935 insurrection led by Luiz Carlos Prestes in Brazil, apart from which there have been only some instances of communist participation in risings by noncommunist groups." Ernst Halperin, "Nationalism and Communism in Chile." Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965, p. 13.

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V

The feeling of utter dependence has grown deep roots during the years of the cold war. But as the confrontation becomes attenuated by the challenge of France and China to the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union, by the growth of polycentrism on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and by a measure of détente between the two great powers, a resurgence of nationalism is apparent in Latin America. "A plague on both your houses" is becoming a common attitude; as the tide of cold-war loyalties recedes, Latin Americans are becoming increasingly conscious of national aspirations submerged for too long.

The time may now be ripe for the centralist state to come into its own, fired with a new nationalism fed on an awareness that the increasing cultural and economic dependence of the region is one of its principal problems. Had circumstances even faintly similar to the present ones occurred, say, half a century ago, a fashionable European ideology would no doubt have been promptly imported by the latest batch of Latin American intellectuals returning home from their grand tour. Today this is no longer possible, partly because the mood is emphatically nationalistic and partly because the prevailing feeling is that the northern hemisphere has precious little guidance to offer: the United States and the Soviet Union are living through critical times themselves and have abandoned much of their ideological fervor in order to adopt pragmatic and short-term solutions. Even those who until recently were willing to grant the benefit of the doubt to some tried old horses—*e.g.* socialism, capitalism and their variants—are now conscious that their application to Latin America is at least questionable. Indeed, Latin America may for the first time in its history become an exporter of political symbols and ideas. This is suggested by the enthusiastic adoption of Ché Guevara by students in Europe and the United States, while here his political appeal is largely restricted to a genuine admiration for his integrity and heroism.

In the absence of a more elaborate framework within which to fit political action, men tend to fall back on elemental loyalties—tribe, family or, as in Latin America today, straightforward nationalism. Besides being undemanding intellectually, nationalism draws support from all the people, regardless of other interests.

A nationalistic ideology can perhaps get us from a confused

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present to a more satisfactory future, but the risks cannot be ignored. Nationalism tends to magnify the impact of external factors on domestic situations. Even if it is based on a reasonably civilized understanding of what constitutes the national interest, it courts international friction. In this kind of mood, affecting the major nations of Latin America simultaneously, rearmament, for example, assumes an importance which cannot be overlooked.

At the same time it should be emphasized that the major objective of Latin American nationalism is to reverse the present trend toward cultural and economic dependence on the United States. This, to be fair, is apparently also an objective of enlightened U.S. policy, as shown in numerous official pronouncements calling for a determined effort in Latin America to shoulder a greater part of the burden of its own development. The financial difficulties of the United States may of course make this objective mandatory. At any rate, it must be remembered that independent behavior in nations, as in human beings, cannot easily be confined to some things, excluding others. If the countries of Latin America are to act with greater independence in the planning and implementation of truly national development policies, it should not surprise anybody if they become independent in foreign policy and other fields as well. The military, for example, which until recently have been the most loyal allies of the United States, are now beginning to see the penetration and interference of the great northern power in the same light in which they formerly viewed communism—as an international threat to national sovereignty and integrity. Their indignant reaction to the efforts of the United States to stem their growing purchases of armaments is a significant example of the new attitude.

Although the numerous Latin American student movements operate from strikingly varied backgrounds, under various political auspices and with very varied purposes, they do seem to share a preoccupation with the need to encourage national research and scholarship as a means to escape the cultural penetration of the United States. These students are not necessarily militants of extreme left-wing parties; more often than is realized they are politically nonaligned or represent middle-of-the-road political movements. They themselves, of course, come predominantly from the middle and upper classes of society.

There is a widespread feeling, especially in the academic community, that Latin American integration is in difficulties partly

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because it is too closely associated with the United States. One of the informal conclusions of a major conference which met earlier this year in Chile to examine the problems of integration was that what was needed was a truly American process of integration instead of the present Inter-American scheme which allows the United States to play too important a role.

Until a few months ago there were three principal organizations interested in the process of integration: the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Inter-American Development Bank and the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress. Of these, the last two are based in Washington and depend on the financial support of the United States; LAFTA is strictly a Latin American organization but also the least successful so far. This anomalous situation has not gone unnoticed, and it may be that the move to create truly Latin American subregional organizations like the Andean Group or the Plata Basin Group is at least indirectly a consequence of this awareness.

Amidst the débris left behind by the quiet failure of the Alliance for Progress will be found a number of social-democratic movements which feel—with or without justification—that the United States did less than it could have done to assist their reformist efforts, after giving them decisive early encouragement. Their frustration is minimal, however, compared with that of the right-wing parties, which feel that after decades of giving their loyal support to every political move made by the United States and facing the domestic onslaught of the left-wing opposition to such unpopular policies as the overthrow of the Arbenz régime in Guatemala or the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy Administration stabbed them in the back by putting forward a program like the Alliance for Progress, whose principal objective was precisely to undermine the very basis of their economic and political position.

Such examples could be multiplied. The important fact is that the growing isolation of the United States in the world, whatever its causes, is now being reflected in Latin America. It is not easy to find a significant political group or sector of society willing to stand up and be counted on the side of the great northern neighbor.

Given these indicators and the concomitant resurgence of nationalism in Latin America, it is likely that relations with the United States will become difficult in the future. Moreover, the

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challenge to U.S. hegemony will probably come not from the extreme left wing but rather from the state itself, supported by sizeable sectors of the urban population. The United States is likely to be more vulnerable to this type of confrontation than is usually imagined. Seen from Latin America, it will resemble the fortress of Singapore on the eve of the Japanese invasion: all guns facing the sea but virtually defenseless against a land attack.

However important the negative dynamism generated by aggressive independence of the United States, I would suggest that this is not the principal feature of contemporary Latin American nationalism. Rather it is the return to a style of political behavior firmly rooted in an autocthonous centralist tradition. On this tradition is founded the structure of institutions and political habits of Latin Americans; on it, as well, are based the organizational successes of the past decades. Latin Americans are increasingly conscious that in harnessing the momentum of this tradition to the needs of national development they will acquire understanding and mastery of the problems of their nations.

Although this novel process of self-discovery is scarcely a few years old it has already offered promising first results in various fields. The original, successful and growing participation of the central government in the Mexican economy; the plans for public multinational corporations which will operate within the subregional schemes; the remarkable history of growth and consolidation of the enterprises fathered by the Chilean Development Corporation—all afford evidence of the vitality of this trend. At the same time, the writings of historians, economists and political analysts reflect both a generalized dissatisfaction with foreign imitation and an endeavor to create a new political architecture, using the materials at hand instead of importing them ready-made from elsewhere.

Latin America has been prodigal in the arts and letters—perhaps the world's best contemporary novels have been written during the past decade by Colombians, Peruvians and Argentines —but it has not distinguished itself in the field of political and social ideas. It is not unduly optimistic to think that this is due at least in part to the diligence with which its intelligentsia has in the past looked to the northern hemisphere not only for political answers but for the questions as well. It would be surprising indeed if a reversal of this trend does not prove extremely rewarding.

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VIET NAM

A QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE

By Duong Van Minh

IN all its two thousand or more years of history, Viet Nam has never been fully in control of its own destiny. We have suffered invasion by the Chinese, the Mongols, the Japanese and the French. We were administered as a protectorate of China for over a thousand years; we were a colony of France for nearly a century. We endured two and a half centuries of civil war between the Lords of the Trinh from the north and the Lords of the Nguyen from the south—a civil war in which the Dutch were heavily involved supporting the former and the Portuguese the latter.

Despite this violent, protracted interplay of external and internal forces, our people have developed strong, distinctive characteristics. And out of the crosscurrents of Chinese, Hindu and Western civilizations and religions has emerged a Vietnamese culture all its own.

Just as the bamboo in our national crest symbolizes our resiliency in the face of uncontrollable forces of nature or man, so too does it emphasize the supple strength of the Vietnamese people and their deep roots in their own land. Though our past has been full of disappointments, our future, like the fresh green shoots of the bamboo, is full of hope. Whether we will succeed or fail is in large measure a question of confidence—confidence in our government, in our constitutional processes and in our ultimate victory over communism.

Before any real progress can be made in Viet Nam, the government must earn the confidence of the people. This cannot be done unless the government has confidence in itself; unless it knows in its own heart it is working for the good of the whole nation; unless it is prepared to explain to the simple people, the villagers in the countryside, what it is trying to do in language they will understand. It must be honest with the people and honest with itself.

When the government has confidence in itself it will be able to lead the Vietnamese people. It will set broad, simple goals that all elements of the nation can work toward together. In so doing it

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can begin to gather a wide base of support; it can show all different groups how they can best use their capabilities to move forward toward the common end.

As one looks back on our past experience with democracy, we can see that our central problem has been of our own making: our governments have lacked confidence in themselves. As a result, once they gain power their main efforts are focused on maintaining themselves in office rather than leading the people forward out of their troubles. Consequently, instead of broadening their base, instead of encouraging all factions, no matter how diverse their views, to join together and contribute in their own ways toward a realization of the people's dream, they have squandered most of their talent and energy in neutralizing any individual or group that is not prepared to subjugate itself completely to their direction.

Caught up thus in a defensive, introverted frame of mind, past governments have usually begun by narrowing their base. In so doing they have shut out many who might be prepared to work in their own way for the national cause. Once this process sets in, personalities become involved, rumors gain credence, suspicions absorb the creative energy of the leaders. Instead of searching for ways to move forward together, schemes are devised to eliminate those who differ even slightly on how to proceed. Those who have been excluded stand aside and criticize or plot.

While the government deludes itself and its powerful allies by giving the outward impression of authority, those responsive to its authority become fewer and fewer. Before long it finds itself balanced like an inverted pyramid and requires only a push from some other self-centered group to topple it from power. This has happened more than once since 1954 and we have only ourselves to blame. It can happen again.

The trouble has been that past governments have repeatedly overlooked the self-purging characteristic of a great cause. When groups within the society begin to work for the whole people—no matter how small their contribution may be—this characteristic manifests itself. Once they become motivated by this wider perspective, their members quickly recognize those within their midst who are absorbed by selfish, personal greed or who are working for an outside power. Then the process of self-purification begins. Those few who cannot raise their eyes above their own narrow interests or who have been captured by the evil doctrine of com-

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munism soon stand out in the crowd. Once identified, the group itself takes steps to isolate and deal with them as appropriate. If the government publicly acknowledges the group's contribution to the nation's objectives and indicates its trust, the group will reciprocate by placing more confidence in the government.

Unfortunately this has not been the case. Instead the communists have been able to exploit honest differences of opinion as to how to reach our common objectives. Manipulating emotions, they have fanned frustrations into a virtual hatred of those in authority. Weakened by this communist deception and by their own shortsighted policy of exclusion, governments became so self-centered that they lost the respect of the people. As a result, the people have become apathetic, have withdrawn into their own shells and have allowed strangers from abroad to take over the brunt of Viet Nam's struggle for freedom.

II

The mechanism for achieving participation and dealing with diversity, for providing a workable relationship between the present government and its opponents within South Viet Nam, is the new Constitution. It provides a sound bicameral framework, based on Western democratic experience and practice, within which the nation can grow and mature. While perhaps not perfect —what constitution is?—provisions are made for its improvement and modernization through orderly amendment.

Drafted by the 117 deputies of the National Constituent Assembly, it urges the people of Viet Nam to put aside the past and take their responsibility before history. Recognizing the many long years of foreign domination, partition, dictatorship and war, it enjoins the nation to look ahead to the future, "to welcome progressive ideas in order to establish a republican form of government of the people, by the people and for the people." Such a government is charged by the Constitution to oppose communism, unite the nation, unify the territory, and assure independence, freedom and democracy for future generations.

In moving ahead toward these goals, today's government must deal with two kinds of opposition. The first is composed of the National Liberation Front and its Viet Cong infrastructure throughout the country. This is the disloyal opposition. It is wholly responsive to Hanoi and to the international communist apparatus. It is the true enemy within our midst. Relatively small

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in numbers, it is well-organized, highly disciplined and ruthless. It maintains and seeks to expand its authority through terror. As an organization it cannot be dealt with by suasion or compromise —much less by coalition.

The second group is made up of those who feel they have been excluded from participation in the process of government because, for one reason or another, they have differed with those in authority as to how best to move forward the national objectives. The new Constitution provides a mechanism for this loyal opposition to make its voice heard through a House and Senate composed of elected representatives of the people.

As we work to build a government responsive under the Constitution to the whole people, we must guard against a mandarinate approach to the administration of the provinces and districts. The rural farmers have learned through bitter experience to be suspicious of officials sent down to them by the central government. The villagers' loyalties are first to the family, then to the *ho,* or clan, and then to the village. If the government is to win their support, it must seek local participation and advice in the selection of local officials. Again it is a question of mutual trust. The government must show its confidence in the people by appointing the district chief whenever possible from among the residents of the district. Similarly, the province chief should be a man who was raised in that province.

The Constitution states that "during the first Presidential term, the President shall appoint province chiefs." It also provides for a House of Representatives of between one and two hundred members elected "from separate constituencies no larger than provinces." This permits us to plan for the day when each district will have its own representative in the legislature. Ultimately, Article 71 of the Constitution directs that province chiefs themselves "will be popularly elected through universal suffrage by direct and secret ballot."

The nature of the war requires that our nation be governed by a strong central government. Local officials must be responsive to the central authority. But if that government is to be strong, the local officials must be men of the people rather than outsiders. The term of the first president (he is elected for four years and can be reëlected once) provides an adequate period during which we can make the orderly transition toward the goal of local administration so wisely envisaged in the Constitution.

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III

As the loyal opposition begins to play a responsible and respected role in the government, communication between the "rice roots" and Saigon will increase and intelligence will begin to flow from the people upward to the government. This will be that rare kind of personal intelligence about the communist infrastructure which is needed to identify the individual members of the clandestine Viet Cong organization that for so long has brutally terrorized our population.

To understand why our intelligence has been so inadequate, we must realize that those who live in the rural areas have for years been caught between two mobile armed forces. The villager has suffered much from both sides. Is it any wonder he has become cautious, taciturn, withdrawn? He rarely trusts anyone beyond his immediate family. His loyalties are patriarchal. His code is the traditional Code of the Le's[1] which defines his relationship to his elders. Where the wisdom of the patriarch deems it safe to share confidence beyond the immediate family, information is exchanged cautiously within the *ho*. Since the clan is composed of all families having a common ancestor, and as the span of lineage can be reckoned as far as the ninth generation, the *ho* can be quite extensive.

But even within this blood relationship, it must be remembered that most Vietnamese families have been torn apart by the long, long war. For my generation, the fighting started in 1930 with the Yen Bay uprising, years before the Japanese invaded our country. And when Viet Nam was partitioned at Potsdam and at Geneva, so too was nearly every Vietnamese family. Contact and communication, even among kinsmen, were severed.

Despite these difficulties, rural intelligence nets can and must be formed. However, they can start only from within a family, within a village. They must be protected and nurtured as carefully as an orchid seedling. It is futile to expect—as government after government in Saigon has done—that outsiders from the capital can be sent into the villages to gather intelligence. Reliable intelligence nets, if properly tended, can grow within the *ho*. Beyond the *ho*, there are the sects, the religions, the secret political societies, minority groups like the montagnards or the Chams, and even embryonic labor organizations (such as the taxi drivers

[1] Written during the Le Dynasty by Emperor Le-hanh-Ton (1460–1497).

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of Saigon) that also can make important intelligence contributions.

Foreigners cannot hope to establish or operate such networks. They are wise to concentrate instead on the scientific and technological aids which can help locate larger enemy formations in the field. When these two complementary intelligence systems can be joined together, our commanders will no longer have to fight the war blindfolded as they have in the past.

Fighting the war blindfolded is a tactical reality that complicates our military effort in South Viet Nam. However, broader strategic considerations complicate it even more. These can be discussed only in the context of the cold-war struggle going on around us. From our viewpoint, the intensity of this global conflict has grown rather than diminished since World War II. Although this wider conflict is beyond our scope and resources as a small emerging nation, we still have our part to play. Like the King's pawn in the Roy Lopez opening, we seem to have become central to the outcome of the entire chess game. Powerful external forces are brought to play in our defense and powerful external forces seek our destruction. Yet the battlefield is our land and our people. The tragedy is that brave men from at home and abroad are dying to keep us free; and brave men—in this case, our own brothers—are dying to unify us under communism.

The conflict also involves strange political aberrations called sanctuaries. The communists have sanctuaries in Cambodia and in Laos. Our friends have sanctuaries in Thailand and Okinawa. These are part of the rules of the worldwide conflict, but the rationale is sometimes hard for us to understand.

In the final analysis, the strategy of the struggle is the strategy of containment. Externally it is the strategy of containment of communist expansion; to this we are pledged as an army, as a nation and as a people. Internally, whether we like it or not, it is a strategy of containment of the conflict within the borders of Viet Nam. At first it was confined to the South. Then the North was made to feel the brutal steel of war. Now, in the interest of peace, which we all so earnestly seek, the war has ceased north of the nineteenth parallel.

The present strategy, the result of this illicit union of external and internal containment, is a monster child called attrition. Much as we loathe it, we have had to live with it since 1954. But within the borders of South Viet Nam, global and ideological

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considerations become somewhat academic. As we see it, the war in our country is simply the defense of our homes against aggression.

IV

As we step back from the present conflict and look at the entire post-1954 period, we can see that our biggest mistake was to have gone too fast when we should have gone slow; and to have gone too slow when we should have gone fast. In the early days of the Republic we pressed too rapidly to destroy the political power of the sects, and in so doing turned them against the government rather than making them our allies as we gradually integrated them into the fiber of the nation. We went too quickly in building strategic hamlets, and too slowly in arming and equipping the villager to defend his home. We rushed forward with the trappings of democracy, while our government lagged in gaining the confidence of the people.

Our next big mistake was to place loyalty to self, to family, to friends ahead of loyalty to nation. This was doubly wrong when our Republic was fighting to survive in 1955, and it is close to treason to do so now as we struggle against an invasion by regular troops from the North. It is this virus of selfishness which spreads tolerance of corruption among our officials and contributes heavily to the people's lack of confidence in their government.

Another mistake which so many of the South Vietnamese made was to embrace the illusion that they could somehow stand apart from the conflict, disassociating themselves from both their government and the communists, while giving lip-service to either side as the occasion required.

The final mistake was to think, as nearly half of all Vietnamese at one time or another have done, that they and their country could ride the tiger of communism—hopefully being able to settle for a Titoist form of independence—without being eaten when they stepped down from the tiger's back.

The symbolic bird of Viet Nam is the phoenix and, like the phoenix, Viet Nam has throughout its history risen again and again from the ashes of enemy conquest and its own internal mistakes to be a stronger, wiser nation.

The hopes of the Vietnamese are the hopes of any rural people: to live in peace, to own their land, to trust their government and

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to give their children a chance for a better life. They are entitled to see these simple wants fulfilled. Today, half blinded by the haze of war, they are confronted by the choice of which path to follow to their dream. Some, disillusioned by the past, are caught up temporarily in the communist illusion. But as a nation, the Vietnamese know very well how to recognize the reality of freedom. Since 1954 millions have already seen through the promise of the communists and have chosen the hard lot of the refugee rather than to remain in a "People's Republic." Millions more only await the opportunity to make a similar choice with their feet.

It is one thing to divide a country on a map, but it is not so easy to divide a people, to sever the bonds of family, culture and history. The Vietnamese people are one; they cannot be separated into northerners or southerners. We know that partition can never be a lasting solution. We have pledged in our Constitution to unite the nation and to unify the territory. When that time comes, when today's cruel and unnatural political curtain is lifted, Vietnamese North and South will again be brothers, standing arm in arm squarely on the side of the Free World.

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VIET NAM

STILL THE SEARCH FOR GOALS

By Edward G. Lansdale

RETURNING home after years of service in Viet Nam, I am nagged by the insistent thought that we have not yet adequately answered a plain question: What is it, exactly, that we seek in Viet Nam?

The question is hardly a new one. It has been asked over and over again and answered as often, in statements by leaders in Viet Nam and by leaders elsewhere, among them several Presidents of the United States and even a number of thoughtful writers in this review. Yet, judging by the nature of the actions undertaken in Viet Nam and by the continuing debates over the issues of the war wherever they can be freely discussed, it is evident that the answers have not satisfied a need and that the question remains still posed, alive, demanding.

We have to answer the question *fully*. In stopping short of complete answers, we may be compounding the cost of this long struggle in terms of irreplaceable human and spiritual resources as well as in material expenditures. This is most obvious on the battleground in Asia, but at home, too, the probing has gone so deeply that it touches the innermost core of American beliefs, troubling us more perhaps than any issue since the Civil War.

Without a sound answer, the seemingly endless war in Viet Nam becomes just that—seemingly endless. Alternatively, it may be headed for an end that could be dishonorable, with profound consequences. As a people who pride themselves on being pragmatic, we can surely accept the practical idea that when we are all risking so much to get some place, we must agree on the destination, so that all of our efforts will be directed toward it, not dispersed, reversed, tangled or impeded. We need goals that are truly defined, as a constant guide to action, whether for the prosecution of the war or for the founding of a just peace.

II

About two thousand years ago, Matthew of Capernaum said: "Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" Are our actions in Viet Nam such that they will bear grapes and figs, or are we gathering only thorns and

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thistles? The answer of course is that we have been in an allegorical jungle, mixing up vines, trees, thorns and thistles in grand profusion. Perhaps we have had just too many gardeners, including some with a bent toward the thorns and thistles, as well as those who wanted just vines and trees.

Identifying our goals from the major actions we have undertaken in Viet Nam, they can be described as follows: to eliminate the enemy south of the 17th parallel; to hamper the enemy's supply routes coming into South Viet Nam; to ease the shock of shifting millions of people away from temporary battle areas; to place security forces in the countryside; to start bringing the rudiments of a better life to the people in villages and hamlets; to update the system of the central government into the twentieth century; to institute the forms of a self-governing democracy; and to provide facilities for a vast increase in commerce. These are the thrusts of our major actions and hint at the complexity of the struggle in Viet Nam. Two by-products of these major actions also are worthy of mention: the forced growth of English as a second language for the Vietnamese (how else can they speak with their various allies today?) and—for Americans—the proving of Parkinson's law about bureaucratic proliferation. Perhaps these two by-products will be the ones that will last for centuries.

Admittedly, the statement of our aims as noted above has a righteous sound to it. Yet it bristles with thorns and thistles. For example, we concentrate on eliminating the enemy by physical means and have relied superstitiously on the magic of casualty numbers to reassure ourselves that we are winning, since the enemy's casualties are far heavier than ours; yet the enemy has steadily increased the size of his forces in South Viet Nam. Further, in pursuing this major aim, the people often have been in the way, helplessly, and have suffered. Despite our considerable efforts to prevent it, the people still suffer grievously. Even the remarkable new injunction to Vietnamese troops to love the people becomes a mockery, given the actuality of the battleground. Thus, if one of our stated aims is to help the people of Viet Nam, at least one of our practices is counterproductive. Unfortunately, it is the practice we pursue the most vigorously.

Each of our other demonstrated aims has its thorns and thistles also, along with plenteous grapes and figs. In updating the central Vietnamese government into the twentieth century, we apparently have generated the types of official corruption so prevalent

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in the Western world in the early days of this century, even complete with budding counterparts of Jacob Riis, Lincoln Steffens and other "muckrakers" to expose and right the wrongs. At least one of the major American actions—the providing of facilities, particularly airfields and new harbors, for a vast increase of commerce some day in the future—has led to wondrous speculation by the Vietnamese. I recall a group of Vietnamese villagers looking on in amazement as Americans were building one of the many new airfields on the ground where they had once lived and grown crops. A Vietnamese official blandly explained to them, tongue in cheek, that this was the way Americans built highways secretly; eventually all the new airfields would be linked together in one grand super-super-highway running throughout the country.

In all of this immense activity, we seem to be struggling toward some day when the long war will end with a whimper instead of a bang. The whimper is apt to be a prolonged one. Not enough of our aims are focused sharply on what most want for Viet Nam when an honest peace has been established. We surely must hope for something better than mere surcease from current agonies, something far beyond an enemy turned into corpses, a massive central governmental structure, lip-service to democracy or millions of once self-reliant people in a welfare status. If we do hope for something more or better or far beyond these things, we still have time—barely—to spell it out plainly and to make use of our magnificent capabilities to attain it.

The enemy, despite his pretensions, has been sorely hurt. This "war of national liberation" has not gone according to script for him any more than our countereffforts have for us. There are even some among the enemy leaders who retain a spark of feeling for humanity, for the "masses" mentioned so casually these days in their dialectics, and who must be desperately fed up with the ambitions of the handful of cold, humorless men who still hunger to gain control of all the people of Viet Nam for their own ends. It is even possible that, given some plainly spoken and understandable goals to be sought in Viet Nam, many among the enemy might awaken to the fact that they have been seeking much the same goals—and that they have small reason left for fighting us.

III

Then, what is it exactly that we Americans *should* be seeking in Viet Nam? Our paramount desire, undoubtedly, is to achieve

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peace. Yet, we also want some fairness about this peace, and scarcely any thoughtful person among us really believes that the leaders on the other side have the same concept of fairness as we do. Somehow, the peace must be such that the free Vietnamese can speak out in the same spirit as Lincoln in 1865 as our Civil War drew to a close.[1]

However, when we speak of a "free choice" for the Vietnamese, we are immediately in semantic trouble. Laudable as it seems to us, to the Vietnamese it raises a vision of a plebiscite, presumably one held under international auspices, with supervision by an international commission which could be no more effective than that established by the Geneva Accords of 1954, or the international supervision of the agreement on Laos. Mistrust comes from witnessing circumvention of the intent of solemn pledges, when one's "life, fortune and sacred honor" are placed in jeopardy by such circumvention. The true Vietnamese nationalists have a deep-seated suspicion that the Vietnamese communists would use coercion and other forms of cheating, unseen or unrecognized by any international commission. Perhaps the communists feel the same way about the nationalists.

This American precept of a "free choice" could be carried out in a way more familiar to the Vietnamese. The way could be to permit the Vietnamese "to vote with their feet," as millions of Vietnamese have been doing in escaping from enemy-controlled areas or from combat zones these past years, and as nearly a million Vietnamese did in moving out of communist North Viet Nam in 1954–55 under the Geneva Accords. It is by now a way of voting familiar to the Vietnamese. A Vietnamese philosopher has suggested that a peace settlement might provide for the division of Viet Nam into three parts: a communist North, a free South and a coalition Center. The people throughout Viet Nam would be given an appropriate period to move to the area governed by the régime of their choice. The new coalition region in the Center would be formed by taking land from both north and south of the present DMZ at the 17th parallel; its size would depend on the number of people who opted to live there under a coalition government. Those in North Viet Nam who want to live in freedom

[1] "With malice towards none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan —to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations."

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would be given a new chance to move to the South; those who want a communist régime could move to the North. The concept is an attractive one, since it involves all of Viet Nam, has face-saving features for all Vietnamese leaders and offers a "free choice" with real substance.

When we Americans speak of "freedom" for the Vietnamese, we mean the opposite of "slavery," which we see as the status of people living under communist authoritarian rule, where the few dictate how the many shall exist. Thus, we would be untrue to our own definition if, having sacrificed so much in the long struggle in Viet Nam, we ended up by giving the people a choice between living under a Leninist system of authoritarian rule or living under another set of masters over whom they have little control. The whims of men with guns—military, police or paramilitary forces—are hardly sound foundations for "freedom." It becomes imperative, therefore, that constitutional government in South Viet Nam be helped to evolve fully and rapidly in ways that make sense to, and are workable by, the Vietnamese—both for the prosecution of the war and the preparations for peace. A start has been made: a Constitution has been written and adopted, and some of the institutions described in it have already been created; others still await birth and must come alive soon, for the health of the whole body politic depends upon them. All of the constitutional provisions would benefit—would grow more sturdily—with our understanding encouragement.

It would be appropriate, too, for us to turn to the preamble of our own Constitution for some guidance on what it is that should be sought in Viet Nam. Although the Vietnamese Constitution is Vietnamese and not American, it shares the fundamental principles subscribed to by free people, and is compatible with the spirit of ours. (These shared beliefs are the true basis of comradeship amongst the free people on earth—our common ideology.) The preamble of the U.S. Constitution sets forth our goals in terms understandable to all: ". . . establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. . . ." These goals have great pertinency to the efforts of Americans in Viet Nam today.

Like ourselves, the Vietnamese people place a high value on "justice." (The Vietnamese who participated in the overthrow of Diem in 1963 spoke yearningly of their desires for "social

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justice." The American Declaration of Independence is devoted largely to the detailing of injustices as the motives for the American action.) The Vietnamese Constitution provides the means to establish a "rule of law" in Viet Nam, yet its realization still awaits birth through the legislative processes of the National Assembly. Even when these means are activated, there will be gigantic tasks ahead to achieve equal justice for all citizens and to obtain laws appropriate to representative government instead of a jumble of colonial and mandarinal dictates. Despite rudimentary efforts, there has been too little American help and encouragement to the Vietnamese in establishing justice for all.

To "provide for the common defense" surely means the provision of better protection for the people in villages and hamlets rather than an overemphasis on the security of a few ranking military commanders, of province and district chiefs, and of military posts, camps and stations. In so doing, the Vietnamese armed forces would rediscover a form of "people's warfare" that long predates the form postulated by the communist strategists, a form toward which the South Vietnamese have made only the barest start.

Insuring "domestic tranquility" and promoting "the general welfare" are two goals that already have high places on the agenda of American efforts in Viet Nam. Many of our programs, such as those involving the national police, public health, agriculture, public works, trade and refugees, are devoted to these objectives. Most of the criticisms of our endeavors in Viet Nam are aimed not at these laudable goals themselves but at how well—or badly—we have been achieving them. A more pertinent criticism might be that a reëvaluation of our total effort would show that, while we are being so generous with material aid to attain these goals, we are being too skimpy with our help toward other goals, such as establishing justice.

Perhaps the most difficult goal of all would be for Americans to help the Vietnamese "secure the blessings of liberty." In modern social studies and governmental practices, such a goal seems quaint, too vaguely worded. Yet it is the essence of what the Vietnamese yearn for, and some practical steps have been taken by the Vietnamese to achieve it. More realistic help and encouragement from us would give them a better chance of success. For example, one of the most significant and far-reaching events in Viet Nam during the past few years was the initiation in the

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spring of 1967 of elected councils having executive powers in villages deemed "secure" enough to make elections feasible. This offers at least the chance to win "the blessings of liberty" and places responsibility in the hands of the people—in a modern adaptation of an ancient Vietnamese custom. In practice, progress has been slow. The number of villages and hamlets having their own elected officials must be steadily increased and the scope of authority of these elected officials should be enlarged. To one who believes in democracy, the fair implementation of laws for land reform and the means to attain redress would seem to fare best if made a responsibility of the elected village council.

The Vietnamese Constitution provides for the elective system to extend up through the villages and through the provinces until it reaches the national level. Some believe that, due to the contingencies of the war, bringing these provisions into practice can be delayed. Such timidity is not necessary. A start can be made. It would be feasible now to elect the Province Chief in a province as "secure" as An Giang, extending the selection of governors by the consent of the governed to other provinces and to "secure" cities as rapidly as possible. The incentive of self-government would give demonstrable meaning to the whole political change taking place in the midst of war in Viet Nam, add immeasurably to the sense of nationhood, provide an attainable public instrument for curbing the corruption of officials, and greatly increase the people's sense of participation and involvement as the war is prosecuted and the peace planned. The time for such an incentive is now, not later. Many of the younger Vietnamese leaders feel this urgently; they are close enough to the people to appraise correctly their great resiliency. They want to move ahead faster; they deserve our steady support.

We have concentrated on killing the enemy and bringing our material resources to bear on the outcome of the war. These actions have had some success in teaching the communists the costly folly of adventuring into "wars of national liberation." The same actions, though, have taught us that the American tendency to rely mostly on muscle and material wealth is not good enough to achieve the goals to which we and the Vietnamese aspire. Our greatest strength lies in our belief in precepts that "we, the people" cherish. Surely it is time to make fuller use of this strength. In so doing, we can lead the way to a true people's peace, not war.

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REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN FRANCE

By Edmond Taylor

ON the surface at least, the Gaullist régime in France now looks substantially stronger than before the May crisis. The June elections gave General de Gaulle and his then Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, a massive parliamentary majority that for the next five years seemingly insures M. Pompidou's successor, former Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, against every normal political hazard—except, perhaps, the eventual loss of his master's confidence. What is probably even more important, the deep national consensus indicated by the scale and circumstances of the Gaullist electoral victory has clearly restored the General's momentarily shaken faith in his own thaumaturgic powers. If a new confrontation between the state and the revolutionary students and workers develops during the next few months, as it may, General de Gaulle can no doubt count this time on a prompt reawakening of the "national instinct" that responded so sluggishly to his leadership last spring. The loyalty of the police, which wavered for a few dangerous days in May after Pompidou's apparent surrender to the students, has been consolidated by appropriate administrative measures during the summer months; the loyalty of the army, which had to be won over at the crucial moment by the amnesty promised General Raoul Salan and other former rebels or conspirators against de Gaulle's Algerian policies, is thought to be fully dependable today. The split between the orthodox Communists and the revolutionaries of the New Left, which probably helped more than either General de Gaulle's charisma or General Massu's armored force-in-being to save the bourgeois republic in its hour of peril, seems to have become even more bitter and unbridgeable since the elections. There is no direct and overt threat to the General's authority from the Right. The personal rivalries and ideological tensions that unquestionably exist within the majority do not seem incoercible. The economic and financial problems that confront the Government are serious, but not, as far as one can judge, unmanageable.

Favorable as the situation thus appears from General de Gaulle's viewpoint—and even, perhaps, from that of the nation at large—certain elements in it worry a number of his political

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allies and some of his own followers. Frenchmen who are less interested in the survival of Gaullism as a power system than in that of French democracy (albeit within the framework of an authoritarian republic) feel even more concern. "At bottom, nothing has been settled," Jacques Duhamel, the rising young leader of a waning centrist opposition, warned his antirevolutionary colleagues in the new National Assembly last July. "The apparent security that the Government enjoys from the size of its majority should not lead it to forget the grave warning furnished by the events of last May."

Though there is little likelihood that government or majority will soon forget what Parisians still refer to simply as "the Events," there appears to be some danger that the wrong conclusions may be drawn from them. A number of Gaullists, or neo-Gaullists, have already fallen into error on this score, judging from the overheated calls in the National Assembly for sterner police action against left-wing disturbers of the peace; or judging from the immunity all too frequently enjoyed by rightist hoodlums around the country whose activities are sometimes unpleasantly reminiscent of Mussolini's early *squadristi* or Hitler's Storm Troopers.[1]

The disarray of the opposition (especially the Left), the Gaullist landslide at the polls, the somewhat exaggerated stress on revolutionary subversion and conspiracy in Gaullist electoral propaganda, the occasional excesses of the Government-sponsored civic action squads during the campaign, and the rehabilitation of former ultra-rightist terrorists have all contributed to the present unhealthy political atmosphere in France. It is not improved by the top-heavy Gaullist majority in the new National Assembly, which, though elected in part by normally leftist voters, seems to include a number of militant right-wingers, or in any case to express at times a militantly rightist mood.

General de Gaulle himself undoubtedly bears some responsibility for the creation of this mood, with its repressive and reactionary undertones. Any less practiced or less supremely self-confident master-sorcerer might well quail at what he has summoned from the deep. But as long as de Gaulle remains in the

[1] A minor, but typically ugly, incident occurred during the summer theatrical festival at Avignon. The American Living Theatre troupe, composed in the main of long-haired but serious-minded and strictly nonviolent cultural dissenters—who had earlier been denounced by the newly elected Gaullist deputy as "idle Freudians"—was molested by unidentified defenders of Western tradition; one member or supporter of the group had his head forcibly shaved.

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Elysée he can be counted on to prevent the exploitation of the conservative reaction by crypto-fascist demagogues. As Maurice Duverger, a leading French political scientist, has pointed out in *Le Monde,* the General coped successfully with a quite similar situation once before. "It has not been sufficiently stressed," Professor Duverger observes, "that General de Gaulle's victory in 1968 has ultimately the same significance as his victory in 1958. Both times he was carried to power by a rightist tidal wave—raised by opposition to the Algerian revolution ten years ago, by hostility to the student revolt last June. In both cases he prevented the wave from totally submerging the nation and destroying democracy."

It would be more prudent to say that General de Gaulle has so far succeeded in saving French democracy from the forces of reaction set in motion by the student revolt. His continued success depends in part on his ability to keep the revolt itself from flaring up again as a serious threat to public order. "The student movements cannot by themselves overthrow the régime," Duverger contends in the article cited. "But they can menace it sufficiently—or give the impression of menacing it—to maintain and aggravate a sense of insecurity in the social body as a whole that might push it toward some form of dictatorship as the only protection against anarchy."

If Duverger's analysis is correct—and there is much evidence to support him—a few nights of street-fighting in the Latin Quarter on the scale of last May might prove enough to turn the Fifth Republic into a neo-Vichyite caricature of itself. In the unlikely event that a new student insurrection actually drove de Gaulle from power, Duverger believes that he might be succeeded by a military junta on the Greek model.

The massive repudiation at the polls of the students' insurrectionary aims and the triumph of what the young rebels consider as "reaction" have not put an end to their agitation. Their apparent ability to catalyze extreme or irrational attitudes among their opponents, which is partly a reflection of the irrationality underlying their own extremism and partly the effect of their special techniques of subversion, therefore represents a continuing danger to the survival of French democracy, if not of Gaullist power. A cool look, however, at the forces and mechanisms of revolutionary violence in France today indicates that the danger should not be overdramatized.

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II

Perhaps the most redoubtable threat to social tranquility in the Fifth Republic is simply the new revolutionary mythology generated by the upheavals of last spring, especially those in the Latin Quarter. In a sense, Raymond Aron was right in characterizing the student insurrection as a kind of "revolutionary psychodrama" seeking the catharsis of accumulated social and cultural frustrations rather than a bona fide revolution arising from some intolerable injustice or inspired by some explosive new idea. The strong element of make-believe by no means lessened its dynamism, however. Alexis de Tocqueville noted with some scorn the similarly imitative and unauthentic passions which motivated the revolutionary movement of 1848 at its Parisian beginnings, but he was well aware that this "wretched tragedy staged by provincial Thespians," as he termed one of its key episodes, had momentous implications for the future of Europe.

Like the Paris insurrectionaries of February 1848, who were imitating the revolutions of 1830 and 1789, the French students modeled their uprising on the Chinese and Cuban revolutions. They superficially updated the romantic socialism of 1848 with criticisms of the industrial society (plucked, it would seem at random, from the writings of Herbert Marcuse and Kenneth Galbraith), and their revolutionary histrionics, akin to those reported by Tocqueville, resulted in a disheveled but intensely dramatic Happening that has already become part of the world folklore of youth, from Berkeley to Dakar. Grafted onto the heady myth of Youth at the Barricades are delusive misinterpretations of what actually happened. One is that the Revolution of 1968, launched by the paving-stones of the heroic Paris students, was on the point of taking power in France and founding a new, fraternal, libertarian, de-alienated, unrepressed and nonconsuming social order, when it was stabbed in the back by the senile bureaucrats of the Communist Party. The other is a slightly more sophisticated, hence dangerous, theory of revolutionary strategy.

According to this theory, Trotsky, Castro, Ché Guevara and the great Chinese military doctrinaire, Marshal Lin Piao, are all correct up to a point, but they all overestimated the difficulty of carrying out a successful revolution in an advanced industrial society not previously disrupted by war or economic breakdown. Georges Sorel, the theoretician of the revolutionary general strike,

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was closer to the truth in one respect. It is necessary, according to the new theory, for a social group that is not caught in the toils of "the system" to set off the revolutionary disorder which will paralyze or dislocate the repressive organs of the state and create the right conditions for a successful general strike. In the industrial society, the working class, contrary to the classic Marxist doctrine, can no longer play the role of revolutionary detonator, because it has been "integrated" into the society. Youth, however, is not yet "integrated," and its intellectual vanguard, the students, can launch it into the revolutionary struggle.

In the great industrial centers where students and young "unintegrated" workers are most heavily concentrated, the police forces of bourgeois society are far more vulnerable than they appear to be. The urban form of guerrilla warfare, if waged in accordance with sound tactical principles, can be as effective as any other kind. This was demonstrated by the spectacular success of the Tet offensive in Viet Nam last winter. For some reason the Paris students, as one of their leaders told a French reporter, considered that the Viet Cong exploits during the offensive not only demonstrated the helplessness of the American military machine in the face of dedicated urban guerrillas, but discredited the American school of sociology whose teachings had hitherto held their minds in awe of the industrial society. According to this student speaker, to launch the revolutionary process only one thing is needed: "to will the revolution." Organization is unnecessary; in fact it is a danger and a handicap. Ideology is irrelevant. Get the revolutionaries acting together and they feel together, even if they do not think together; barricades before dialectics. Physical destruction of the enemy is not essential; it is enough to destroy him symbolically, to shatter his morale by spectacular acts of resistance and defiance, "to do something striking and forbidden"—*e.g.* in a university to occupy the administrative offices as the seat of "institutional repression."[2]

A number of responsible French intellectuals, including some whose sympathies were with the students last May, have since been trying to warn them against new revolutionary adventures inspired by such oversimplifications, half-truths and plain self-deceptions. The Communists, scandalized by the students' contention that revolution can be "willed" into being without waiting for authorization from Moscow, or even history, have been hammer-

[2] Philippe Labro *et al*, "Ce n'est qu'un début." Paris: Edition Spéciale, 1968.

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ing home the same point. (No doubt they were still more pained by the students' freely expressed view that revolution is something too serious to be entrusted to the leadership of over-age professional revolutionaries.) In his lengthy report to the Party's Central Committee on the May disorders and their electoral epilogue in June, Waldeck Rochet, the leader of the French Communists, repeatedly fulminated against the new leftist deviationists who propose "substituting the juvenile revolution for the proletarian revolution." Such "pseudo-revolutionary theories," he declared, were being spread in France by "the powerfully subsidized propaganda of Mao Tse-tung's group, by the Trotskyites, and by other groups equally alien to true Marxism." Marcuse was singled out for particular attention as a false revolutionary prophet. As for the belief that between May 25 and May 30 the Gaullist régime had practically crumbled away and that power could have been taken over without risk, Rochet charged it was the result of a "veritable campaign of intoxication orchestrated by the Government itself," and aimed at enticing the workers to commit acts of rebellion so that the army could be sent against them.

There is no evidence to support the charge that the Government deliberately exaggerated the appearance of weakness in order to trap the workers, but the Communist contention that the Gaullist régime had pulled itself together by the end of May —after a few days of disarray produced by its earlier blunders— and was supported by most of the nation, is corroborated by everything that has happened since. Jean-Paul Sartre, the aging *enfant terrible* of the French intellectual Left, was thus helping to keep alive what is a dangerous myth (of the Lost Revolution) when he told the German weekly *Der Spiegel* in July that the French Communists had "betrayed the May revolution" by ending the strikes and accepting elections they knew they would lose. Such myths, and the nostalgia for the barricades that accompanies them, die hard. Some of the more romantic May revolutionists even appear to have convinced themselves that the revolution, though betrayed, was never really lost and is steadily advancing from triumph to triumph. The repressive excesses that have occurred since May 30, and the occasional disturbing symptoms of fascism in the national mood, are thought to confirm this sanguine thesis. As one brilliant, if slightly bemused, young French sociologist remarked in summing up the positive achievements of the

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May revolution, "The repressive and absurd nature of the state apparatus and of the social system has been unveiled."[3]

Though the revolutionary myths and fallacies that sprang up with the barricades in May still have a potentially dangerous currency among students, alienated young factory workers and irresponsible or politically illiterate intellectuals, the organized groups actually committed to revolutionary violence or subversion in France seem relatively feeble. The Communists, who remain a powerful political force in the country despite their losses in the elections, claim to be at the same time intransigently revolutionary in their aims and impeccably legal in their methods. In reality, as far as an observer can judge, the Party maintains its underground conspiratorial apparatus and continues to believe in violence as a legitimate form of political action, but has no present intent to overthrow the capitalist system in France, by force or otherwise. The Communist leaders clearly regard the heretics of the New Left as a greater threat than the traditional class enemy, and while denouncing the "reactionary" Gaullist régime in public, avoid doing anything that might hamper it in repressing the forces of revolutionary extremism. "Objectively," as Sartre put it in his *Spiegel* interview, the Party can be considered an "accomplice" of the régime, though it might be both politer and more accurate to term it a kind of loyally disloyal opposition.

The new revolutionary Left is composed of the traditional extremist splinter groups—anarchist, Trotskyite, neo-Stalinist and, in the last few years, Maoist—organized by adult workers or intellectuals; of the militant student organizations loosely affiliated with them, that sprang into existence or prominence during the recent disorders; of various decentralized coördinating committees; and of ideological sympathizers in the dissident Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste Unifié,* or PSU) and the labor unions, particularly the Catholic-oriented CFTD (French Confederation of Democratic Workers). At different times government spokes-

[3] "La Brèche," by Edgar Morin, Claude Lefort and Jean-Marc Coudray, in "La Révolution Anticipée." Paris: Fayard, 1968. Incidentally, the satisfaction that intellectuals of the French New Left derive from seeing the state goaded into proving how repressive it can be, or the bourgeoisie provoked into demonstrating how reactionary it is, reminds some foreign and French observers, among them Raymond Aron, of the suicidal attitudes displayed by many German leftists—including at that time the Communists—in 1930 and 1931. And as Aron pertinently noted in one of his articles on the May crisis in *Le Figaro,* "Professor Marcuse, the grandfather of today's 'wild men,' had already adopted an attitude of categorical negation toward the existing régime, then the Weimar Republic."

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men have hinted darkly at vast international conspiracies underlying the local disorders, and press articles evidently based on declassified police or intelligence reports have focused attention now on one, now on another of the extreme-leftist groups as the primary source of subversive agitation in the country. It is true that the groups named have engaged in revolutionary conspiracy; they do number among their members professional, or at least semiprofessional, revolutionaries and have contacts of some sort with international political organizations or the political warfare services of foreign powers.

Three youth or student groups have gained particular notoriety. The so-called Movement of March 22, which played a considerable part in getting the student agitation started last spring, is an amorphous body dedicated to the cult of revolutionary action rather than to any particular ideology. Like its original leader, the German student, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, many of its members might be classified as neo-anarchists, but some of them are Guevarists or other types of revolutionary romantics. The organization that seems to have played the biggest role in the street demonstrations and on the barricades of the Latin Quarter was the JCR (Communist Revolutionary Youth), a Trotskyite movement affiliated with the French section of the Fourth International, but which also has friendly contacts with the Italian and Cuban Communist parties. The UJCML (Union of Young Marxist-Leninist Communists) is a "Maoist" or at least pro-Chinese political club founded by dissident Communist students in 1966 and dedicated to the principles of the Cultural Revolution as understood on the Left Bank. It is reputed to have the greatest influence among Paris university—and some high-school—students. It likewise seems to have been the main link between the Latin Quarter insurgents and the young factory workers who spearheaded the strike movement throughout the country. Whether the young French "Maoists" have been getting anything more substantial than sympathy and an occasional cup of green tea from the Chinese embassy in Paris, or from other official agencies of Peking in Europe, is not clearly established.

The three groups just named, and a number of minor ones, were dissolved by a government decree on June 12, their publications were banned, and some of their members have since been arrested for illegal underground activity. (For some reason, the French police have been cracking down mainly on the young Trotskyites

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(JCR), while the "Maoists" have been little disturbed in their summer "long march," wherein they split up and sought jobs in factories or proletarian vacation camps in order to spread the Maoist gospel.) Legally, the Government felt it had ample grounds for suppressing the various extremist groups. Whether the action was expedient remains to be seen. Above all, it seems doubtful that it has eliminated the roots of revolutionary agitation in France. Important though their role as "detonators" was at one point, the suppressed groups, whose total combined membership is estimated to lie somewhere between 5,000 and 16,000, did not necessarily constitute the hard core of the revolutionary movement.

Probably the movement has no real core, which is at once its strength and its weakness. In so far as the source of its dynamism can be localized, two organizational nexuses seem particularly important. One is the recently politicized national leadership of the originally apolitical student federation, UNEF (National Union of French Students), and the closely allied professional union of university-level teaching personnel, SNESup (*Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieure*). The other is simply the neighborhood committees originally organized to protest against the war in Viet Nam and American "imperialism," the so-called *Comités Viet Nam de Base*. More and more evidence is accumulating to suggest that the real "Maoist" influence on the French Left is exercised through these decentralized neighborhood committees uniting many shades of leftist opinion around practical objectives accepted by all, rather than through the official Marxist-Leninist organizations. They likewise played a vital role in developing and training the young activists who finally "detonated" the student revolt.

III

Neither the militant leaders of UNEF and SNESup nor the Maoist and Trotskyite activists in the neighborhood committees can order a renewal of the May insurrection at will, assuming that they want to, and the suppressed revolutionary organizations probably lack the numerical strength to do so. A revolutionary consensus would first have to be built up again. The régime might crystalize such a consensus against itself if it went too far in its pursuit of absolute order in the streets and on the campuses. On the other hand, a combination of limited police action to contain

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the revolution, and of bold social reforms aimed at isolating the extremists and winning over the moderate or uncommitted elements of the New Left, could almost certainly avert the danger of a serious new outbreak.

General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Couve de Murville probably understand the problem, though the General's authoritarian temperament may lead him to overestimate the importance of eradicating relatively trivial threats to public order. He is less likely to underestimate the need for drastic reform, and some of his more conservative followers may get a bad shock when the long-promised Gaullist program for the "decolonization" of the French worker and for the liberation of the French provinces from the imperialism of the capital is fully unveiled.

Already, General de Gaulle's personally selected new Minister of Education, Edgar Faure, perhaps the deepest as well as the shrewdest political mind in the Cabinet, has furnished an intriguing preview of the Government's plans for a radical transformation of the overly centralized, overly authoritarian, overly mandarinized French educational system created by Napoleon and little changed since his day. While the deputies of the majority stirred unhappily in their seats, M. Faure last July informed the National Assembly, and through it the nation, that his proposed reform of the university system in particular would be based on two principles: democratization and modernization. It would be a grave error, he maintained, to blame the recent disorders in the Latin Quarter solely on a revolutionary conspiracy; nor could the eruption be attributed simply to youthful "nihilism or the love of violence." The students would not have responded as they did to extremist leadership if they had not had real grievances. In outlining how he proposed to go about eliminating these grievances M. Faure sounded at moments as if he had joined the Cultural Revolution himself; the verve with which he manipulated its jargon sometimes raised the hackles of his more conservative listeners.

"To those who want to change the consumer-society," the Minister declared, "we say that this type of society is not our ideal, either. We, too, want to see society changed, and we hope to bring about the desired changes through the principle of participation, which is an essential means for reaffirming the personality of individuals and groups, and for enabling them to escape from the alienations of a one-dimensional world. . . . Far from

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giving comfort to the capitalist economic system, participation as practiced within the university should lead to transforming a society of consumption into a society of promotion."

Judging from other hints in M. Faure's speech, it seems that beneath the revolutionary rhetoric borrowed from campus critics there is a real intent to carry out significant and perhaps daring social reforms in France. Unless sabotaged by extremists on one side or the other, and assuming that they will not be put into effect so recklessly as to create economic chaos, General de Gaulle's proposed innovations promise to strengthen democracy in France by introducing it into sectors of French national life where in the past it has scarcely existed: in local government and regional administration, in the universities and high schools, and even, it would seem, in the factories. Unless, however, this grass-roots democratization of French life is accompanied by a renovation and rebirth of democracy at the top of the national power structure, it is by no means certain that it will achieve its aim of making the Fifth Republic revolution-proof. The news programs of the government-controlled radio and TV networks need "decolonization" even more urgently than do the assembly-lines of the nation's factories. "Alienation" is a problem not only in the formalized, overcrowded lecture halls of the Sorbonne and in the dehumanized barrack-tenements of the new industrial suburbs, but in the polling-booths of the republic where the citizens vote for one party, or prime minister, and find that they have in effect elected another. "Participation" is nowhere more vital in a democratic society than in its parliament.

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ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY

By Raymond Vernon

THIRTY-SIX years ago, the President of the United States observed that the U.S. tariff was "solely a domestic question," a subject inappropriate for international bargaining. This view, archaic as it now may seem, stirred no public outcry, no editorial protest in the nation's leading dailies.

But that was another era.

Today, the commitments among the principal non-communist countries of the world cover the subject of tariffs, import and export licenses, and subsidies; the level of foreign exchange rates and the price of gold; the price and quality of international air service; the price of coffee, wheat, sugar and tin; safety-at-sea standards, deep-sea fishing and whaling rights; and the international use of the ether waves. There is a pooling of foreign-aid funds through the World Bank and various regional banking institutions; a pooling of international technical assistance efforts through numerous U.N. agencies. More important still, through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development (OECD) there are well-entrenched habits of international consultation and international persuasion on "domestic" subjects of the most sensitive sort: on internal interest rates, on budgetary and fiscal policy and on employment and incomes policy. And within the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association both the commitments and the consultations go deeper still. A decent respect for the opinions of mankind now seems to require a willingness on the part of sovereigns to expose many critical national economic policies to the collective scrutiny of a jury of peers.

To be sure, the millennium is still far distant. Nations still take it for granted that "the vital interests" of any sovereign, as the sovereign perceives them, will take precedence over any international obligation. The fifty or sixty new countries that have erupted out of their colonial status into national independence over the past twenty years especially treasure their sovereign rights to independent action. Still, as far as the advanced countries are concerned, the generalization holds: the pattern of coördination, consultation and commitment has evolved to such a point

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that freedom of economic action on the part of those nations is materially qualified.

How far will this trend go? As one looks back at the history of international economic relations, there is some basis for the view that the trend has been with us for a long time, pushed almost inexorably by advances in the technology of transport and communication, from the ocean-going windjammer to the airborne jet. But history suggests also that the responses of nations to the near-inexorable pressures for increased contact have been punctuated at times by subtle resistance or savage reaction, enough to throw the process back on its heels for protracted periods. All the elements of both the integrative process and the resistant counter-reaction are present today.

II

The persistence of man in reaching out beyond his national boundaries to exploit the economic opportunities in other lands is amply documented by history, from the Phoenicians' investments in the tin mines of Cornwall to Fiat's commitments in the Soviet Union. For many decades before World War I, international economic ties were critical to the economies that today are thought of as "advanced." Migration was high; capital was flowing across international boundaries at impressive rates; and there were considerable movements of goods among these countries.

From World War I to World War II, the technology of international transportation and communication steadily advanced. But with the characteristic perverseness that punctuates the history of human institutions, the advanced nations demonstrated that they were not the passive pawns of technological change and were quite capable of resisting the implications of such change for a decade or two. While world production went up something like 40 percent in the interwar period, nations managed to suppress the growth of world trade so that it increased by only half the production rate. International investment also was restricted; after an ebullient period of growth in the 1920s, the flow of investment was curbed and reversed in the 1930s.

In general, the interwar period was an era of early Keynesian experimentation, an interval in which many nations turned inward to learn if a proper mix of autarkic national policies could generate full employment and reasonable rates of growth. As part of the disposition for each nation to try to fend for itself, there

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was a rash of competitive devaluations and export subsidies, coupled with national policies aimed at propping up internal demand and floating national economies off the shoals. To implement these policies, it was necessary for governments to restrict trade and control capital movements, irrespective of the integrating pressures created by the advances in transport and communication.

The restrictive initiatives of governments between the two great wars were abetted by equally restrictive undertakings on the part of international business. By World War I, leading national firms in different countries had already begun to have painful encounters with one another in international markets. Part of the contact was by way of competition in international trade, especially for new products in the fields of chemicals, transportation, electrical equipment and machinery. But part of the contact took place by even more intrusive means. A few scores of U. S. enterprises invested in overseas manufacturing subsidiaries, locating them in many instances within the markets of their principal international competitors; a smaller number of European firms did the same. Somehow, as many businessmen of the era saw it, the bruising contacts between business interests from different countries had to be arrested and contained. Accordingly, wherever a few large firms or a few strong producer associations controlled national industries, the industries concerned set about creating agreements that divided world markets on national lines or shared them pro rata among the producers from different nations, thereby limiting the flow of international trade and investment.

While governments and enterprises were busily attempting to clamp down the flow of international transactions, the objective conditions for the growth of those activities perversely continued to improve. World War II accelerated the trend spectacularly. It shrank the Atlantic crossing from four days to seven hours. It turned transatlantic tourism from a rich man's indulgence into a middleclass need. It opened up the possibility for international consultations on a day-to-day basis not only between the officials of governments but also between the engineers, controllers, salesmen and strategists of private firms.

In the years immediately following World War II, before the prewar international cartels could effectively regroup, American businessmen rediscovered Europe; at the same time Europeans began to rediscover one another and the American market. This

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time, however, the contacts were not confined to a few hundred firms on each side of the Atlantic, but were spread over some thousands of enterprises.

The full force of the acceleration in international contacts did not emerge, however, until the early 1960s. By that time the improvements in transportation and communication had been assisted by a wholesale dismantling of governmental restrictions on trade, payments and capital movements among the countries of the advanced world. It was then that the magnitude of the explosion in the international exchange of goods, money, people and ideas really began to be evident. From 1953 to 1965 the volume of international trade in manufactured goods among the advanced countries almost tripled, outrunning the expansion of production by a very considerable margin. Symptomatic of one of the factors behind the increase was the spectacular growth in international air freight, which rose steadily by 20 percent or so per year (in ton-miles). The arrivals and departures of international travelers in North America and Europe grew about 10 percent annually. And direct investment by U. S. interests in the other advanced countries rose annually by about the same percentage.

It was not merely the quantum jump in international contacts that mattered; it was a change in the quality of those contacts as well. The development of a Eurodollar market abroad is illustrative of that qualitative change. Here is a market in which the sale of several billion dollars' worth of paper, denominated in U. S. currency, is being transacted annually between principals who have no ties of residence or nationality to the United States. Commercial banks throughout Europe use Eurodollars with aplomb, often for purely local purposes. Sometimes, for instance, these instruments are used by banks to lay off the surplus funds of their local economies, sometimes to acquire needed funds for local loans.

The quality of the interpenetration and interdependence of the advanced countries is suggested by many other indices, some quite subtle in character. Young Europeans feel detached from the concept of the nation-state: "We are all German Jews," chorused the French student militants as they marched on the National Assembly. There is a willingness to place on the agenda of the OECD and other international organizations such sensitive domestic issues as the monetary and fiscal policies of member gov-

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ernments. And there is a proliferation of private organizations, such as the multinational enterprises, with structures that take only casual account of the way in which sovereign states have drawn their national boundaries.

III

The multinational enterprise provides a striking illustration of the extent to which modern means of communication permit an integrated organization to link resources in different national economies in order to serve a common set of organizational aims. The term "multinational enterprise" is sometimes confusing and always imprecise; but what I have in mind here is simply a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common management strategy. That kind of definition serves well enough to characterize Ford or Nestlé, IBM or Philips.

Nothing is altogether without precedent in human institution-building; but the multinational enterprise, as I use the term here, comes very close to lacking a relevant precedent.

It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that nations began to allow businessmen, as a routine matter of right, to create corporations without limit of life or size of function. And it has only been six or seven decades since most jurisdictions permitted corporations to own other corporations. Because businessmen were not slow to exercise their new prerogatives, it rapidly became commonplace to find clusters of corporations linked together by a common parent, sharing a common pool of resources, and adhering to a common strategy.

Already before World War I there were a few international clusters of corporations containing entities of diverse nationalities within a common organizational structure. Two dozen oil and mining companies, several scores of manufacturing companies and a few banks and insurance companies made up most of the list. Not all of these, however, pretended to administer their far-flung subsidiaries in accordance with a common strategy. As long as the time-cost of face-to-face consultation among corporate affiliates in different countries was so high, there was neither much need nor much opportunity to develop a tight, continuous and integral strategy among them. Accordingly, the subsidiaries remote from the parents that had created them often fell under the effective control of local strong men.

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By 1950 over 400 U. S. companies had assets of $1 million or more in foreign direct investments. But even at that late date, it is doubtful that many saw their foreign investments as much more than peripheral to the corporate structure. The domestic U. S. market was still the serious business of most of these enterprises. The requirements of that market usually determined the mix and design of the firm's products, the direction of its technological curiosity and the nature of its preferred production process. The dollar was thought of as the riskless medium of exchange, while all other currencies were thought of as involving special risk. The Americans in the enterprise were the "natives" of the microcosm, while others in the enterprise were the "foreigners."

In the late 1950s there were major signs of change, and in the ten years that followed the change went very deep. Two tendencies in particular became evident. One strong tendency, especially apparent in the corporate clusters headed by U. S. parents, was toward the reorganization of the control and command mechanism. The "international vice president" or his equivalent, brought into being by the first burst of overseas interest, is rapidly being eliminated. This change is not a sign of the downgrading of the organization's interest in foreign markets, but the very opposite. It is a sign of the elevation and absorption of the business done "abroad" into the mainstream of corporate strategy. In some cases it is more; it is the beginning of the obliteration of the invidious distinction inside the corporation between "home business" and "foreign business." It is the emergence of the strategic view that business should find the best markets, employ the best technology, finance through the best channels, irrespective of geography. It would be pushing history more than a little to say that the U. S. parent firms of multinational enterprises have reached the point at which their affinity to the dollar is no greater than to the franc, or that their identification with Italian markets is as close as with American, or even that their executive recruiting system is as partial to Bavarians as to Hoosiers. But that is the direction of the movement.

The second visible tendency in the structure of U. S. parent firms, closely related to the first, has been the in-gathering of foreign subsidiaries, wherever they may be, under the discipline and framework of a common global strategy and a common global control. The headquarters planning of many of these enterprises is more "global" today than it has ever been. It is capable of

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scanning the world for sales opportunities or production sites or capital supplies or technical skills with greater ease and sophistication than ten years ago. International procurement, cross-hauling and distribution are becoming a commonplace.

One ought not draw the inference from this description that the corporate officers of the subsidiaries are mere puppets of the center, yanked about by computers operating from a distant common post. Many have the discretion to tailor the commands from the center to their local needs. But their conditioning and their objectives are designed to contribute to a common organizational strategy of some sort; otherwise there would be no reason for the existence of the multinational enterprise.

In appraising the possibilities of a reaction to the trend, one has to be aware that the nation-state has sometimes felt threatened by the trend in rather sensitive areas of its existence. So far, multinational enterprises have been concentrated largely in a few industries—in oil and mining, drugs and chemicals, machinery, transportation equipment, and food and tobacco. A few of these industries, as it happens, embrace national activities in which nation-states feel a special vulnerability and insecurity; some of these industries, for instance, relate to the national defense or to irreplaceable national resources or to technological leadership.

To add to the tension, nation-states have come to give credence to some of the more uninhibited projections of the future which picture the multinational enterprise as the overwhelmingly dominant vehicle of the world's business. This kind of projection, one ought to note, is not based on very solid evidence. On the contrary, various studies indicate that with every passing decade, as the world's markets grow, the basic standardized industries, such as aluminum, steel and oil, contain a growing number of firms, not a declining number. More generally, as the technology of any line becomes well and widely known and as the markets for an established product enlarge, additional producers find the barriers to entry less formidable and manage to gain a foothold. It is not foreordained, therefore, that mankind will be swallowed up by the International Colossus Corporation. None the less, that fear exists.

Still another source of the tension created by multinational enterprises arises out of the fact that about four out of five such enterprises are headed by U. S. parents, and that the activity of these enterprises is usually thought of by other nations as an

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extension of the American hegemony. The notion that the General Motors' subsidiary in France in some sense represents an extension of U. S. economic domination to the soil of France may seem a trifle farfetched to most Americans. The interests of General Motors and those of the United States are usually carefully differentiated and sometimes sharply distinguished by the American political process. To Europeans, however, the distinction is not readily evident.

Basing their reaction on an amalgam of fact, fear and fancy, therefore, many governments view the multinational enterprise with a sense of acute discomfort. Few governments would be able to say precisely how and when they expect the global interests of the enterprise to conflict with the national interests of the economy; many of the illustrations that are used to document the fear are patently exceptional or farfetched. But as long as the multinational enterprise has the power, difficult or improbable though its use may sometimes be, to dry up technology or export technicians or drain off capital or reduce production or shift profits or alter prices or allocate export markets, there is a latent or active tension associated with its presence. As long as they are predominantly headed by U. S. firms, there is also a fear that they may be the instruments of U. S. policy. For some governments the tension can be tolerated perfectly well, but for others the sense of loss of control has been much more difficult to abide.

IV

Although it is unlikely that the business of the advanced world will be dominated by a few large firms, it is more than probable that the economic links between the national economies of the advanced world will become even deeper and more intimate. The increasing intimacy of these ties presents challenges of a new order to the individual nation-state.

Picture the economy of any of the advanced countries of North America or Europe as I have sketched it. It is an economy that draws a considerable part of its technology from outside its boundaries, even while it exports a continuous flow of information to others; it relies upon the plants of other nations to provide a flow of critical products, while relying also upon their markets to absorb substantial proportions of the products it generates; it draws on the savings of nationals in other countries for some purposes, while exporting quantities of its own savings to satisfy

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the needs of others; it offers sanctuary to enterprises which frame their strategy in global terms, while expecting some of its own nationals to establish themselves in other countries in pursuit of a global strategy.

One cannot easily trace out all the consequences of this pattern of interpenetration. Some of those consequences, however, are reasonably clear. When the rediscount rate is hiked in New York, the cost of money rises in Brussels; when the United States runs a large budgetary deficit, inflationary pressures build up in Europe; more generally, when Italy has an earthquake, dishes rattle in Holland.

From the point of view of national governments, such a degree of openness on the part of national economies is disconcerting enough. Whatever happens in any economy becomes the pressing business of all the others: a general strike in France; a fall of government in Britain. Regardless of the complex political jockeying that may be going on at a moment of economic crisis, there are compelling pressures on each country to help douse the other's fires. The French disdain of British economic management before their own May fiasco did not altogether exempt them from the need to assist the pound sterling in crisis. The wry American satisfaction at de Gaulle's discomfiture did not permit the U. S. Government to disregard the need to support the franc.

The interdependence of the advanced nations has made them especially vulnerable to the consequences when one of them decides to place a block in the system. When the United States began imposing restrictions on the export of its capital, the Government of Canada felt threatened. The remedy for Canada's problems was in some sense even more disconcerting for the nation-state concept than the original threat had been; in order to continue receiving the necessary flow of capital from the United States, Canada undertook to restrain the reëxport of capital to third countries.

Those same United States restrictions led to largely unanticipated consequences for European capital markets. The subsidiaries of U. S. enterprises, eager to continue building their European business, searched the European economies for idle cash with which to finance their expansion. To help them in the search, American investment bankers made complex partnerships with European financial interests. Coupling American mass selling expertise with European savoir faire, these transatlantic syndicates

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sold some billions of dollars of bonds on the European market, thus changing rather dramatically both the channels and the instruments to which European savings were being drawn.

There is still another implication of the close ties among the economies of the advanced nations, one which in the end may prove the most disconcerting of all. A considerable part of the international flow of money, goods and services among these economies can no longer be thought of as arm's-length transactions. Many of these transactions take place between the sister affiliates of multinational entities. For instance, close to one-third of U. S. exports of nonmilitary manufactured goods, about $6 billion annually, is shipped to the overseas affiliates of U. S. parent firms, while over $5 billion are returned annually to the United States by such affiliates in the form of dividends, interest and royalties.

Apart from the international transactions that take place under the mantle of multinational enterprise, there are also the transactions that take place among the members of more informal international alliances. For instance, the commercial banking and investment banking systems of the advanced countries are now so intimately intertwined that it would be distorting reality to think of many of their transactions as representing arm's-length exchanges.

When international transactions are effected between parties whose relationships are long-term and organic in character, the regulatory capabilities of an intervening state inevitably decline. As a result, any state which senses an inadequacy in its capacity to impose effective restrictions at the border has ample reason for harboring that feeling. For brief periods of time, perhaps, regulatory controls may have a real impact; for longer periods, the illusion of such impact may persist simply because the specific channel that had been blocked by a particular set of controls was responding in line with governmental expectations. But given the complexity of multinational institutions and the presence of so many alternative channels for the legitimate international movement of funds and other resources, the regulating sovereign seems increasingly at a disadvantage.

V

The advanced world, carried ebulliently on the crest of a technological revolution in transportation and communication, has

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absentmindedly set up a virile system of international institutions and relationships that sit alongside the system of nation-states. The system of nation-states has its built-in machinery of political process and public accountability, while the international system wields its power and garners its support by less well-defined means.

In part, the two systems are complementary; in part they are at odds. The international system, when operating benignly, stands for all the good things that can be achieved by open boundaries: more trade, more capital flows, more movement of ideas and people, more growth. The system of nation-states, at its best, stands for all the good things that national policy can hope to provide: more economic security, more social equality, more identification and a sense of belonging. An economic determinist, if asked to project the outcome of the clash between the systems, would probably lean toward the assumption that the international order will prevail. The shrinkage of international distances will continue; the flow of international ideas will accelerate; the opportunities and the requirements of large-scale human endeavor will increase.

But such a prediction, if it were made, would be far too facile, especially for the three or four decades ahead that represent the planning horizon of most of us. There is a stubborn life and purpose in the system of nation-states, and there is a tenacious capacity on the part of mankind indefinitely to disregard the seemingly inevitable. It is perfectly possible, therefore, to picture a sequence of events in which the increasing openness of national boundaries leads to a reaction of disconcerting force. Restrictions on the flow of capital, goods and people could conceivably be the first response to the difficulties and uncertainties that have been generated by the relatively open boundaries of the past decade or two. In classic Hegelian fashion the world may experience a period of revulsion from the international order before it is prepared to move on to a new international synthesis.

Some kinds of problems are less likely to touch off a spasm of revulsion and withdrawal than are others. I would worry only a little, for instance, about the problems that arise over the conflicting jurisdictional reach of nation-states, such as the efforts of one nation to influence the actions of the nationals of another. Conflicts of this sort, which appear from time to time in fields such as antitrust or trading with the enemy or securities regulation,

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can be handled reasonably well as nations grow more sensitive to the problem. A tolerable state of affairs can be created partly by the nation-states' application of self-imposed constraints and partly by their negotiation of common standards.

There are some problems, however, whose solution is not amenable to modest measures of that sort. Some demand consciously coördinated action among sovereigns on issues that are fairly sensitive in terms of domestic politics. The balance-of-payments issue, for instance, when it involves agreements among governments to create Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or "paper gold," begins to move into sensitive territory. The existence of agreements of this sort may go unnoticed by the politicians for a period of time, provided they are sufficiently technical and obscure. But when they begin to demand coördinated economic action tending to restrict the freedom of states to frame independent domestic policies, one can expect to see the beginnings of major difficulty. When this interrelation becomes widely apparent, coördinated action may be resisted by all the principal actors involved: by the governments which would have to share their power with others; and by the enterprises whose transactions would be the subject of the coördinated governmental control.

If governments were obliged to coördinate their monetary, fiscal and other economic policies on any intimate and continuous basis, the consequences would presumably affect all business, whether oriented to the domestic market or to the international market. But multinational enterprises would have an especially heavy stake in such a trend. In some respects, the trend could increase the freedom of multinational enterprises; but the opposite may also be true. Intergovernmental coördination might, for instance, reduce the number of situations in which the rights afforded by some governments were thwarted by the regulations imposed by others. On the other hand, since there are some things that governments can do together which they cannot do separately, intergovernmental coördination could have the effect of increasing the effectiveness of regulations by the public sector in many fields, including taxation and monetary regulation.

In general, multinational enterprises as a group have exhibited no great enthusiasm for a coördinated approach by sovereign states to the problems that the states addressed individually in the past. Such a reserved reaction is readily understandable. The largest and most seasoned of such enterprises can point with jus-

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tifiable pride to the fact that, despite the pitfalls and dangers that uncoördinated sovereign action may theoretically offer to multinational enterprises, few of them have fallen victim to the dangers of six or seven decades of war, depression and tension. As far as such enterprises are concerned, a heavy presumption exists that they would continue to survive even in an uncoördinated world.

Instead of subjecting themselves to the uncertain consequences of multinational coördination, most such enterprises are quite ready to commit themselves to a "code of good behavior" toward the economies in which their affiliates are established. These enterprises are aware that their "conduct" has generally been quite reasonable and acceptable when viewed by any normal standards. Accordingly, most of them have been willing to commit themselves on paper to the continuation of such conduct. They are usually prepared to agree to train local nationals, observe local customs, obey local laws and perform all the other acts expected of decent local citizens. But "conduct"—at least "conduct" defined in these terms—is not very relevant to the underlying issue. With varying degrees of intensity, nation-states have a sense that the locus of their power is challenged by an open international system in general and by multinational enterprises in particular. What some are searching for is the means of checking their sense of ebbing control and of retaining a tolerable amount of that power.

It may be that, in the end, sovereign states will learn to live with a decline in their perceived economic power. But one marvels at the tenacity with which man seeks to retain a sense of differentiation and identity, a feeling of control, even when the apparent cost of the identity and the control seems out of all proportion to its value. One cannot disregard the possibility that one of the advanced countries, imperiled by a sense of ebbing control and declining identity, may strike out blindly against the others.

The role of statesmen in a situation of this kind is to find the means for accommodating the tension before it grows intolerable. In this case the accommodation will be painful and complex. On the part of governments, it will involve agreements that demand the conscious sharing of prerogatives that once were independently exercised. On the part of business, it may demand a tolerance for more coördinated and more effective measures of public control. Whether the advanced world has the resiliency and farsightedness to take the needed steps remains an open question.

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WHO WILL CONTROL THE SEABED?

By Arvid Pardo

THE oceans cover nearly two-thirds of our planet and are its last great frontier for natural resources. The depths of the oceans and the ocean floor itself were of little interest until the middle of the last century when the first scientific deep-sea surveys were undertaken. The *Challenger* expedition nearly a hundred years ago discovered the existence of phosphorite and manganese dioxide concretions on the ocean floor, but these remained of purely scientific interest for many years. Although offshore mining of petroleum dates from 1899 and although undersea deposits of hard minerals, such as iron or coal, were mined even before the turn of the century by driving shafts and tunnels from the adjoining land, the seabed and its subsoil did not acquire much economic significance until after the Second World War. Even then, political, economic and legal interest was confined to the land underlying the shallow waters of the continental shelf; virtually the only practical use of the land underlying deeper waters was considered to be as a support for submarine pipes and cables. As late as 1956 it was possible for the International Law Commission to state with regard to the ocean floor that "apart from the case of the exploitation or exploration of the soil or subsoil of a continental shelf . . . such exploitation had not yet assumed sufficient practical importance to justify special regulation."

The last few years, however, have witnessed a spectacular change in attitudes. On the one hand, there has been an increasing realization of the importance of ocean resources to man's future; and on the other, rapid technological progress has resulted in the discovery of vast mineral resources on and under the ocean floor and has made these resources accessible and exploitable for a variety of purposes. Until comparatively recently man relied on the weighted line and laborious dredging for his knowledge of the seabed. We now have underwater photography and television, the echo-sounder and a variety of sophisticated seismic and other devices, such as scanning sonar, which can conveniently provide us with a precise image of the ocean floor and some indication of its geological structure. Thus man has probably been able to acquire more knowledge about the deep

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THE WEALTH OF THE SEABED

ALTHOUGH the oceans are vast and although our knowledge of the submerged land beneath them is still fragmentary, there is no doubt that the value of known ocean resources has increased at least in proportion to our knowledge of the marine environment and to the advance of technology. Hence there is legitimate expectation that the 90 percent of the ocean floor that is unknown will be revealed to contain resources as valuable as those already discovered.

Estimates of offshore reserves of petroleum, natural gas and sulphur are soaring. In 1950 natural gas reserves under the United States continental shelf were estimated at 50 trillion cubic feet; in 1965 they were estimated at 150 trillion cubic feet. In 1947 world offshore petroleum reserves were not believed to exceed 1 trillion barrels; in 1966, they were estimated at 2.5 trillion barrels. This excludes the more recent discovery of enormously rich petroleum deposits under the arctic continental shelf of the Soviet Union and a major oilfield reported to contain an estimated 5 to 10 billion barrels of petroleum off northern Alaska.

Beyond the geophysical continental shelf, the sediments of the ocean floor are believed to contain 100,000 trillion tons of calcareous ooze, which could be used for the manufacture of cement, and some 100 trillion tons of siliceous ooze which could be used in the manufacture of insulating brick, as a filler, as an absorbent and as a mild abrasive. Ocean floor sediments also contain 100,000 trillion tons of pelagic clays containing manganese grains in concentrations up to 5 percent, and, in addition, a variety of minerals and rare earths in varying concentrations. Valuable deposits of phosphorite in the form of nodules, slabs or pellets are known to exist on the outer continental shelf, on the continental slope and on submarine banks.

Manganese nodules, a scientific curiosity until a few years ago, are the hard mineral resource which is attracting most attention at the present time. Irregularly spherical in shape, they are commonly found on the surface of the ocean floor at depths between 4,500 and 19,000 feet. Concentration and distribution of the nodules vary widely and so does their chemical composition. Maximum known metal content of the nodules has been determined as follows: 57.1 percent manganese, 39.5 percent iron, 2.9 percent copper, 2.4 percent nickel, 2.1 percent cobalt, etc. Tentative tonnage estimates for Pacific Ocean nodules, based on a far from adequate knowledge of the extent of deposits, range from 9 to 170 trillion tons. Such quantities would meet present demand for these minerals for scores—in some cases hundreds—of thousands of years. Indeed, the manganese nodules are accumulating faster than the world (in 1960) is consuming the metals they contain.

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seas and the ocean floor in the past fifteen years than in the preceding two thousand years.

Although we know that immense, untapped mineral resources exist on and under the ocean floor, some are likely to remain unexploited for the foreseeable future, either because there is an abundant supply on hand or because we still lack the technology for detailed evaluation of deposits and for their subsequent exploitation. However, remarkable advances have been made in the past decade. In the case of hydrocarbons, exploration wells were dug at a water depth of 70 feet in 1953; the figure is now 640 feet; and by next year, with new equipment, it may be 1,500 feet. In 1953 no wells were located more than 25 miles from land; now there are wells over 100 miles at sea. Fifteen years ago evaluation of mineral deposits lying on the seabed could be carried out only in very shallow water; now sufficiently accurate evaluations can be undertaken in depths exceeding 3,000 feet.

Exploitation techniques are not as advanced as those for evaluation. Three main techniques are used for the exploitation of mineral resources on and under the seabed: drilling, dredging and mining. Drilling for production purposes has now reached depths of approximately 350 feet and is expected to exceed 600 feet by the end of this year, as compared to less than 70 feet twenty years ago. Dredging is at present mainly limited to the exploitation of placer deposits in depths not exceeding 100 to 200 feet according to the minerals mined; this, however, compares with depths of around 30 feet in 1947. Technology for mining bedrock deposits in water deeper than 300 feet is not yet in sight.

As evaluation and exploitation of the mineral resources of the ocean floor venture into even deeper waters, technical problems multiply. The Economic Sub-Committee of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the United Nations to study the peaceful uses of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction has stated that "extrapolation of these figures [*i.e.* comparison of the present technological position to that of twenty years ago] would imply that another decade will be necessary to double again the depths reached at present, but it is no doubt hazardous to anticipate the rate of further progress of technology since major breakthroughs cannot be excluded."

There are several indications that major breakthroughs may be imminent. Considerable publicity has been given to the recent

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construction in several countries of vessels which can submerge to depths of some 9,000 feet and serve a variety of specialized purposes—scientific, recreational, rescue, ocean-engineering or military. It is believed that if present materials—high-strength steels and aluminum—continue to be used, rapidly increasing costs will inhibit extensive commercial and military intrusion into the deep sea. However, a new generation of deep-submergence vessels, in which much use is made of materials such as glass in the construction of pressure hulls, is either on the drawing boards or under construction; in addition some of the vessels will be nuclear-powered. Several of these vessels, such as the *Hikino* and Lockheed's DSRV are designed to operate at depths in excess of 20,000 feet. Of particular importance is the construction of sophisticated robots and low-cost submersibles capable of performing useful tasks on the bottom at great depths.

Another recent major technological development has been the demonstrated ability to adapt human physiology in such a way as to enable man to operate freely for long periods at depths at least as great as those of the geophysical continental shelf.[1] Although it is difficult to forecast the potential of present techniques in view of the complex problems involved in the acclimatization of man to the ocean depths, it has been confidently predicted that by 1975 there will be colonies of aquanauts living and working on the ocean floor at depths in the neighborhood of 1,500 feet.

[1] The land underlying the seas and oceans may be broadly divided into the continental shelf, the continental slope and the abyss. The geophysical continental shelf is commonly defined as that area of the sea or ocean floor between the mean low-water line and that sharp change in the inclination of the floor that marks the inner edge of the continental slope. The sharp change in inclination occurs at varying depths from 150 to 1,500 feet, but usually around the 400 to 500 foot isobath. The width of the shelf ranges from less than one mile to approximately 800 miles. Continental shelves can be generally characterized as the submerged extensions of adjacent land areas. The geophysical definition of the continental shelf must be distinguished from the legal definition which was adopted by the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

The continental slope, usually from ten to twenty miles wide, extends from the outer edge of the continental shelf to the abyss or the ocean floor. The abyss or ocean floor appears to be a rolling plain from 10,000 to 15,000 feet below the surface of the sea; it is scarred by deep gorges called trenches and studded with sea mounts and guyots. The mean depth of the world's oceans is about 11,500 feet; more than 75 percent of the ocean floor lies at a depth of less than 15,000 feet. Great submarine mountain ranges rise from the ocean floor and often demarcate ocean basins. The mid-Atlantic ridge, frequently rising 10,500 feet above the ocean floor, extends the entire length of the Atlantic. The mid-Oceanic ridge, extensively mapped during the years 1959–65 by the International Indian Ocean Expedition, curves in a great arc, in places 1,500 miles broad, from the Arabian peninsula to the Crozet Islands, rising occasionally 15,000 feet above the abyss.

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Thus not only the entire continental shelf and most submarine banks, but also some of the summits of the great submarine mountain ranges already appear within range of permanent occupation by man, and the technology exists or is about to be developed which will make the greater part of the ocean floor both exploitable and more conveniently accessible in the near future, possibly the next five years.[2] Whether the ocean floor beyond the geophysical continental shelf can be commercially exploited within the next decade has been seriously questioned, despite the technological advances that have been made. It is said that we know too little about that vast mysterious world plunged in perpetual darkness and that even if sufficient knowledge were available the cost of exploitation would be prohibitive. Both objections are based on the situation as it is now, but I do not believe that they take sufficiently into consideration the dynamism that exists in the field.

It is true that our knowledge of the ocean floor beyond the geophysical continental shelf is fragmentary. It is also true that what knowledge we have has been acquired almost entirely within the last fifteen years and that indications point to the existence of a wide range of virtually inexhaustible mineral resources. This is likely to be a powerful spur to action. Exploration, limited and poorly funded fifteen years ago, is now proceeding at an ever increasing pace; the Inter-governmental Oceanographic Commission, established in 1960, has organized several wide-ranging and extremely successful oceanographic expeditions; more are planned. The Decade of Ocean Exploration proposed by the United States will be endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly this autumn and will certainly lead to a vast increase in our rapidly expanding knowledge.

II

Private enterprise appears confident that present exploration efforts will yield commercially valuable results. Investment in the offshore oil industry has reached $13 billion; the greater part of this, of course, has been made within the limits of the continental shelf, but in the last five years a growing proportion has been made beyond the shelf. Offshore oil-lease payments to

[2] All parts of the ocean floor have, of course, been accessible by bathyscaph, since the deepest part of the ocean, the bottom of the Mariana trench, was reached by Auguste Piccard eight years ago. Bathyscaphs, however, are unwieldy vehicles which have serious limitations.

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the United States Government alone have produced more than $1.7 billion within the past 13 months for drilling rights to be exercised within the next five years; more than one-third of this sum was from leases on areas under more than 600 feet of water. It is hardly likely that oil companies would pay millions of dollars for leases unless there were reasonable prospects of successful exploitation before expiration of the lease. We can therefore reasonably expect that exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits beyond the geophysical continental shelf will start soon. Exploitation of surface deposits, such as phosphorite and manganese nodules, may lie somewhat further in the future. It is significant, however, that a phosphate lease on areas under some 4,000 feet of water has already been granted, and that there have been reports that a prototype submersible for the mining of the manganese nodules on the deep ocean floor is under construction.

The cost factor in offshore exploration and exploitation is high and the risks are greater than on the land, but known and suspected mineral resources may be worth the gamble. With regard to the oil industry, it is noteworthy that although the average offshore "dry hole" costs about $370,000, as compared to $50,000 on land, the trade magazine *Off-shore* said recently: "The offshore industry is standing on the doorstep of the biggest drilling boom in history. In one year, the industry has demonstrated its faith in the outer continental shelf with three record breaking oil and gas leases, as well as in vast off-shore concessions abroad."[8]

Various considerations are likely to intensify the pressure for the early employment of the ever more sophisticated technology available. The world is faced with a rapidly expanding population, which will require the consumption of vastly increased quantities of food, minerals and other natural resources. It is unlikely that the land alone will be able to provide for all the needs of mankind at acceptable cost; hence the vital importance of oceanic and suboceanic resources. More important in the short run may be the desire of many technologically advanced countries to correct balance-of-payments deficits or to lessen their dependence on foreign countries for petroleum, natural gas and many minerals vital to industry. An example of such considerations was the comment which appeared in the London *Daily*

[8] As quoted in *U.S. News and World Report*, August 5, 1968. Most of "the outer continental shelf" lies beyond the geophysical shelf.

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Telegraph of July 21 in connection with the discovery this year of the new Alaskan oil field: "Commercial exploitation of Alaskan oil on a big scale may be some years off," it said. "In the meantime its existence makes a handy club with which to fend off would-be blackmailers, be they political or simply after more money."

Finally, governments throughout the world are showing an increasing interest in the deep seas, the ocean floor and its subsoil—an interest reflected in rapidly rising government budgets. As late as 1956 the U. S. Government's expenditure on oceanographic research and technology was about $25 million; this year it will be $448 million despite the financial stringency caused by the war in Viet Nam, and the amount is expected to double within the next two years. Similar increases in government expenditures may be observed in the Soviet Union, France and other countries, although in absolute terms they cannot be compared to that in the United States.

The main reason for this governmental interest is military. Governments have suddenly realized the vital importance of the deep seas and ocean floor to defense. An unidentified Russian is reported to have said that the nation that first learns to live under the seas will control them, and the nation that controls the seas will control the world. There is much truth in this statement. Limited military use of the ocean floor is already being made, and there is little doubt that the major naval powers are planning to take full advantage of its strategic possibilities, within the limits of their respective technological and financial capabilities. There are many military uses, both nuclear and conventional, to which the ocean floor and its subsurface could be put. Deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system on the oceanic mountain ranges, for example, could prove an effective counter to multiple-warhead missiles aimed at land targets. The advantages are obvious: more than one strike at incoming missiles would be possible; secondly, incoming independently targeted missiles could be attacked before the several warheads separated. There are also indications that research is being undertaken on the development of mobile seabed systems either for nuclear weapons or for detection. The seabed can be used, too, for the emplacement of nuclear mines for offensive or defensive purposes.

Conventional military uses of the seabed include deployment

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of anchored sonar systems to detect and track vessels moving on or under the surface of the ocean, anchored navigation aids and communication facilities. Many of these devices are already available and some deployment beyond the continental shelf has already taken place. It is also possible to envisage the establishment of fortifications or fixed military installations, such as underwater submarine bases on the ocean floor. These would extend the length and range of submerged missions and thus improve the possibilities of concealment.

Improved concealment is perhaps the most important factor behind the intense interest of military authorities in the seabed. In the opaque atmosphere beyond moderate depths, even fixed military installations would be difficult to pinpoint. Silos and military installations buried in the seabed—certainly a serious possibility—would be almost impossible to identify. Thus the advantages of using the deep seas and ocean floors for military purposes to the greatest possible extent may appear compelling to the country or countries possessing the requisite technology. Yet such a course of action may have grave consequences.

For example, the successful deployment of extensive tracking devices would impair the near invulnerability of missile submarines and would consequently produce seriously destabilizing effects. Secondly, use of the ocean floor for military purposes would almost certainly lead to an immediate and rapid escalation of the arms race in the seas. The race may have already started: an informed guess is that the United States Navy is currently spending about $400 million for submarine tracking and detection devices installed on the ocean floor. An intense nuclear and conventional arms race already exists in the atmosphere, on land, on the surface, and immediately under the surface, of the seas; the addition of an arms race in a new environment, as now appears to be in prospect, would further strain the financial resources of the major powers, causing postponement of those comprehensive measures for the improvement of standards of living which are widely considered to be imperative. The disappointment of impatient expectations could increase both internal and international tensions.

When large manned military installations and permanent fortifications become feasible, it is possible to envisage an arms race degenerating into a competitive scramble by a few countries permanently to appropriate accessible strategic areas on the

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ocean floor without much regard to the interests of others. Permanent military installations on or beneath the ocean floor require secure protection against spying or harassment, and this could lead to the unilateral proclamation of jurisdiction over large areas of the surrounding and superjacent sea. A distinguished military expert stated last year: "Military installations are now centered reasonably close to the land mass; that will not be the case . . . ten years from now. We will carve out rather large chunks of the ocean away from the land masses which we . . . regard as very important to our national defense and . . . we shall deny access by any other nation to the areas which we will block out." If one major power were to block out large areas of the ocean and ocean floor, it is not unreasonable to believe that other technologically advanced countries might follow suit.

Storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on or underneath the ocean floor would constitute an additional hazard to the integrity of the marine environment as a whole—an environment already threatened by the systematic large-scale dumping of the radioactive and other wastes of an increasingly industrialized world. It is clear that vigorous action by the international community is becoming imperative in the interests of all. Yet although there has been much study and discussion of the problems of ocean pollution, effective action at the international level has been lacking. The main obstacles, apart from a general lack of a sense of urgency, are fragmentation of competence and plurality of jurisdiction, both at the national and international level. Moreover, the problem is scarcely susceptible to a satisfactory solution in the present legal context where it is uncertain who, if anybody, has responsibility for the deep seas, the ocean floor and its subsoil beyond a continental shelf that is variously defined in different legislation.

III

The current state of international law is reflected in the provisions of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, which came into force in 1964. The Convention recognizes that a coastal State has sovereign rights, for purposes of exploration and exploitation of natural resources, over its continental shelf defined as: "the sea-bed and the sub-soil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the

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superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas."

At the time it was concluded, the Convention was hailed as a major achievement of the United Nations. So convinced were legal experts of its excellence that revision was made difficult; not until five years after entry into force—that is, not before 1969—can a request for revision be entertained, and even then "the General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request." Unfortunately, however, the framers of the Convention were not in touch with developing technology and apparently did not conceive that the seabed could soon be exploited for military and commercial purposes beyond the arbitrarily selected 200-metre isobath.

The definition of the continental shelf, as incorporated in the 1958 Geneva Convention, has lent itself to two basic interpretations.

The first holds that the deep-sea floor, with the possible exception of areas immediately adjacent to the coasts, cannot be included within the scope of the Continental Shelf Convention. Exponents of this approach recognize the existence of a possible legal problem with regard to submarine areas situated under still undefined depths of water and at still undefined distances from the coast. They advocate either delaying the establishment of a legal régime for these areas until their utilization for military or commercial purposes forces the issue, or suggest, in the words of Northcutt Ely, that "until enough international competition and friction develop to justify the creation of some advance license system . . . recognition of the flag of the craft or other surface mechanism from which the exploration is controlled sufficiently identifies the jurisdiction which ought to have plenary control over the exploration and over the exploitation of the resources so discovered."

This interpretation of the 1958 Geneva Convention has not gone unchallenged, however, since it is in contradiction to the explicit wording of article 1(a), which states that the continental shelf extends to "the submarine areas adjacent to the coast . . . to a depth of 200 metres and *beyond that limit* to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the resources of the said areas." This would appear to mean that a coastal State may extend its effective jurisdiction over the

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ocean floor at ever greater depths as technical capability anywhere in the world makes exploitation possible, until eventually the midway point between it and the coastal State opposite is reached. Such an interpretation would give the powers governing such small islands as Clipperton, Easter, St. Helena, Azores or Niue sovereign rights over millions of square miles of invaluable ocean floor. It would give the United States relatively little, the Soviet Union less, and landlocked countries nothing at all.

More important than the opinion of jurists, however distinguished they may be, is the action taken by governments, which are increasingly inclined to appropriate unilaterally whatever areas of the seabed are accessible and appear to have some economic value. Permits for exploration of the ocean bottom have been granted by the United States as far as 100 miles from its coast and in water depths up to 6,000 feet; Australia has issued an exploration permit for an area 200 miles from its coast and both Honduras and Nicaragua have licensed exploration out to 225 miles. By legislation or constitutional provision several States claim a "continental shelf" defined in terms of exploitability alone, a definition which is meaningless under contemporary conditions. The seabed of "closed" or relatively shallow seas is already being divided up by mutual agreement among the coastal States. Thus the bed of the North Sea was parceled out among the littoral States in 1964 and this year Italy and Jugoslavia divided between themselves most of the floor of the Adriatic.

Although the greater part of the North Sea and Adriatic comes within a reasonable geophysical definition of the continental shelf, these unchallenged arrangements may foreshadow a division of all the closed seas of the world. Moreover, claims to jurisdiction over the ocean floor and its subsoil based on the test of exploitability alone, or action implying claims to jurisdiction at great distances from the coast, may signal the initial stages either of a distribution of the entire ocean floor of the world among the coastal States or of a race to grab and hold lands anywhere under the high seas. This year a company with British and American capital claimed, by a notice in the London *Daily Express,* an area of 270 square miles in the Red Sea for the purpose of exploiting one of its in-solution concentrations of minerals.

The intolerable injustice of reserving the plurality of the

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world's resources for the exclusive benefit of a handful of nations has been recognized by President Johnson. More than two years ago he said: "Under no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and hold the lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings."

IV

What are the alternatives to a policy of wait-and-see? One has already been mentioned. The international community might agree that only coastal States have the right to exploit the ocean floor and that the floor itself be divided among them in accordance with the principles of the 1958 Geneva Convention.

This solution could be very attractive for some countries and presents certain advantages. It would end controversy about the limits of the continental shelf and permit each State to protect claims of exclusive rights within its area. Mining companies would deal with national governments as they have in the past. Coastal States would be insured against foreign installations near their shores. Possible international disputes over conflicting claims would be minimized, and so on. Provision could even be made to institute some sort of tax or royalty on minerals extracted by coastal States to compensate landlocked countries, or as a contribution toward some international fund to assist developing countries.

Nevertheless, a "national lake" solution has overwhelming drawbacks. It is fundamentally inequitable: some countries through accidents of geography or history would make disproportionate gains. It does not correspond to the military requirements of the major powers, hence it would not be acceptable to them, and without the consent of the major powers no agreement would be viable. It would tend to impede scientific research. Finally, it would make it difficult for the international community to adopt comprehensive and effective measures to combat the growing pollution of the seas and would be likely to impinge upon fishing and possible new uses of the seabed for transportation.

The second alternative is an international régime. This can be conceived in different ways, but it must meet certain basic cri-

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teria. In the first place it must be viable—that is, it must be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of States; and, in order to be acceptable, it must be equitable and safeguard as much as possible the legitimate interests of all. Second, an international solution must permit and if possible encourage an orderly, peaceful and economically efficient exploitation of the minerals of the ocean floor, taking into account the need to avoid serious damage to the marine environment or destructive competition with present sources of minerals. Third, it should be flexible in order to accommodate new developments involving competing uses of the sea and of the seabed. Fourth, scientific investigation and exploration should not be inhibited. Finally, and most importantly, an international régime must not jeopardize vital security interests but should provide a legal framework for the eventual demilitarization of the ocean floor.

At the General Assembly last year, Malta suggested the adoption of a resolution embodying the following concepts:

1. The sea-bed and the ocean floor are a common heritage of mankind and should be used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive benefit of mankind as a whole. The needs of poor countries, representing that part of mankind which is most in need of assistance, should receive preferential consideration in the event of financial benefits being derived from the exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean floor for commercial purposes.

2. Claims to sovereignty over the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond present national jurisdiction, as presently claimed, should be frozen until a clear definition of the continental shelf is formulated.

3. A widely representative, but not too numerous, body should be established; in the first place to consider the security, economic and other implications of the establishment of an international regime over the deep seas and ocean floor beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction; in the second place, to draft a comprehensive treaty to safeguard the international character of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond present national jurisdiction; and in the third place to provide for the establishment of an international agency which will ensure that national activities undertaken in the deep seas and on the ocean floor will conform to the principles and provisions incorporated in the proposed treaty.

Support for this resolution came from many countries, though several of the technologically advanced States felt they needed time to study all the facts and their implications before taking a definite position. At the suggestion of Malta, an informal group was appointed to elaborate proposals that might be acceptable to the great majority of member States. On the recommendation of this group, an essentially preparatory resolution was unani-

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mously adopted by the General Assembly establishing an Ad Hoc Committee of 35 members to prepare a study for the consideration of the Assembly this year. This study is to include (a) a survey of past and present activities of all organizations within the United Nations family having to do with the seabed and ocean floor and of existing international agreements concerning these areas; (b) an account of the scientific, technical, economic, legal and other aspects of the item; (c) "an indication regarding practical means to promote international co-operation in the exploration, conservation and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof . . . and of their resources . . . taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions put forward by Member States . . . ."

The Ad Hoc Committee, which has held three meetings—the most recent in Rio de Janeiro in August, established two working groups, one to deal with legal matters and the other with economic and technical matters. Their discussions have served the useful purpose of clearing the ground and establishing agreed facts as a basis for future consideration of the question.

Without going into detail, it can be said that there is broad agreement on the general proposition that an undefined area of the seabed is beyond national jurisdiction and that international coöperation is desirable in the development of marine resources. But approaches to the question are widely divergent. The great oceanic maritime powers appear to favor a relatively restricted continental shelf under national jurisdiction and unrestricted access to and use of the ocean floor beyond. They are either silent or vague on the question of making provision for all countries to participate in the financial benefits that could result from the economic exploitation of the seabed. A few less technologically advanced oceanic countries, while supporting the principle that all States should participate in these potential benefits, would like to define the continental shelf as being so wide that it would extend virtually to mid-ocean; for the present these States are not anxious to proceed to consideration of a precise definition. The great majority of developing countries on the other hand, while taking various positions on the definition of the continental shelf under national jurisdiction, support the idea that this complex question urgently needs to be examined; they also strongly support the early adoption by the General Assembly of general principles with regard to the exploration and use of the seabed.

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It is encouraging that all States have supported the notion that the ocean floor should be used for peaceful purposes, but there is a deep divergence between those which favor complete demilitarization and those which would be satisfied with more limited arms-control measures. Finally, although there is virtual unanimity with regard to the need to ensure freedom of scientific research and for international coöperation to control pollution of the seas, there do not appear to be clear ideas as to what specific action should be taken. In view of the divergence in outlook and approach among the countries represented on the Ad Hoc Committee, it is unlikely that the report which will be submitted to the General Assembly this fall will contain more than a limited number of general conclusions and recommendations.

I hope, however, that it will be possible to muster agreement this autumn to establish a committee to provide continuing coördination of international and inter-governmental activities involving the seabed and to examine the merits of the various plans that can be envisaged for control of the ocean floor. I also hope that it will be possible for the General Assembly at its present session to adopt a declaration firmly committing the international community to certain basic principles of action in the exploration and use of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Perhaps, too, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee could be invited to take up the question of defining the factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective agreement for the demilitarization of the ocean floor so that this crucial but complex matter can be constructively considered next year.

These would represent useful first steps toward serious consideration of an international régime for the seabed and of the international machinery that would be required to administer it for the benefit and in the interests of all.

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HOW INDIA IS TACKLING HER POPULATION PROBLEM

By S. Chandrasekhar

THE Government of India and its thoughtful citizens have been aware of the problems posed by the rapid growth of India's population during the past decade and a half; but the adverse economic circumstances of the last two or three years brought home to them, as nothing had done in the past, the disturbing nature of India's population explosion. The psychological climate necessary for the serious implementation of the family-planning program had arrived.

The dimensions and magnitude of India's population problem may be briefly recalled. India's total population passed the 520 million mark in mid-1968. That is, one out of every seven persons in the world is a citizen of India. With only 2.4 percent of the world's total land area, India has to support 14 percent of the world's total population. To this population a baby is born every second and a half, 21 million births a year, a birth rate of 41 per thousand per year. Some 8 million persons die every year—a high death rate of 16 per thousand per year. Thus the nation adds 13 million people—Australia's present population—to the existing population every year. The population is growing at the rate of slightly over 2.5 percent per year. And at the current rate of increase it may double itself in the next 28 years, reaching the incredible figure of one billion before the end of this century.

The major cause of this high rate of growth is not so much the high birth rate as the increasing success, in terms of Asian standards, with which India's health and medical services have been implemented in the last three five-year plans. Major communicable diseases like cholera, malaria and smallpox have been nearly brought under control and measures to eradicate them are now being put into effect. And, in response to these relatively improved health conditions, life expectancy has risen from 32 years in 1950 to 51 years in 1968.

But India has also registered remarkable progress in both the agricultural and industrial sectors during the last 20 years of her political freedom. This progress, far exceeding anything registered during any comparable earlier period, is all the more significant considering the heavy odds and unprecedented problems that the

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new Government of India had to face, ranging all the way from the forced Hindu migration from Pakistan into India, which involved the settlement and rehabilitation of millions of refugees, to the brief but costly border wars with Communist China and Pakistan. In addition, the food problem has been a cause of considerable anxiety, especially over the past few years.

Although the availability of goods and services has increased threefold over the last decade, their per capita consumption has not increased at all. While this year a partial breakthrough in agricultural production has been achieved, resulting in bumper crops of nearly 100 million tons, compared to about 65 million tons a year in the past few years, the per capita consumption of foodgrains has not markedly increased. As for educational facilities, the number of universities has increased from 16 in 1947 to 67 in 1968, and the liberal arts colleges affiliated to these universities have increased proportionately—an impressive achievement. But thousands of students with the requisite academic credentials continue to find it difficult to secure admission to these colleges. The increased facilities simply do not keep pace with the needs of the growing population. This is true of almost every aspect of life in India.

All this is reflected in the national income figures. India's total national income increased from Rs. 86 billion in 1948–49 to Rs. 149 billion in 1966–67, or an increase of 73.25 percent over a period of nearly two decades. But the per capita income increased during the same period from Rs. 248 to Rs. 297, a meagre 19.76 percent. Not only is India's per capita income today among the lowest in the world, but the rate of increase over two decades of overall national development is remarkably insignificant.

The main reason why the Indian economy continues to be an economy of shortages is the country's excessive population growth. Between mid-1947 when India gained her political freedom and mid-1968 she has added 182.7 million to her total population. Like other underdeveloped countries, India bears witness to the fact that the technology of health and hygiene can be more rapidly transmitted than the technology of production and economic growth. This means that the population increases rapidly as a result of death control, but the increase in the production of food and other necessities does not keep pace.[1]

[1] For an examination of the various aspects of Asia's population problems, see S. Chandrasekhar (Ed.), "Asia's Population Problems." New York: Praeger, 1967.

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II

Hence the declared objective of the Government of India to reduce the birth rate from the present 41 per thousand to 25—if not 20—per thousand as expeditiously as possible. Although a policy of population control has been in force for the last few years, it was only after the formation of the new cabinet early in 1967 that a vigorous, new anti-natalist policy was formulated and an all-out campaign begun to halve the nation's birth rate by 1975–76 if possible.

This population policy has to be made effective within the framework of an open society with centuries-old customs and traditions. India today is the largest democracy in the world, but an overwhelming majority of the people are illiterate (more than 70 percent), are small-scale farmers (about 80 percent), and live in some 564,000 far-flung villages; some 14 major languages and more than 200 dialects are in use. The cultural levels of the population vary all the way from a Nobel-prize winner to a pre-literate peasant. What is more, according to the Constitution, health and family planning are responsibilities of the States. Since the efficiency of the administrative machinery of the various State governments is not uniform, there are considerable differences in the achievement of family-planning targets.

The major problem before the Government is to reach the country's married couples and convince them of the need for small families. During the last 20 years we have conducted some 30 surveys of attitudes of parents among rural and urban populations, comprising various caste, religious, cultural and income groups. A summary of these random samplings shows that about 70 percent of wives and about 66 percent of husbands among couples with at least three children are in favor of family planning for economic and health reasons. It may be assumed, then, that a majority of Indian couples is in favor, at least in principle, of family planning. Of the 105 million married couples in the country today, living together and leading a normal conjugal life, 90 million couples are in the reproductive age group; and these are our target couples who must be brought to accept the small-family norm. They are distributed over 17 States, 11 Union Territories (comparable to the District of Columbia), 326 administrative districts, some 2,690 towns and cities and 564,258 villages. In each of India's 17 States (except four Hindi-speaking States) a different language is spoken and each can be considered a country

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in itself. Indeed, if the State of Uttar Pradesh were to join the United Nations, its population of a little over 80 million would make it the seventh largest member.

India's towns and cities are well knit and it is not difficult to reach their inhabitants. They have government hospitals and clinics, schools and colleges; they are served by railroads and many are connected by airways. Literacy rates are high, newspapers and periodicals are read avidly, and people listen to All-India Radio. But our communications program nevertheless has to take into account wide differences in culture, religion, custom and tradition. To carry it through we have set up a media section in the Health and Family Planning Ministry. The basic approach is to present only a few simple messages, in a few words, repeated in the same form in all possible media. An example of this approach is the use of the happy faces of the "family of four" with the slogan "Two or three children—enough" and the Red Triangle to identify the program and the location of family-planning facilities. This simple message is being propagated through motion pictures, on the radio, through a family-planning song, in the press, on billboards, posters, cinema slides and on the sides of buses.

But the villages pose a problem; and it is the 60 million farm couples, illiterate and poor, who need family planning most. Talks, group discussions and *Bhajans* (religious musical discourses) on family planning have been promoted; and peripatetic clinics have been organized in rural areas. But although radio should be the most effective instrument of our propaganda, the community radio sets presented to a fourth of the village *Panchayats* are frequently out of order.

Though India is the second largest film-producing country in the world, commercial films deal primarily with mythologies and religious subjects and very few are devoted to family planning. The Government of India has produced movies that deal with the subject in most of the regional languages, but all movies reach only about 20 percent of the total population. As for television, only one experimental station in New Delhi with a 30-mile radius is functioning now. Fortunately, the Prime Minister is in favor of developing TV stations all over the country, for the educational value of TV for an illiterate country like India cannot be overemphasized; but our financial resources are limited and some consider TV a luxury for a poor country like ours. In view of these difficulties, audiovisual methods are found most rewarding.

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III

Perhaps the most difficult problem before us is the choice of a contraceptive that is acceptable under Indian conditions, particularly in the depressed rural areas where privacy, running water, electricity, any knowledge of reproductive physiology and, most important, motivation, are more or less absent. Besides, among such diverse groups no single method, however good, can be suitable to all. Hence, we have adopted what we call the cafeteria approach: theoretically all the scientifically approved contraceptives are available to the people in the Government Family Planning clinics, but for mass consumption only four methods are now advocated and made available.

The first of these is sterilization—vasectomy for fathers or tubectomy for mothers. Vasectomy, the simple operation on the male, which I popularized in Madras State fifteen years ago, has now caught on and is becoming popular. Generally Indian couples marry early and have three or four children; they then want a simple and permanent method of conception control. Sometimes, when the husband is unwilling, the wife may undergo tubectomy, which is a relatively major operation needing at least a week's hospitalization. All services are free—the surgeon's fee, the hospital and drugs, and in addition a few rupees are given to the patient to offset the loss of wages and incidental expenses. These few rupees—about five dollars—have assumed the nature of an incentive. In fact, in large industrial establishments like the Tatas and others, workers who are willing to undergo vasectomy after the third child are offered an incentive of Rs. 250/—and a few days' leave with pay. Up to mid-June 1968, 4.2 million persons had been sterilized. Ninety percent of these sterilizations are vasectomies and the rest are tubectomies.

The second widespread method is the IUD (intra-uterine contraceptive device), or the loop, introduced in 1965. So far 2.4 million loops have been inserted. But the method is not very popular as it has led to excessive bleeding in about 10 percent of the cases, as well as involuntary expulsion in about 6 percent. Research to devise a better loop is under-way. All the needed loops are manufactured in India in a government-owned factory.

The third contraceptive method we are advocating is the condom or sheath. The total requirement is well above 300 million pieces per annum, and so far indigenous production totals only about 30 million. The rest have to be imported, involving foreign

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exchange. However, in 1968 we have been able to obtain from the United States Government, as a part of its aid to India's Family Planning Program, 200 million sheaths. In addition, we have set up a factory owned by the Government of India—the Hindustan Latex Limited—in Kerala, with technical assistance from Japan and the United States. This concern will go into production in a few months and will produce 145 million pieces a year.

But apart from production there is also a marketing problem. We have to devise a distribution mechanism to reach the people in our far-flung rural communities, where demand has to be created and supplies provided. Of course, all hospitals, clinics and Family Welfare Centers carry all supplies and distribute them free. Another distribution channel is through postmen, school teachers and members of coöperative societies; they receive the condoms free and in turn sell them at a nominal rate of 5 *paise* (less than a cent) for three pieces, keeping the proceeds as commission. Thus a large number of people who otherwise would not go to the Family Planning Centers are reached.

Very recently a new system of mass distribution was devised, using such commercial houses as Union Carbide India, Western India Match Company, Lipton India, Hindustan Lever, Brooke Bond India, and the Imperial Tobacco Company India. These large companies have an estimated 400,000 sales outlets penetrating into rural markets. Here the condoms are sold at the rate of 15 paise (less than 2 cents) for three pieces, of which 8 paise comes back to the Government and 7 paise goes for the remuneration of the distributor. This is the first time the Government has ever undertaken the distribution in this manner of any commodity, much less a contraceptive.

The latest contraceptive method we are making available is the pill. My predecessor was opposed to including the pill in the official family-planning program, but after discussions with experts in the World Health Organization and the USAID I have approved its use. Since we do not manufacture the pill in India, the import cost in hard currency was a matter of some concern. But during my discussions with President Johnson and USAID officials earlier this year in Washington, generous American dollar aid to our program was forthcoming and has made it possible for us to embark on a pilot project in which about 100,000 highly motivated urban wives are put on the pill under medical supervision. If the pill proves successful, its use may be extended.

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Family-planning methods and the necessary supplies and advice are available in 26,202 centers all over the country, made up of 1,815 urban centers, 5,133 main rural centers and 19,254 rural sub-centers. In addition, 1,592 hospitals and urban institutions and 7,401 rural institutions do family-planning work. The Federal Government has taken the necessary steps to provide male and female doctors for these centers. So far, 13,087 doctors have been trained in various family-planning methods to work in the centers and some 120,520 paramedical personnel have been trained to assist the doctors.

But the paucity of doctors, particularly women doctors trained in family planning and willing to work in rural areas, continues to be an acute problem. In fact, we are faced with the perennial problem of finding trained workers at all levels—whether nurses, health educators or health visitors. But by dint of scholarships to medical students who opt to work in family planning and special emoluments for doctors working in rural hardship posts we hope to meet this difficulty.

IV

What factors—political, economic, social and religious—favor our current efforts to reduce India's birth rate? The foremost factor is the Government's awareness that population growth is the nation's number-one problem, ranking with the question of modernizing India's agriculture and food production. Indeed, food production and family planning are simply two sides of the coin of national economic and social development. Awareness of this fact has led to the creation of the largest official family-planning program of its kind in the world. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, is a dedicated champion of the cause and is the chairman of the Federal cabinet committee on family planning. The fact that she is a woman and the mother of two sons gives her support special significance in the Indian cultural milieu.

During the First Five-Year Plan (1951–56) a small sum of Rs. 3 million was appropriated for family planning, but the Health Ministry's energies in popularizing the rhythm method were so misspent that only Rs. 1.5 million was actually used over the five years and only 147 family-planning clinics were set up. During the Second Five-Year Plan (1956–61) Rs. 22 million were spent and the number of clinics increased to 4,165. The Third Five-Year Plan (1961–66) witnessed the introduction of all methods of

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family planning, including the loop, disseminated through the extension education approach. For the Fourth Five-Year Plan begun in 1966 and currently being discussed, a tentative sum of Rs. 2,300 million is proposed. Under today's program, there are one Primary Health Center for 80,000 of rural population and one urban center for 50,000 population.

As almost all the world's religions are represented in India's population the religious attitude to family planning is important. Fortunately there is no objection on religious grounds as such to family planning in India today. As was pointed out by Professor Radhakrishnan, distinguished philosopher and India's former President, "The Hindu *dharma* gives us a program of rules and regulations and permits their constant change. The rules of *dharma* are the mortal flesh of immortal ideas and so are mutable." Social flexibility has been the essential characteristic of the Hindu code of ethics. Nor do the Muslims and other religious groups oppose the official family-planning program. Even the old opposition from the small Indian Catholic minority is now diminished.

During the last year and a half, international assistance, support and sympathy for our program have increased. Aid, large and small, is coming from the United States ($30 million),[2] Sweden ($2.2 million), Japan and Denmark. Several foreign agencies have also helped, the largest aid coming from the Ford Foundation. This foreign assistance covers a wide variety of programs—provision of technical experts, commodities and supplies and training for our personnel both in India and abroad. A random listing includes vehicles, audiovisual equipment, paper, printing and mailing units, films, condoms, oral contraceptives, raw materials, training and research facilities.

V

However, there are some unfavorable factors with which we have to contend. Perhaps the most distressing of these is the injection of communal and religious bias into the program. While we have made every effort to keep it truly national, above and beyond party and religious politics, certain opposition parties attack us on the ground that its actual implementation is changing the ratio among the existing religious groups. The argument

[2] For a discussion of American aid to the various sectors of the Indian economy, see S. Chandrasekhar, "American Aid and India's Economic Development." New York: Praeger, 1967.

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frequently voiced by the Jana Sangh, the right extremist Hindu opposition party, contends that considerably more Hindus than Muslims (in relation to their respective total populations) are being sterilized. And, secondly, since Hindus are bound by the monogamic law while Muslims are permitted to have four wives according to their law, the total population of the Hindus is likely to dwindle while that of the Muslims is likely to increase rapidly. Since in a democracy numbers matter and since many vote on the basis of religious (and caste) loyalties, the present family-planning program might eventually change the entire complexion of the Indian (Hindu) nation. So runs the argument.

Our reply is that Muslims, Christians (both Protestant and Catholic) and other minority religious communities are all coming to the government clinics and that the communal ratio of the Indian population shows no signs of changing. All evidence shows that these Hindu extremist fears are groundless and that educated and motivated husbands and wives resort to family planning while the very poor, the ignorant and the unmotivated do not—among all religious groups.

But there is force in the argument that in a secular democracy the Muslim minority community alone should not be permitted plurality of wives, no matter what the Islamic religion says. When even avowedly Islamic countries like Turkey, the United Arab Republic and Pakistan have given up polygamy, there is no reason why Indian Muslims should not give up their right to more than one wife, particularly when in practice 95 percent of Indian Muslims have only one. But the demand for this belated social reform must come from the Muslims, especially the Muslim women.

Another serious difficulty is the want of an efficient, modernized and national welfare-oriented administrative machinery. The present bureaucracy owes its existence to the British rulers, who were understandably interested in maintaining law and order and collecting revenues.

The late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said many things about this "creaking," "slow moving," "red-tape-minded" "delaying bureaucracy" with its countless pettifogging rules. Several serious but by-and-large unsuccessful attempts at reform have been made during the last twenty years. Recently the Administrative Reforms Commission has been working on plans to reform the administration but some believe there is no particular reason to expect any radical recommendations or their immediate imple-

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mentation. I agree with Nehru that the present administrative machinery is manned largely by men who have been trained to be extremely proficient in old and outdated methods, unsuited to the demands of a modern industrializing economy in a changing world. What India needs is a band of dedicated civil servants who are trained to examine issues competently and quickly and take serious and responsible decisions. In our program particularly, a generalist is at a great disadvantage because he is innocent of basic knowledge of such subjects as demography, vital statistics, gynecology and obstetrics. To this difficulty is added a general ignorance of conditions in advanced countries. However, there are a few exceptions and the family-planning program is being implemented to the greatest possible extent.

There is also some cultural resistance to family planning among certain communities, particularly in rural areas. The desire of Hindu parents for sons is well known. A couple with two sons, for instance, is highly motivated in favor of family planning, but a couple with five daughters would like to try again for a son. This desire for sons is in part a religious attitude, but basically it corresponds to an economic need, for with farming completely unmechanized a villager needs sons as workers on his farm. The village couple with two or three children but only one son is often reluctant to practice family planning on the grounds that, given the high rate of child mortality, their son might not survive the critical first five years. This very real problem argues the need for the intensive program now being launched in India to combat malnutrition (the basis of most child mortality) among preschool-age children. In this group malnutrition is a qualitative as well as a quantitative problem and calls for a reduction in nutrient deficiencies through food fortification (wheat, rice and salt), low-cost formulated foods, and large-scale child-feeding programs. A recent study estimates that nearly 70 percent of the childhood malnutrition in India could be eliminated by the limitation of families to three children.

While, as already pointed out, there are no religious objections as such to family planning, there is always the weight of custom and tradition, apathy and inertia. Here again the difficulty appears to be cultural but the roots are also economic. Our dilemma is that whereas fertility control is needed to check the threatened decline in the already low living standards of our people, the successful widespread practice of family planning requires, and to

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some extent presupposes, a far higher level of living than is the situation in India. Poverty and low income lead to malnutrition and under-nutrition, which in turn lead to apathy and inertia. It is amazing that our rural labor force is able to do as much work as it does in the light of the protein deficiency of their meagre, unbalanced diet. However, both government and an awakened public are constantly endeavoring to bring about change through a multipronged effort to modernize our whole society, an adequate examination of which is not possible here. Despite an apparent resistance to change, the cake of custom is gradually being broken, the weight of caste is slowly lessening and, in the process of engineered social change, obscurantism is on its way out.

VI

Such are the major features of India's current program to cut down its birth rate. Two further proposals which will help reduce the country's total fertility have been before us for some time and will now go before Parliament in the form of bills to raise the age of consent for girls and to liberalize abortion.

It is an established fact that either as a result of being generally more mature, or because of greater opportunities for education and for gainful employment, or a combination of these, girls marrying at a later age favor and adopt family planning more readily. There is a correlation between raising the marriage age of our girls and reducing the nation's birth rate. Marrying at a higher age cuts down the reproductive span. Some recent studies have shown that if the minimum age at marriage for females were fixed at 20 years the reduction in the birth rate in a decade would range from 12 to 30 percent.

The minimum age at marriage for girls, fixed at 14 by the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, was raised to 15 in 1957. We are hoping to raise it to 18 years. Opposition is not lacking, for some critics maintain that this may cause hardship to rural girls who have no educational opportunities and who marry—the only career open to them—as early as they can. But we feel that Parliament will approve the proposed measure in view of the pressing need to reduce the nation's birth rate.

The second proposal before us is to liberalize the existing law on abortion. The provisions regarding abortion in the Indian Penal Code were enacted about a century ago, in keeping with the British Law on the subject. Abortion was made a crime for

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which the mother as well as the abortionist could be punished in all cases except where it had to be induced in order to save the mother's life. This law has been observed in the breach in a very large number of cases in rural and urban areas all over India. Whatever may be the moral and ethical feelings professed by some sections of society on the question of induced abortion, it is an undeniable fact that large numbers of Indian mothers are prepared to risk their lives in an illegal abortion rather than carry that particular child to term. Furthermore, it is revealed that a great majority of these mothers are married women.

The main argument in India against liberalizing abortion is that the strain on the existing medical services would be too great. But a recent breakthrough in the Soviet Union would soon make this argument out of date. Soviet scientists have prepared an aborting device on the suction principle which is virtually harmless and does not need special surgical supervision. Moreover the entire operation lasts no more than five minutes.

VII

The skeptics—Indian and foreign—who doubted whether an agrarian, underdeveloped, conservative and "religion-ridden" society could become aware of its excessive fertility have been silenced. Despite many difficulties we have been able to create at many levels an intellectual awareness of the threatening nature of our population explosion. It is remarkable that the people's attitudes toward family planning have changed rapidly during the last twenty years, from unhesitating condemnation of a device believed to promote promiscuity and immorality to approval of a welcome innovation promoting women's health and economic prosperity. India is after all a free society and there is more mental freedom in India than in certain advanced countries. The progressive, positive policy of population control initiated by the late Prime Minister Nehru is being continued with even more vigor by the present Prime Minister.

In the past, family-planning work was confined to doctors on the Government's payroll. The private medical practitioners who naturally charge a fee for advice, supplies and services were not brought into the Government program. The result was a latent hostility on their part. During the last year, however, we have successfully brought private doctors into the national program on the basis of a mutually agreed payment. Besides these regular

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allopathic doctors, we have now secured the support of such diverse groups as practitioners of the three indigenous systems of medicine (*Ayurveda, Unani* and *Siddha*), women's organizations, trained social workers, foreign Christian missionary hospitals and doctors, business and industrial leaders who care for industrial labor, the army of civil servants of all ranks in various Ministries and Government Departments, various religious organizations, *Panchayati Raj* and other rural elected agencies, municipalities and other local government bodies, and the vast number of Gandhian *Sarvodaya* workers in the rural areas. This has given family planning real national support from a wide spectrum of voluntary agencies.

Obviously today's population policy cannot yield full results at once, but it is encouraging to note that a perceptible beginning of the decline in the birth rate is already visible in certain areas where there are dedicated doctors and paramedical personnel, ready supplies, good incentives, excellent administrative machinery and satisfactory public relations. As pointed out earlier, we have so far sterilized 4.2 million persons. Since a majority of the sterilizations is done on parents with three children and since most of these come from a socio-economic group which normally has 6.2 children, each sterilization has prevented the arrival of some 3 children who otherwise would have been born in the next six to ten years. In other words, at a conservative estimate, we have prevented the arrival of some 10 to 12 million babies so far. Besides, 2.4 million mothers have accepted the loop and an unestimated number use the condoms. These methods jointly have perhaps prevented the birth of about 15 million babies. We hope to step up the present pace of progress in the next few years. We are determined that India's birth rate shall decline to 25 per one thousand per year by 1975–76 at the latest. The available signs indicate that we shall succeed.

In the India of my dreams no citizen shall have to beg for his next meal, or sleep on the pavements of our city streets, or live a life of illiterate darkness, or suffer from a curable or preventable disease, or lead a demoralized life of enforced idleness. The future citizens of this ancient land must have pride in their cultural heritage, feel dignity as valued members of the community and hope for an ever better future of peace and prosperity for their children's children yet unborn.

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PROTEST IN MOSCOW

By Paul A. Smith, Jr.

ON January 8, 1968, in the dingy halls of the Moscow City Court, four relatively unknown young Soviet citizens went on trial for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. On January 12 they were convicted and sentenced to labor camp for terms ranging from one to seven years. On the same day the first of a number of petitions, appeals and protests relating to the trial and to the general issue of civil rights in the Soviet Union was signed and circulated throughout Moscow by members of the Soviet intellectual Establishment. By early April the attitudes which this documentation represented had precipitated a distinct hardening in the official cultural policy of the régime.

In the months since the trial the texts of a number of protest documents reached the West and were published in various newspapers and journals. By the end of April, at least twenty separate documents had become available, all relating to the January 8–12 trial of Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov, Alexei Dobrovol'skiy and Vera Lashkova, and to the closely related detention of the mathematician Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin. There were reports of a number of other documents circulating in the Soviet Union, but it was not clear how many of them were related to the Moscow trial rather than to other currently active sources of discontent such as the arrests of Leningrad University people during 1967, the trials and imprisonment of Ukrainian intellectuals since 1965, and the persecution of a growing number of Soviet Baptists.

Taken together, the twenty documents in hand comprise about fifty pages of typescript, legal size, in cyrillic. There are over four hundred signers, including full names and occupations. Most of the documents are dated in January or February. Addresses of the signers are given in some instances, and it is clear that an effort has been made to avoid any concealment of personal responsibility. With four exceptions—Leningrad, Novosibirsk, a collective farm in the Baltic and a small town on the Volga—all of the documents originated in Moscow. Most of the signers are resident in Moscow. About forty live in Novosibirsk, and a few each in Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Magadan and other places.

The content covers violations of the law by the Soviet Court,

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the KGB and the police in the Ginzburg case; an appeal for redress under the Soviet Constitution; indignation at distorted reporting of the trial in the Soviet press; and a warning against a return to the arbitrary rule and oppression of Stalin's day. Most of the documents at least refer to some aspect of these themes. But the emphasis and the approach are by no means uniform. In some cases one theme or another is omitted; and in a few cases obviously arising from the position of the protestors—*e.g.* a document drafted by a group of witnesses whose rights as witnesses were abused by the Court—attention is focused on one subject. One of the documents relates solely to the arbitrary detention in a mental institution of Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin, a mathematician and leading figure in the protest against the Ginzburg trial. Only one of the documents approaches the matter from the viewpoint of the Communist Party. The others, although signed in many instances by people who are party members, adopt the stance of Soviet citizens who are concerned not only for the fate of the individuals involved but also for their country.

The tone is one of reason and relative calm. The style is elevated or at least educated. The approach varies from a dry statement of principle to the use of judicious rhetoric. There is a note of firm conviction, and there are in many cases requests that the appeals be given wide publicity. But there is no demagogy. The attitude toward duly constituted authority is respectful. A few documents "protest," but most "ask," "petition" or "request."

The authenticity of the documents seems, on the whole, hard to question. Personal contact in some cases between members of the Western colony in Moscow and some of the signers, plus name checks against published biographic directories, establish the existence of a fair sample of the signers. Denunciation and, in a few cases, publication of hedged recantations provide further confirmation. So much for the actual documents.

II

Before describing the big and little people involved in this protest movement, some background information may be in order. Sinyavskiy and Daniel were arrested in November 1965 and tried in February 1966. The issue at this trial was literary freedom—specifically, whether the interpretation put on a writer's work by the authorities is sufficient in itself to convict the writer of anti-Soviet agitation under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal

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Code.[1] This, at least, was the immediate issue. But in the background stood the larger questions of the artist's right to explore experience, his freedom of choice in literary forms, his access to the public and his right to participate in the world literary community. The issue of civil rights under the Soviet Constitution did not come up, as such.

A second aspect of the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial is that both were respected members of the Moscow literary Establishment. Sinyavskiy, of course, is a noted literary critic. Daniel is less well known, but is none the less a reputable literary translator. Their arrest and trial were very much an Establishment affair and were obviously regarded as such by all concerned.

A third consideration is age. Sinyavskiy and Daniel, both 43, come from a generation which experienced Stalinism and the War. Their awareness of these matters is based on experience and their attitudes toward them arise from personal involvement.

None of these circumstances—literary freedom, membership in the Establishment, or age—applied directly in the next round. But the conflict with authority continued, and the unspoken, fundamental issue—the right to dissent—was the same.

In 1967 we know of two trials in Moscow arising from protest against the continued imprisonment of Sinyavskiy and Daniel. But the people involved were *not* members of the literary Establishment, they were *not* arrested for what they had written, at least nominally, and they were of quite a different generation than Sinyavskiy and Daniel. The arrests—and this is important to note—were for participation in unauthorized demonstrations, and the defense was based on an appeal to civil rights nominally guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution. The culprits were a young man named Khaustov, tried in February 1967, and another young dissident, Bukovskiy, brought to trial with his companions Kushev and Delone in September 1967. Both were charged with taking part in street demonstrations during January 1967 against

[1] "Agitation or propaganda carried out for the purpose of weakening Soviet power or for the accomplishment of individual, especially dangerous state crimes, the dissemination for the same purpose of slanderous falsifications defaming the Soviet state and social structure, as well as the dissemination, preparation or retention for the same purpose of writings having such content— Punished by deprivation of freedom for six months to seven years plus deportation for two to five years or without deportation, or by deportation for two to five years.

"The same activity carried out by persons previously condemned for especially dangerous state crimes, as well as commitment in time of war— Punished by deprivation of freedom for three to ten years plus deportation for two to five years, or without deportation." V. S. Zhuravleva and Yu.I. Lukina, eds. "Ugolovniy Kodeks RSFSR." Yurizdat. Moskva, 1968.

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the further detention of Sinyavskiy and Daniel. Bukovskiy was tried under an article of the code prohibiting, in effect, participation in genuinely spontaneous demonstrations,[2] and he defended himself by citing Article 125 of the Constitution providing, *inter alia,* for freedom of assembly and demonstration.[3] "What's the good of this right," Bukovskiy asked the judge, "if I can only demonstrate *for* official policies?" Under Stalin, people simply didn't ask this question. But then Bukovskiy really hadn't lived under Stalin. The judge gave him three years to think it over.

Now about this time—that is, in the fall and winter of 1967–68—something quite significant began to happen. Among the members of the Moscow intellectual Establishment an increasing measure of support began to develop for the "little people" of the intellectual underground. This can be marked, if a date is needed, by the publication in December 1967 in the world press of a letter from a Moscow physical chemist, Paul Litvinov, the grandson of the sometime Foreign Minister, describing KGB attempts to pressure him into suppressing a privately made transcript of the final plea by Bukovskiy at the September trial. This solitary act of defiance was followed in January and February 1968 by the remarkable wave of support for Ginzburg and his companions, who were the next to be tried.

Before discussing the Ginzburg trial, let us look for a minute at the "little people" who triggered this movement among the Establishment intellectuals. On a police blotter, they are not very impressive. With one exception, that of Ginzburg, who is 31, they are all in their twenties, or younger. Except for self-published works, they have not appeared in print. They are unemployed or occupied in menial jobs. They are university dropouts, expellees or rejects. Most of them have a record of involvement in unofficial, radical societal groupings—SMOG, The Ryleev Circle, etc. And most of them have taken part in genuinely spontaneous demonstrations, *e.g.* those at Mayakovskiy's Statue or in Pushkin

[2] Article 190/III. "The organization or participation in group action attended by obvious disobedience to legal demands by representatives of authority or which involves violation of the works of transport, state or social institutions or enterprises." *Ibid.,* p. 68.

[3] "In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law: (a) freedom of speech; (b) freedom of the press; (c) freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings; (d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations. These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights." *Konstitutsiya SSSR.* GOSYURIZDAT. Moskva, 1960, p. 27.

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Square. Taken together, this is the basis for the officially promulgated image of these youngsters as disgruntled failures, deluded by an idealized image of the West and preyed upon by cynical emigré organizations.

One should be cautious in accepting this official Soviet image. But equally one should resist the temptation to see these youths as the martyred white knights of constitutional democracy. Their origins, motives and aims, like those of their Western counterparts, deserve the considered attention of sociologists and psychologists as well as that of political analysts.

On the record—and by that I mean what we have of their statements in court, plus their writings in such underground journals as *Feniks, Sintaksis, Russkoye Slovo* and others—I would say that these youngsters are primarily fledgling writers and frustrated social critics in the Russian tradition. As such, they are intent on savoring life on their own terms. Though they are critical, they do not necessarily reject the basic tenets of the society in which they live. Some of their writings could be interpreted as favoring a resort to violence to bring about changes they feel necessary. All of them seem to be undergoing a normal inclination to rebel against conventional wisdom and established authority—complicated by the problem of Stalin and what his downfall means for the legitimacy of that authority in the present Soviet context.

As positive models, they seem interested either in nineteenth-century Russian social thinkers or in what they imagine to be the liberal spirits of the West, or both. But of the two, the Russian influence is clearly the stronger. The Decembrists, notably Ryleev; the "Men of the Sixties," like Chernyshevskiy; Herzen and the later Revolutionary romantics; the early Marxists, such as Plekhanov and Lenin; and the poets of the 1920s appear repeatedly in their writings. The literary and constitutional achievements of the West, as they imagine them, have had an influence: Hemingway, for example, in writing; and in politics the social democracies of Western Europe. There is a marked admiration for romantic figures like Ché Guevara. But the trinity of the American New Left—Mills, Mailer and Marcuse—has not been mentioned in the underground journals. (Marcuse was mentioned by *Pravda,* however, in a May 30 article commenting on worldwide student unrest. *Pravda's* commentator lumped the San Diego philosopher together with Mao, the CIA, French student

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radical Cohn-Bendit, and *The New York Times* as part of a diversionary bourgeois plot to "confuse and disorient the ardent but politically inexperienced young people.")

In the West, the views of the Soviet underground writers would hardly seem grounds for expulsion from a university. And given the fact that Soviet power has now been in existence for over fifty years, one is tempted to wonder why the Soviet authorities are not prepared to regard them with a certain amount of toleration. But the evidence indicates that not only is the number of such youths in Soviet society on the rise, but that the régime's ability and readiness to cope with them by any means other than legal repression seems to be declining. Why? In partial answer, two observations about the Soviet intellectual milieu may have an immediate bearing on the problem:

(1) The structural imbalance in the Soviet educational system, with its overwhelming emphasis on the production of natural scientists and engineers and a corresponding under-valuation of the social sciences. Given the broad intellectual infrastructure created by a good system of basic education, the result is a growing number of would-be social critics with no place to go. Such people are increasingly finding themselves misplaced in the natural sciences, like Paul Litvinov, or are publishing underground essays and sitting around on curbstones, like Yuri Galanskov, being interviewed by Western newsmen.

(2) The overemphasis on Moscow as the center of learning and symbol of success. In the Soviet Union, if you don't make it to Moscow, you haven't "made it," particularly in the media world, the arts or in what passes for the social sciences. The result is a new class of *raznochintsiy,* young men who lack the connections or other qualities to enter Moscow University, but who refuse to settle for training or positions in the provinces.

These two considerations are not put forward as an all-embracing explanation of unrest among Soviet youth, but they are important elements in the situation. Moreover, they provide a significant distinction in attitudes between the "little people" involved in the present wave of dissidence and those of their Establishment supporters.

III

The single voice raised by Paul Litvinov in support of Bukovskiy during 1967 turned into a roar following the trial of Alek-

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sandr Ginzburg and his companions in January 1968. All four were tried under Article 70 of the Criminal Code. Since there is no public record of the trial, or even an unofficial transcript as in the case of Sinyavskiy and Daniel, it is difficult to say what actually happened. From the information at hand, it appears that the four were arrested in January 1967 for having produced and circulated a White Book on the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial, including sending it abroad, and for having participated in other manifestations of support for the convicted writers. The charge that their actions were anti-Soviet was buttressed by a self-incriminating confession by one of the defendants and the statements of a prosecution witness named Broks-Sokolov alleging that the four were acting in collaboration with a Frankfurt-based, anti-communist Russian emigré organization known as the *Narodno-Trudovoi Soyuz* (NTS). There were also related charges of speculation in foreign currency. In short, a highly questionable affair if the prosecution's case were accepted as true.

The significant aspect of the whole affair lay in the fact that an articulate segment of the Moscow intellectual Establishment was not prepared to accept the official version of the case and chose to risk their professional and personal reputations—and possibly their necks—in order to say so. Why they did so is a large question, and I will not attempt to give any definitive answer to it. But I believe that their reasons were other than those which motivated the younger people who were actually in court.

The Establishment intellectuals who protested the manner in which the intellectual underground was treated by the régime in the Ginzburg trial are scarcely the kind of people one would describe as outcasts or failures. Of the four hundred or more signers of protest documents against the Ginzburg trial and the detention of Yesenin-Volpin, virtually all were professionals.[4] Roughly another hundred intellectuals (80 mathematicians and physico-mathematicians, plus 20 related scientific workers and

[4] A rough breakdown shows: 34 civil engineers; 24 physico-mathematicians; 23 philologists; 20 writers; 17 mathematicians; 17 teachers; 15 scientific researchers; 13 undergraduate students; 10 literary critics; 10 historians; 9 editors; 9 graduate students; 8 physicists; 8 philosophers; 7 economists; 7 translators; 7 linguists; 6 art critics; 6 geologists; 6 poets; 4 biologists; 4 technicians; 3 university instructors; 3 librarians; 3 bibliographers; 3 architects; 3 chemists; 3 pedagogues; 3 factory workers; 2 journalists; 2 jurists; 2 medical doctors; 2 chemical engineers; 2 theatrical directors; 1 religious writer; 1 film writer; 1 radio journalist; 1 radio editor; 1 actor; 1 musician; 1 pianist; 1 geographer; 1 geophysicist; 1 sociologist; 1 medical student; 1 bookseller; 1 stenographer; 1 pensioner; 1 electrician; 1 housewife; 1 ex-army officer (major-general); and 1 Kolkhoz director.

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teachers) signed the protest devoted solely to the detention of their colleague Yesenin-Volpin following his participation in the protest movement.

One of the striking things about these people is that with the exception of some forty scientists from Novosibirsk, they are almost all from Moscow. They are also almost all professional people who are either relatively well established or have got their feet onto the rungs of the ladder. They may not all be Lenin Prize Winners or be published in editions of 100,000 copies, but they are in a different class from most of their fellow citizens in a society which still has a great gulf between the rich and the poor. They are also far removed from the literary underground, whose members are neither of the Establishment nor likely to become so under present conditions.

They are not, on the other hand, quite as illustrious a group as some of the dissenters in previous years. Among those who are known to have protested in 1968 the best-known names are perhaps the writers Aksyonov, Balter, Iskander, Kazakov, Nagibin, Paustovskiy and Pilyer; the poets Antokol'skiy, Akhmadullina, Kornilov and Matveeva, and the artist Birgir. The scientists, most of whom were protesting the Yesenin-Volpin detention, include the Lenin Prize winners P. S. Novikov, I. M. Gel'fand, S. P. Novikov, I. P. Novikov and Yu. Manin. Lyudmilla Keldysh, sister of the Academy of Sciences President M. Keldysh, also was a signer.

Many of the leaders of the liberal wing in the literary Establishment were not present. Yevtushenko was on a tour of Latin America and despite numerous opportunities refrained from comment not only on the Ginzburg trial but on political themes in general. Voznesenskiy had not been heard from since his scrape with the authorities in the summer of 1967 over cancellation of his trip to New York. And Solzhenitsyn, still involved in his battle with the Writers' Union over censorship, remained aloof from the case.

Also silent were the big names in science and the arts who had signed a petition to Brezhnev in the spring of 1966 against a rehabilitation of Stalin at the 23rd Party Congress. Whether these people—notably the scientists Kapitsa and Tamm, filmmaker Romm and senior ballerina Plisetskaya—were not convinced of the merits of Ginzburg and his friends, or preferred to confine their protests to questions of principle and avoid partic-

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ular cases, or possibly sought to make their views known through less public channels, is not known.

In assessing the 1968 protest, it is hard to decide what significance should be attached to this silence. One's first reaction might be to conclude that the Ginzburg affair is perhaps not as important as some of the previous causes célèbres, *e.g.* Sinyavskiy-Daniel. In terms of the stature of the defendants, this is manifestly so. However, the area of involvement has now progressed downward and outward, with more people from a wider range of professions having committed themselves in writing to an open difference of view with the régime. Seen in this light, the absence of illustrious names at the head of the protest documents in some ways enhances rather than diminishes their significance.

The Soviet intellectual Establishment is a highly structured community. Public protest against the official line is a risky course professionally, quite aside from the matter of terror and outright physical danger. Presumably the working-level scientist or run-of-the-mill writer who becomes involved in such matters does so—unless he is a fanatic—only because he feels that his superiors share his views, at least covertly; or because he feels that somewhere up above there is an element of the political élite which will protect him; or—and this a very big or—he feels that the thing he is protesting against constitutes such a clear and present danger that all thought of the practical consequences of his act recede into the background in favor of trying to forestall the main danger—namely, a reëmergence of Stalinism.

There may, however, be another, more positive motive for the protest than fear of police terror, which in the past has led the disaffected to seek cover in silence, in anonymity or lip service to ideological orthodoxy. As a working hypothesis, I would suggest that the motivation may be a growing awareness among the working levels of the Establishment that the ideological orthodoxy of the post-Khrushchev leadership has become irrelevant, both as a personal philosophy of life and as a tool to move the masses. When Stalin's body was removed from the Mausoleum it left a gap in history. It also left a gap in the Mausoleum, and the Mausoleum is what the leadership stands on, both figuratively and literally. Until that gap is filled by some credible substitute, the élite and the Establishment are in danger of repudiation by the masses. To fill the gap, there must either be a revival of earlier national values or a formulation of new values.

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It is ferment of this kind that now stirs the intellectual underground. And I think it is reasonable to suppose that the members of the Establishment who are watching and supporting them are doing so as part of a search for ideas and images to fill the ideological vacuum threatening their class and their country. In other words, the motivation is not only a fear of renewed terror from above, but also an awareness of new dangers from below and a compulsion to find some positive answer to them.

This search is taking place amidst the welter of personality, power and policy differences to be found in any intellectual community. The documents themselves do not offer any clear leads to what themes are dominant. What can be said by way of generalization about the direction of the dissent is that it appears from the Moscow documents to be more reformist than revolutionary, and that it has a strong flavor of Russian nationalism. The dissenters' approach to the problems of Soviet society is one of loyalty to the Constitution and to the laws implementing it. Their complaint is that the officials conducting the Ginzburg trial acted against the law in their conduct of the trial and the investigation leading up to it. The attitude is strictly constitutional, and the appeal for redress is based upon a concept of loyalty to and support of Soviet power.

This limitation to a constitutional approach is apparently not shared by the university faculty members and other intellectuals arrested and tried in Leningrad during 1967 and early 1968. We have very little documentation, but it appears that the Leningraders were much more forthright in advancing ideological programs beyond the framework of purely constitutional issues. There have been allegations, which have been denied by other sources, that some of them do not reject in principle the use of violence to achieve their aims. There were also reports that some of the dissenters were found to have illegal weapons in their possession. Moreover, the charge on which they were arraigned and convicted is treason,[5] which is a great deal more serious than the charges applied to the Muscovites. If one accepts these reports

[5] "Treason: that is, an act intentionally committed by a citizen of the U.S.S.R. which is damaging to the state independence, territorial inviolability, or military power of the U.S.S.R.; defection to the enemy, espionage, communicating a state or military secret to a foreign state, flight to a foreign country or refusal to return from a foreign country to the U.S.S.R., assisting a foreign country in carrying on hostile activity against the U.S.S.R., or plotting with a view to seizing power—shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of from ten to fifteen years, with confiscation of property, or death with confiscation of property." Zhuravleva and Lukina, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

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as more or less valid, it would seem to indicate a substantial difference of purpose and tactics.

Both dissenting groups emphasize nationalism. The Moscow protest documents also appeal in many cases to universal human rights, to the U.N. Resolution on the subject and to Soviet ratification of it. But the point of departure is a sense of traditional Russian values. This element of Russian nationalism makes one wonder how much the Moscow and Leningrad dissenters have in common with the Ukrainian intellectuals persecuted in recent years for manifestations of "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism." The traditional Russian attitude is to scoff at the existence of a Ukrainian national culture distinct from the Russian. In the short run, the two might find a common ground, particularly if the Ukrainians, as seems to be the case, adopt the tactic of appealing to the Soviet Constitution. But in the available protest documents there is no reference to the plight of the Ukrainians. One of the Moscow documents did raise the question of national minorities, but it concerned the Crimean Tatars and the continued deprivation of their civil rights, taken from them under Stalin. One wonders why the drafters chose a relatively obscure minority, rather than the more obvious example of the Ukrainians, to make their point.

IV

What has been the régime's attitude toward the protestors? During the Anniversary Year, the leadership tried to maintain a posture of Olympian detachment. The *Pravda* article of January 27, 1967, which was the only major cultural pronouncement of that year, rebuked both liberals and conservatives in the literary Establishment for their unseemly public disputes. This semblance of fine impartiality, which in fact favored the conservatives, lasted until February 1968 when the aftermath of the Ginzburg trial shattered the calm in a spectacular manner. In the months that followed, the official attitude toward any manifestation of ideological nonconformity hardened appreciably.

The new policy line triggered by the Ginzburg affair was both xenophobic and militantly orthodox. On February 14 Kosygin spoke in Minsk, and on the following day Brezhnev gave an address in Leningrad. Both leaders included statements on cultural affairs and their lines were almost identical. Both recognized a malaise in Soviet society and both ascribed it to evil influences

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from abroad acting upon politically immature elements. Its essence, they claimed, is nationalist and revisionist. Its cure, as prescribed by the two leaders, amounts to a strong dose of fundamentalist doctrine administered through improved agitation and propaganda. The responsibility, both made clear, lies not only on the party apparatus but on all Soviet organizations and individual citizens.

The "foreign devil" line was restated and amplified in *Pravda* articles on March 3 and March 14, and was repeated with appropriate embellishments by Brezhnev in a major speech on March 29. Any doubts which may have existed about unity within the party apparatus on this new policy were removed on April 10 when the Central Committee Plenum published a resolution restating the Brezhnev-Kosygin line in unmistakable terms.

Practical measures to back up these pronouncements were applied promptly by the KGB and the party apparatus. Warnings were issued to Western correspondents against further contact with the dissenters. Party members who signed the protests were attacked in their local party organizations for ideological deviations, and in some cases were expelled. Pressure was applied through places of employment to make some protestors issue recantations. And in some cases, notably that of the mathematicians Lyudmilla Keldysh and her husband, planned trips abroad were canceled on short notice. But the harassment did not extend to the arbitrary use of police power. With the exception of Yesenin-Volpin, who was confined for a time in a mental institution, there were—so far as we know—no arbitrary arrests.

In comparing the content of the protest movement with the régime's reaction to it, one is struck by two things: both sides seem preoccupied by nationalism, and both seem intent on stressing legality as a means to achieve their aims. The difference is over the right of dissent under the Soviet Constitution.

Just before and just after the Ginzburg trial, articles were published in the Soviet central press by two eminent jurists discussing in general terms the merits of socialist legality. Neither mentioned the trial. But the intent was clear: the suppression of underground intellectuals was not to be interpreted by lower level officials as a mandate to dispense with legal formalities in coping with dissent. And despite some appearances to the contrary, a case could be made for the legality of the government's position in the Ginzburg case.

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But to argue that Ginzburg's conviction was legal means arguing, in effect, that the great legal reforms of 1958 and after do not mean progress away from authoritarian rule and toward Western concepts of civil liberties. On the contrary, the effect of the emphasis on legality is to make easier the codification and rationalization of power by an orthodox and conservative oligarchy. In other words, the trend is toward authority, but not toward arbitrariness. The leadership is to provide justice, by its standards, without permitting dissent or other manifestations of democracy.

The Moscow protest reveals that this policy of creeping, legalistic reaction has stirred a widening pattern of resentment and concern among the intellectuals. With the Ginzburg affair, dissent ceased to be a family dispute over literary freedom within the upper levels of the literary community and became instead a question of constitutional principles and law affecting the entire society. This broadening of the framework of dissent, and a corresponding expansion of the constituency from which it draws support, marked an important qualitative change in the relations between the Soviet leaders and the people.

Seen in retrospect, the Soviet reaction to liberalization in Czechoslovakia appears consistent with events in Moscow. What the Soviet leaders were unwilling to accept at home they were unwilling to accept in their European domain. In both instances, they were faced with the ultimate dilemma of their system—the choice between recognizing the right to dissent or of putting down dissent by an application of force without constitutional or genuine legal justification. In Czechoslovakia they chose force; at home a policy of deepening legalistic repression has postponed a firm choice.

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POLLUTION AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE

By Abel Wolman

THE Earth is one ecological unit. The student of disease pandemics—cholera, plague, influenza—has long understood that the world is bound by bacterial bonds. When the volcano Krakatoa exploded in the Dutch East Indies in August 1883, the sun was darkened by the debris scattered across oceans and the roar was heard in Japan and the Philippines. Earthquakes in Japan have affected the levels of wells in California and Texas. In July 1968, it was reported that violent rains and winds in England brought airborne red silts from the Sahara Desert.

Whenever man eats, drinks, works, fights or plays he creates modifications in his environment. The consequences of such disturbances may be small, great or worldwide. They depend upon the nature, the place, the time and the intensity of his activities. The artificial political boundaries which separate cities, states, countries and regions are myriad; the areas they enclose range from the minuscule to the vast land mass of the Soviet Union. With such geographic diversity, it is inevitable that the movement of wastes by water, air and land will often cross national and international barriers. "Around the World in Eighty Days" was not imaginary for man, nor is it for his wastes.

Although this passage of physical, chemical and biological materials has long confronted us, the consequences have become more evident in the last half-century. Industrialization, urbanization and explosive population growth have combined to intensify interest and concern. Society is thus forced, with all the ingenuity at its command, to restore the desired quality of its surroundings. The task requires a determination of the condition, including concentration, time and place under which potentially polluting wastes may be disposed of to nature without adverse effects upon human health, animal and plant life and materials.

There has been much public discussion—and not only in the United States—regarding the deteriorating quality of the world environment. The reasons for the mounting interest and indeed excitement are succinctly stated in the 1965 Report of the Environmental Pollution Panel of the President's Science Advisory

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Committee: "The production of pollutants and an increasing need for pollution management are an inevitable concomitant of a technological society with a high standard of living. Pollution problems will increase in importance as our technology and standard of living continue to grow."

The issues vary from country to country and from region to region. In the industrially developed countries, prompt actions to alleviate pollution are required, whereas in many parts of Asia and Africa air pollution ranks well below the pressing necessities for increasing the food supply and for general economic development. The delayed or mistaken actions of the developed countries in controlling the environment should not be repeated in the developing regions.

Although one cannot overemphasize the necessity of moving rapidly toward upgrading the quality of our surroundings, there should be a balance between the prophets of doom and those who say "all is well." Many public pronouncements fail to recognize that society has provided corrective measures over the last half-century and at a cost of billions of dollars. More of this money has gone into abating pollution in the water than in the air. For example, very large parts of the Potomac and the Ohio Rivers and the Thames River in England are in better condition today than 20 years ago. The quality of the air in Pittsburgh and in London is likewise greatly improved over that of decades ago. Such reminders should not be interpreted as apologies for the many examples of parallel deteriorations, but as encouragement to speed up correctives.

The difficulties in the way of moving more rapidly are not usually technologic. Science and technology have already provided innumerable means for reversing the process of deterioration. The failure lies primarily in the speed with which they are applied. The search should be for still simpler, cheaper and quicker methods, leading to more rapid implementation.

Industrial changes have resulted in the lessening of both water and air pollution. For instance, the introduction of gas and oil for energy uses has had great benefit in many areas. The production of waste per unit of many consumer goods has been consistently reduced over the years. In many instances, these benefits result from other sources than direct measures to abate pollution.

Since our understanding of the ecology of the fresh and sea waters leaves much to be desired, hasty conclusions and actions

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resting on little knowledge may do harm or waste money. The attempt to deal with fish mortality in rivers, lakes or seas is an example. Whether this is due in various instances to willful or accidental pollution, to natural infections of disease, to meteorologic and hydrologic changes, to the appearance of hostile marine life or to overfishing is still not always ascertainable. Often it is easier to ascribe such events to "pollution" rather than to admit that the necessary biologic understanding and explanations are in fact not available.

In every country, whether rich or poor, the most important restraint on necessary action is lack of funds. Corrections virtually always cost money. Unfortunately, although there are examples of getting rich by the recovery of waste materials they are rare. Governments must set priorities in budgeting their funds—and the handling of waste will not always head the list.

Actually, in the last ten years the United States has passed more corrective legislation in these fields than in its previous history; and its record compares favorably with that of any other country in the world. Incidentally, the quality of its environment compares favorably with that of other industrial countries, all of which are struggling to catch up with the consequences of growth. But no country, regardless of its political ideology, has been entirely successful. Economic considerations and the absence of institutional devices everywhere hold back progress.

Thus the world is confronted with continuing and increasing insults to the environment. Such interference with its ecology cannot be allowed to continue unchecked. Management of the world's resources in a logical and beneficial manner is completely possible in the present state of art and science. The constraints lie in public apathy, lack of political will, lack of funds and lack of a proper managerial structure and competence. A selection of priorities is inevitable in any society, even in the affluent United States. We still have the time to proceed actively toward upgrading our methods and aims. Present practices, even where damaging, have not yet resulted, with few exceptions, in irreversibly damaging our natural environment. To prevent such permanent damage is the challenge of the next ten years. Within this setting, I suggested, at the UNESCO Paris conference of September 1968, that before it is too late "some international agency should be charged with the responsibility of the continuing examination, identification and assessment of changes in the total

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resources picture. . . . Essentially, we need an intelligence agency in matters of human ecology."

II

Until the last few years most of the problems in pollution have been related primarily to water. This is illustrated by the definition of "pollution" adopted by the International Law Association Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers. The phrase was to encompass "any detrimental change resulting from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or quality of the waters of an international drainage basin."

Of special interest is the fact that, in spite of the clarity of the definition, no international river agreement has stood the test of time without requiring repeated modification of significant terms. This is not surprising, since the conditions of adjudication or agreement are rarely static. Situations are always in flux as nations grow, as their economic character changes and as technology modifies their way of life. Unlike geographic boundary agreements, which most often are fixed, water problems and users are disturbed by the passage of time.

International coöperation in water pollution is reflected largely in the creation of bodies specifically concerned with the prevention of damage to international waterways.[1] The work of various international commissions has then been used as the basis for legislation, or for purposes of standardization in individual countries.

For almost two years now, the World Health Organization has been trying to set up a project aimed at preventing pollution in the Danube basin. Preliminary data indicate that large stretches of the Danube itself are still in reasonable condition for practically any water use, but many of the tributaries and certain parts of the main river already show signs of heavy pollution. Because of the international difficulties of cleaning up pollution

[1] These include the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, the International Commission for the Protection of the Waters of Lake Constance and, outside Europe, the International Joint Commission (concerning the waters forming the boundary between the United States and Canada) and the International Boundary and Water Commission (which performs the same functions in respect to the boundary between the United States and Mexico). The Conference of Heads of Water Management Services of the Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (which includes representatives from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the U.S.S.R.) has approved common criteria and standards of purity for surface waters, as well as principles of water classification.

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after it has occurred (as in the Rhine), the aim here is to institute a mechanism for saving the Danube in time. Similar action may be taken with the large international river basins in Africa (the Chad, the Niger and the Senegal) for which international river commissions have already been formed; their terms of reference include the sanitary protection of their waters.

By far the most important achievements in the protection of international water courses must be credited to bilateral agreements. These are generally more comprehensive and more detailed than the international conventions, which tend largely to be concerned with matters other than pollution (such as navigation or hydroelectric power). To date, about forty European and ten extra-European bilateral agreements have been drawn up dealing especially with protecting water from pollution.[2] These agreements differ significantly. Some prescribe prevention of pollution in rather general terms without defining it. Others indicate the sources or types of polluting effluents or discharges to be prohibited. However, in most cases, no standards are set. Although a few make it incumbent upon the parties concerned to take suitable measures concerning waste-disposal and pollution, the obligation tends to be couched in the most general terms. Very few agreements specify objective parameters, as in the Belgian-French agreement for the Meuse, which if enforced would make an agreement fully effective.

Potential conflicts concern the Rhine and the Meuse. The International Commission for Protection of the River Rhine against Pollution was formed in 1950 by Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands. The group set about the joint testing of water quality, and in 1965 they signed a formal treaty with a firm legal base and extended its inquiries into further details. They undertook to (a) prepare studies to determine the nature, extent and origin of pollution and draw conclusions from the results of such studies; (b) recommend to the signatory governments appropriate measures for the protection of the Rhine against pollution; (c) prepare elements which may serve as a basis of future international agreements or arrangements.

[2] Examples are those between Spain and France, Hungary and Jugoslavia, France and Switzerland (largely to control and prevent pollution in the Rhone, the Arve, Lake Geneva and tributary waters); Canada and the United States (boundary waters); Belgium and Germany; Belgium and the Netherlands; between Belgium, France and Luxembourg; France and Germany; Poland and the U.S.S.R.; Poland and East Germany; Poland and Jugoslavia; and the many agreements between the Balkan countries.

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What they, and others, have failed to do was to come to grips with the hard-core questions as to who was to institute corrective measures and who was to pay for them. At this writing, real international controls have not come into being. On the River Meuse, the situation has not been advanced even this far.

The international implications of air pollution were recognized at a much later stage. Specific international agreements for controlling such pollution are rare, but seem to be needed. Thus, Sweden unofficially charged recently that pollution generated by industrial activities in the British Isles and Central European countries seemed to have been affecting the air over Swedish territory. Again, France, Germany and Luxembourg have international problems because of air pollution generated in the intensely industrialized regions close to their borders. No sign of international action to prevent or control this is so far on the horizon.

The air pollution generated by motor vehicles will no doubt become of considerable importance to the European countries in the future. Only a few (France, England, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Czechoslovakia) manufacture motor vehicles for export; if any other European country should decide to limit pollution from this source, suitable international instruments will have to be evolved by the major car manufacturers, perhaps on the lines followed by the U.S. manufacturers in compliance with the 1967 Clean Air Act.

With few exceptions, most of the existing international agreements have not had rapid success in correcting or preventing pollution. Indeed, in many instances the machinery for control has not been set up. Where it does exist, activities have been centered largely upon collection and interpretation of data. As conscious efforts are made toward control, this information will, of course, be useful. An intelligence and monitoring network is a prerequisite to successful international management. Inherent in such practices is the parallel need for standardized measurement, for scientifically based criteria and for methods of assessing priorities in decision-making.

The special legal difficulties in dealing with water pollution were pointed out in 1964 by the International Law Association Committee. It reported that, of all the problems of international law with which it was concerned, it had experienced most difficulty with the subject of pollution. It recognized the complexities

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of this major problem of our era and the direct conflicts of interest involved. Rules of law "would not be completely pleasing to any interested state."

As yet, no case involving river pollution has been submitted to adjudication before the International Court of Justice or any other international tribunal. One of the few international court cases involving air pollution occurred more than a third of a century ago, when the United States entered a claim against Canada because of air pollution in the State of Washington from smelter stacks discharging, among other materials, sulphur dioxide. The settlement avoided the critical questions of international law, because Canada simply assumed responsibility for damages. No later cases involving either air or water are at hand; hence no substantial principles of international law have been established. Where the neighbors are on daily speaking terms and not inclined to use guns, the issues either have not reached a court or have been resolved, at least temporarily, by negotiation.

The case of the Colorado River illustrates the long history of an international agreement on control, albeit an uneasy one. Discussions between Mexico and the United States on the quantity of Colorado River water reaching Mexico cover over a half-century. After many proposals, counter-proposals, meetings, adjournments and resumptions of discussions, the 1944 Treaty emerged. It covered both the Colorado and the Rio Grande Rivers, largely as to the relative allocations of quantities of water between the two sovereign countries.

Before the Treaty was ratified, the quality of water to be delivered to Mexico was discussed in the U.S. Senate. Witnesses suggested, with obvious circumspection, that Mexico should take water delivered "regardless of quality." The words were not inserted in the Treaty, because such specificity might have prevented ratification by the Mexican Senate. The actual section dealing with the quality of the water to be delivered to Mexico, both subtle in language and equivocal in application, was bound to create problems and did.

The physical fact was, and is, that a substantial amount of water delivered to Mexico, under the Treaty, is return flow from the irrigation activities in the upper and lower basins in the Colorado River drainage area. As time went on, it was predictable that the salinity in the waters crossing the Mexican border would mount—and, of course, it created bitterness among the Mexicans.

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The difficulties were considerably enhanced when extremely alkaline lands went into use in the Wellton-Mohawk Project in Arizona. The salts leached from these operations aggravated the already deteriorated quality of the waters reaching Mexico.

This difficulty was temporarily solved in 1965, when the Presidents of the two countries announced that the United States, at its own expense, would construct a bypass drain to carry heavy saline waters around the Mexican diversion works. This temporary device is useful and it buys time, but the problem of salinity remains. As intensive uses grow in the United States, the situation will return to plague U.S.-Mexican relationships.

This oversimplification of the Colorado River dispute (and it has major repercussions within the United States itself) is intended to illustrate the complexities and interrelationships of land use, water allocation and quality degradation. These are and will be paralleled in many parts of the world. For example, throughout Latin America, 22 international river agreements have been consummated. They cover less than 15 percent of the 68 international river basins in that continent. Even those in effect are limited in functions and uses covered. More important, in virtually all such agreements, the organizations required to implement control are generally nonexistent or inadequate.

The agreements between India and Pakistan, on the uses of the Indus River and on the diversion of flood waters of the Ganges River into the Hooghly River, are recent demonstrations that there is hope of removing at least some of many antagonisms originating in such problems. The diversion of water into the Hooghly will reduce the incursions of salt water from the sea moving upstream to the major intakes of fresh water for the Calcutta region.

Partial successes in international control of water, air and land pollution have been registered over the last century. If the voice of experience is clear, however, it is that such efforts do not offer the "instant" correctives or preventatives so fondly anticipated by many of us. The road to international agreements, in these as in other activities, is rarely characterized by either logic, simplicity or permanence.

III

The surge in scientific research and development, and the technological applications resulting therefrom, are among the major characteristics of the period of World War II and the sub-

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sequent decades. These advances were bound to intensify problems of environmental pollution.

The creation of the atom bomb and its subsequent periodic testing in the air are a most significant reminder of the continuity of the world's atmosphere. The actions of the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain, France and Communist China disclosed that the resulting fallout of radioactive materials came remarkably promptly and was geographically very wide. As a result surveillance and monitoring systems were established by the major powers on a worldwide basis. They surpass in efficiency any systems for the detection of other environmental contaminants. In the case of radiation, the obvious reasons for this were the potentially lethal biological effects and the necessity for sophisticated warning devices for national defense.

Aside from considerations of the socio-psychological effects of such fallout, the biological impacts upon man, other animal and plant life are generally considered, so far, to have been within the limits of acceptable risk. Some scientists, however, do not share this comforting view. The importance of fallout is listed here, primarily, to take cognizance of the strenuous efforts of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to universalize worldwide control of the proliferation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. This hope of international agreement, including all countries, is still far from fulfillment, although the danger is clear; sophisticated means of global measurement are available and the peaceful uses of atomic energy may be evaluated and applied under effective controls.

In this connection, the disposal of radioactive wastes at sea illustrates the necessity for nations to consult with each other when such wastes move beyond national boundaries. The sensitivity of sovereign states on matters like this is increased by allegations that visiting nuclear-powered surface ships and submarines pollute harbors and domestic sea-lanes.

Oil spills provide another striking reminder of the "oneness" of oceans. In this instance, the problem is not new. The United States has signed a number of international conventions for the multilateral regulation of maritime matters, including the prevention of pollution of the seas. The 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil was amended by the contracting governments in April 1962. Some of these changes were incorporated earlier by the U.S. Congress in the amended Oil Pollution Act of 1961. All of these attempts have

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been directed toward limiting oily discharges by defining prohibited zones, recording oil discharges and losses, promoting the installation of oil-receiving facilities in ports and providing procedures for the apprehension and prosecution of violators.

Although the conventions have undoubtedly been helpful, they stand in need of considerable improvement. This is true likewise of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between the United States and Great Britain, and of a whole series of bilateral and unilateral acts of the last forty to fifty years. The recent wreck of the *Torrey Canyon* on the coast of England and the breakup of the *Ocean Eagle* at the mouth of San Juan Harbor, Puerto Rico, emphasized again the evil effects of such disasters at sea, including the destruction of bathing beaches and biological life. The wrecks involved most complicated legal consequences; and prohibitory legislation alone proved to be an astonishingly weak reed upon which to lean for either the prevention of such disasters or subsequent cleanup. In the *Torrey Canyon* case, at least, the materials used for cleanup did more damage than the oil. The successes in the case of the *Ocean Eagle* were somewhat better, but still left much to be desired. The recent developments of an effective oil-slick dispersant may help matters in the future, but the two cases illustrate the incapacity of nations to cope, both legally and technologically, with "oil out of control."

To the credit of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and others, a meeting was called in London in May 1967, two months after the *Torrey Canyon* disaster. It was held at the headquarters of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the creation of the 1954 and 1962 Oil Pollution Conferences. In discussing "how to avoid the hazards presented by the carriage of oil or other noxious or hazardous cargoes," the London conference drew up a long list of preventive measures, all of which, in varying degree, will have to be implemented. This is particularly the case since the advent of ships that can carry tonnages of oil unheard of even five years ago, the transfer of cargoes from ship to ship offshore and the re-transfer of these cargoes to onshore processing and distribution centers.

Among the preventive measures now under discussion are the designation of sea-lanes and prohibited areas, the addition of navigational aids, shore guidance for ships near to land, speed restrictions, use of automatic pilots, review of construction and design, and the organization of intensive watches—all by inter-

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national comity. In order to minimize damage when accidents do occur, research and rapid exchange of findings, on both national and international levels, will be required. The recent incidents disclose a great ignorance of how to manage spills by mechanical, chemical or physical means. The development of methods of recovering oil from bilge water before it is discharged into the sea should go far toward reducing one common source of pollution by tankers which are, whether intentionally or unintentionally, violating the law. Progress with the management of oil spills will undoubtedly effect improvements in the handling of other noxious and hazardous materials.

The legal questions arising from accidents at sea are even more perplexing. They can only be noted here, since they are beyond the purview of this paper. Serious questions have already arisen as to (a) the legal right of affected nations to participate in official inquiries; (b) the legal ability of a state threatened by a casualty in international waters to take measures to protect its coastline; (c) the nature and extent of liability; (d) access of foreign salvage equipment to territorial waters; and (e) the powers of coastal states to pursue surveillance and control procedures. In response to the directive of the President following closely on the heels of the *Torrey Canyon* disaster, Federal agencies are working hard to delineate many of these issues and to develop machinery to cope with them.

IV

One would be rash indeed to pretend to define explicitly the position of the United States with respect to international pollution problems. What may be said confidently, however, is that the record of the last half-century indicates that the United States, like every other country (or person, for that matter), faces up to such problems only as a consequence of actual conflict or crisis. Rarely do international agreements anticipate the need. In recent years, the United States has moved more steadily and more rapidly to establish—or to participate in establishing—basic measurements for future conventions. We have given wholehearted coöperation, on a global scale, to the collection of data and other collaborative projects of the International Hydrologic Decade, the International Biological Decade, the proposed International Decade of Ocean Exploration and similar worldwide operations.

Bilateral issues seem to dwindle into insignificance when a

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country is confronted with the multiplicity of impending decisions involving control of the atmosphere and development of the resources of the oceans. Impatient as one may be to have clear policies enunciated, we must first accumulate basic scientific knowledge. It is a hard road and unattractive to the public and to budget makers, both of whom want quick results. Unfortunately, detailed working knowledge of the atmosphere and the seas is not yet profound. These elements must be understood before they can be managed, and certainly before control of them can be intelligently allocated among the family of nations.

In spite of the foregoing strictures, a permanent battle over ownership and control has already begun. International, national and local resolutions, claims and counterclaims abound. The United States, like many other countries, is treading lightly in this mine-studded field, before accepting cloudy long-range commitments. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that, regardless of who ultimately owns what part of the oceans, the pollution problem will still remain to be solved. The spread of pollution transcends national ownership. Agreements on control will have to come—and it is not too early to develop and begin to implement them.

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THE MANAGEMENT OF SOVIET MANPOWER

By Efim Manevich

IN a number of countries (the United States, Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany to mention a few), it has recently been claimed in newspaper and magazine articles that unemployment has appeared in the Soviet Union. The authors frequently refer to the works of Soviet economists (my own included) in which serious problems are raised concerning our rational utilization of manpower.

Naturally, there are many intricate as well as unresolved problems in the Soviet economy. We write about them a good deal and attempt to solve them while carrying out the economic reform. Nevertheless, we have no problem of unemployment. We solved it long ago—almost forty years back—during the years of the first five-year plan. At that time there was large-scale construction of new enterprises in various branches of the national economy and the collectivization of agriculture was in the main completed. Ever since, the number of factory and office workers in all branches of the economy has been increasing from year to year.

NON-AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE

(*In millions*)

1913	*1932*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*	*1966*	*1967*	*1970 (plan)*
12.9	24.2	33.9	40.4	62.0	79.7	82.3	91–92

The fact that the Soviet national economy is planned gives ample opportunity to anticipate requirements and undertake the training of workers in those trades which will be needed in the future. The planned economy and the development of the country's productive forces ensure full employment for all able-bodied people either in production or in the services. As technical progress permits more goods and services to be provided by fewer people, working hours are reduced and free time is increased, thus creating still greater opportunities for developing the intellectual potential of wide sections of the working people.

Thus, although unemployment disappeared rapidly in the U.S.S.R., an intricate problem, or set of problems, remains: how to supply the developing national economy and all its branches, as well as the enormous undeveloped districts of the country, with

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workers. What are the sources for replenishing the working class and the intelligentsia? How should the rational utilization of manpower be ensured?

During all these years the principal sources for replenishing manpower were: first, young people reaching the age of employment; second, the collective-farm peasantry and the country's rural population in general; third, women engaged in housekeeping. In recent years an extensive study has been conducted of problems involved in using the country's labor resources rationally. These acquire paramount importance at the present stage of economic development because of the increasing shortage of workers and because implementation of the economic reform requires thrifty management of the economy.

Also, for a number of reasons, among which the consequences of the past war are still of importance, the birth rate has been falling in recent years and the increase in the population has slowed down, as the following table for the past seven years shows.

NATURAL INCREASE IN POPULATION
(Per 1,000 of the population)

1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
17.8	16.6	14.9	14.0	12.7	11.1	10.9

It stands to reason that we are concerned. At some time this drop in the birth rate will inevitably result in a reduction in the total labor force and will especially affect the most active age groups. Fortunately, during the current five-year period (1966–1970) the increase in the population is satisfactory thus far. However, the universal compulsory secondary (ten-grade) education now being introduced in our country means that youth will actually begin to work at a later age.

Due to the general improvement in the standard of living of the peasants (collective farmers and state farm workers) the flow of rural inhabitants into the towns has somewhat declined lately. There is also less chance to draw women into productive employment: during the seven-year period, 1959–65, the proportion of able-bodied women engaged in housekeeping dropped by 50 percent.

All these considerations today aggravate the problem of finding and rationally using manpower in the Soviet national economy. They explain the recently adopted decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers (see *Pravda,* February 16, 1968) on measures to provide personnel for

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capital construction. In particular it is noted that "construction projects in a number of the country's districts experience an acute shortage of workers and engineering-technical personnel."

The problem of attracting manpower to areas in Siberia and the Far East which are exceptionally rich in natural resources has not as yet been solved. These areas constitute more than 50 percent of the entire territory of the Soviet Union but hold only 10–10.5 percent of its population. This means that our manpower resources are very unevenly distributed. Thus while the average population density for the whole country (according to the latest census) is 9.4 persons per square kilometer, the figure for the Yakut S.S.R. and the Magadan Region is 0.2 and for the Far Eastern area 1.4. At the same time, the population density of the Moldavian S.S.R. is 85.6 persons per square kilometer, in the Donetsk Region, 160.8, and in the Andizhan Region (Uzbek S.S.R.), 181.7.

The resolutions of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party envisage large-scale economic construction in the East of the country, which obviously will require large numbers of workers with diverse skills. During the twenty years which separate the last two censuses (1939–1959), the size of the population in Western Siberia increased by 28 percent, that of Eastern Siberia by 34 percent and that of the Far East by 70 percent. These increases were considerably greater than in other parts of the U.S.S.R. However, data for recent years show that the number of people leaving Siberia exceeds the number arriving, and, incidentally, the outflow is mainly directed toward the southern and western areas of the country.

A system of economic and organizational measures is being implemented to increase the movement of manpower to outlying districts of the country and to stem sharply the inflow from those areas. These measures include wage differentials; the building of comfortable housing with all conveniences, of children's establishments, schools, clubs, theatres and hospitals; and an improvement in the pattern of production so that branches of industry manufacturing consumer goods and foodstuffs also develop in these outlying areas, thus providing women with employment.

In this respect the decision of September 26, 1967, taken by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, "On Measures for Further Improving the Well-being of the Soviet People," is of great importance. In addition to the existing privileges for workers

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engaged in the heavy, chemical and mining industries and in construction, this decision also introduces coefficients (bonuses) to wages for all workers in the Far East, Siberia and the European North engaged in the light and food industries, in education, public health, communal services, science, culture and other branches of the national economy. Greater privileges have also been given to those working in the Far North and in similar areas; for example, wage bonuses are granted after a shorter period of service.

II

The service industries have begun to develop rapidly in recent years. In the past we were unable to devote great attention to this sphere, but now that the standard of living of the population has risen there is a need to increase considerably the number of workers in trade and communal services as well as in other enterprises where services are required. Thus, the present five-year plan envisages an increase of approximately 150 percent in the volume of services by 1970, including an increase of more than 200 percent in rural localities; there will be a 500 percent increase in such services as dry cleaning, a 700 percent increase in housing repairs and a 200 percent increase in the repair of household appliances, furniture, etc. It stands to reason that a large labor force will be required for such a big program. Favorable conditions will have to be created to attract it. In particular, a shorter workday is being established for women who must also do housekeeping.

The development of services touches many aspects of Soviet life—the problem of how to use manpower rationally, the opportunities for drawing available labor resources into social production, particularly in medium-sized and small towns, the easing of living conditions by reducing the time spent on housekeeping, and so on.

In order to use labor resources more rationally in average-sized and small towns and to take account of the need to use both male and female labor, new enterprises in the current five-year period are mainly being built away from the principal urban centers. Soviet economists are advancing many proposals on ways to draw into social production those who at present are engaged only in housekeeping, to develop services and to set up small specialized enterprises as branches of large factories.

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The rural population is a natural source for replenishing manpower in all branches of the national economy. Only recently a majority of Soviet citizens was engaged in farming and lived in rural localities. Today the composition of society has radically changed and there has been a sharp increase in the number of factory and office workers, with a reduction in the number of people engaged in agriculture.

CHANGES IN THE SIZE OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION
(as percentages of the total population)

	1913	*1920*	*1926*	*1939*	*1961*	*1965*	*1968*
Urban	18	15	18	33	50	53	55
Rural	82	85	82	67	50	47	45

As this table shows, the process of urbanization is taking place at a rapid rate. For many years, some two-thirds of the requirements of the national economy for additional workers was met by the agricultural sector. With the development of technical progress, including the mechanization of farming, and a rise in labor productivity, the number of people engaged in agriculture drops and the number engaged in industry, construction, transport and services increases.

However, those who have come to the cities looking for work have not been confined to this category. Many peasants, especially among the young, want to move to the cities in order to enjoy the higher living standard there. This is why many agricultural districts today are seriously short of manpower, especially machine operators.

A complex of measures is now being implemented to reduce social-economic differences between town and countryside. Of great importance was the introduction in 1966 of a guaranteed wage (both in cash and in kind) on all collective farms and of state pensions for collective farmers. The material interest of collective farmers, as individuals and as a group, in the successful operation of the enterprise has been considerably enhanced. Comfortable homes, clubs, cinemas, libraries, hospitals and schools are gradually being built.

In order to use the labor of peasants as efficiently as possible, to reduce the seasonal nature of their work and provide full employment the year round, and to improve their standard of living generally, every effort is being made to develop auxiliary enterprises such as the processing of food and other agricultural products, the manufacture of potato starch and alcohol, as well as the

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manufacture of building materials, packing materials and consumer goods. Branches of some industrial enterprises are being set up on collective and state farms on a seasonal basis. In addition to providing year-round employment, these measures should result in some 8 million rubles worth of additional goods.

The shortage of factory and office workers in various branches of the national economy and in various districts also makes it necessary for the Soviet Government to draw back into productive use some of those who have retired on pensions. In the U.S.S.R. pensions are granted at a comparatively early age: women at the age of 55 and men at the age of 60 (in some branches it is correspondingly 45 and 50). There are many able-bodied people in these age groups. In order to provide material incentives to accept productive employment, the Council of Ministers decided in early 1964 that pensioners should receive 50 percent of their pensions in addition to their wages. Pensioners working in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East receive 75 percent of their pensions, and those working in underground jobs, in harmful labor conditions or in hot shops receive their full pensions irrespective of their earnings. The adoption of this law brought a sharp increase in the number of pensioners working in industry and in construction.

III

The introduction of new technology and the growth in labor productivity should as a rule be accompanied by a definite release of manpower. In our socialist conditions, when many economic areas and enterprises—especially new ones—face an acute need for manpower, this process can and should be one of the sources for providing it. Besides this, the release of manpower should reduce idle time and loss in working time; it should improve all qualitative indices, especially labor productivity. Unfortunately the release of workers resulting from the introduction of new technology, mechanization and automation is being carried out very slowly. As a rule, a factory or office worker who might be released is kept in a manpower "reserve" as a hedge against changes in plan assignments and the possibility of a labor shortage in the future. A "reserve" is necessary when an enterprise fails to operate smoothly.

A discussion is now in progress in Soviet economic journals on how best to induce executives of enterprises to release unneeded

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manpower, on how best to organize the retraining of workers whose trades are becoming redundant as a result of the technological revolution, and on how best to assure the material security of workers during their retraining and provision of new jobs.

Another factor inhibiting the release of surplus workers has been that until recently enterprise executives had to find employment for these workers. They were not always in a position to attend to this. Now the situation has changed; last year State Committees for the Utilization of Labor Resources were set up under the Councils of Ministers of all the fifteen Union Republics to deal with the entire complex of problems concerning the redistribution and most efficient utilization of labor.

The Committees have already been formed and subordinate agencies have been set up in all regions, cities and districts to study the composition of the able-bodied population and the requirements for workers and specialists in various branches of the national economy. These agencies participate in drawing up the balance-sheet on manpower and in planning how it should be trained and distributed.

On the basis of their studies the Committees try to anticipate what fields and particular enterprises will soon release manpower so that they can plan ahead how and where workers can best be used. To cite a typical example, with the completion of the Bratsk hydropower station, more than 14,000 construction workers became available for other employment. Part of them wished to work on the new Ust Ilim hydropower station which is being built north of Bratsk; others were provided with jobs in industrial enterprises there. Only an insignificant number left for other districts, mainly in the south and west.

Through their employment offices in every city and district, the Committees disseminate information on the requirements of particular enterprises for workers, engineering and technical personnel and clerks. In the Russian Federal Republic alone more than 1,300 such offices have helped provide jobs to 873,000 persons, including young people who have reached the employment age, housewives seeking outside work and those who wish to change their jobs. The Committees devote special attention to placing youth in industry. Enterprises prepare in advance to accept young people and provide training courses; and those arriving from other towns or villages are provided with housing. The Committees also help families moving to collective farms

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and state farms in the Far East, Siberia and the Volga areas. For example, they see to it that good houses are built before families arrive. Settlers receive state credits, are exempted from taxes and are helped in setting up their households.

Another function of the Committees is to help draft plans for the siting of new industrial plants and the training and retraining of workers. Thus, they have both analytical and operational responsibilities: they collect data on manpower resources and they organize the redistribution of manpower and the placing of factory and office workers in new jobs.

IV

At the important economic conference held last May, the main speaker, Nikolai Baibakov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Committee, called attention to the fact that in the coming five-year period labor resources will be strained: by 1970, 92 percent of the country's able-bodied people of working age will be productively employed. Hence, opportunities for increasing the labor force will be exhausted in many districts. This means that the demand for additional manpower will have to be met from the natural increase in the population. "Because of the shortage of manpower in large industrial centers," Chairman Baibakov concluded, "the construction and expansion of enterprises during the new five-year period should be conducted without increasing the number of those employed. At the same time it is necessary to increase further the proportion of new construction undertaken in small and average-sized towns where manpower resources are still to be found."

Another matter discussed at the conference was the need for material and legal means to obtain the release of superfluous workers. Particular stress was put on how to provide managers with incentives to use manpower thriftily. For example, in an experiment at the Shchokino Chemical Mill approximately 50 percent of the wages of workers released was left at the disposal of the mill; these funds were then used to pay workers who combined jobs and increased the volume of their work. During the nine-month period of this experiment (August 1967 to April 1968), the personnel in this enterprise was reduced by 324 while production increased (January to April 1968) by more than 19 percent compared with the corresponding period of the previous

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year. This experiment was approved at the conference and will be repeated in a number of other enterprises.

One proposal discussed at the conference was that enterprises should pay the state for the manpower they use. This idea was first advanced by Leonid Kantorovich, a Soviet Academician, who wrote:

> How is it possible to solve such an important task as the rational distribution of manpower? How to interest enterprises in it? It stands to reason that economic measures are required for this purpose. I think that the problem could be solved this way: A procedure should be established whereby enterprises pay for using manpower in the same way as they pay for fixed funds and working funds. Payment should be introduced in those districts where there is a shortage of manpower. In localities with a surplus of manpower, on the other hand, enterprises should be given subsidies for expanding production. Naturally, enterprises will pay only for using those categories of manpower which are in short supply.

I do not agree with the proposal advanced by Kantorovich and his supporters. First, any kind of tax (and this also applies to various fines, penalties, etc.) which is taken from one pocket and placed in another (from the pocket of a state enterprise and into the pocket of the state budget) rarely produces the required economic effect. Second, practice shows that there are more effective ways to stimulate the personal interest of executives and workers in the economic use of resources in general and manpower in particular. The plan tried in the Shchokino Chemical Mill is more effective; the workers and managers there are genuinely interested in a more rational utilization of manpower. Therefore, I see no need to establish a special tax for manpower, and it is noteworthy that at the economic conference the proposal failed to receive support.

The Soviet Union still has many serious employment problems, but they have nothing in common with unemployment.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD. By Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University), 1968, 610 p. $15.00.

An exploration, on a high conceptual level, of the study of international violence from the perspective of international law. The case studies are useful for the advanced scholar as well as the student of international law.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY. By Ruth B. Russell. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968, 510 p. $10.00.

A carefully researched study advancing the thesis that American security interests would be better served by using the United Nations as a means to create an East-West détente rather than to advance cold-war objectives.

THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS. By James A. Stegenga. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968, 227 p. $6.25.

A first-rate case study of the last remaining major U.N. peace-keeping force. Future U.N. forces, in the author's judgment, will resemble the Cyprus force rather than that in the Congo or Gaza.

THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION. By Milton Katz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 165 p. $4.95.

A valuable monograph including an analysis of the South West African cases before the International Court of Justice.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1968, 239 p. $7.00.

A forward-looking report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace.

WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD POLITICS: AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO WAR AND REVOLUTION. By N. Gordon Levin, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 340 p. $7.50.

The author argues that Wilson's foreign policy was marked by a major effort to avoid the dangers to America from both the European nationalism of the Right and Lenin's revolutionary radicalism of the Left.

THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE: REVOLUTION IN THE MODERN WORLD. Edited by Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 244 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.95).

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A valuable contribution to the growing literature on the causes and current development of revolution, including case studies of Mexico, Turkey, Egypt and Cuba.

REVOLUTION AND COUNTERREVOLUTION: CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE IN SOCIAL STRUCTURES. By Seymour Martin Lipset. New York: Basic Books, 1968, 466 p. $10.00.

A collection of twelve major essays in political sociology written during the past five years.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY. By Joseph De Rivera. Columbus: Merrill, 1968, 441 p. $9.25.

A welcome, and in places even pioneering, contribution. Good on case materials, but fuzzy in its generalizations and somewhat turgid in style.

THE AMERICAN STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By William T. R. Fox. Columbia: University of South Carolina, Institute of International Studies, 1968, 116 p. $3.50.

Six splendid essays, all previously published.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE 1945. By Peter Calvocoressi. New York: Praeger, 1968, 480 p. $7.50.

A competent factual summary by a British scholar.

THE PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL AND WORLD AFFAIRS. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968, 408 p. $5.95.

A useful symposium based on the premise that exposure to international affairs should extend to professional schools, especially those in business, public administration, law, agriculture, engineering, medicine and education. (A report of a study by Education and World Affairs).

COMMUNISM AND THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT: PERSISTENT MYTHS AND CHANGING BEHAVIOR. By John H. Kautsky. New York: Wiley, 1968, 216 p. $6.95 (Paper, $3.95).

A collection of the author's articles since the early 1950s dealing broadly with the theme of the title.

WAR AND AFTERMATH: 1914–1929. By Pierre Renouvin. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 369 p. $8.50.

A concise and balanced review of international politics during the early inter-war period, by an eminent French scholar. (Originally published in Paris in 1957.)

WAR: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AGGRESSION. Edited by Morton Fried and others. New York: The Natural History Press (for the American Museum of Natural History), 1968, 262 p. $6.95.

A symposium on armed conflict by sixteen anthropologists.

GREAT TRUE SPY STORIES. Edited by Allen W. Dulles. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 393 p. $6.95.

Thirty-nine true "whodunits," some of which are stranger than fiction.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. By William B. Bader. New York: Pegasus (for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University), 1968, 176 p. $6.00 (Paper, $1.95).

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A sensible analysis arguing for a more pragmatic American attitude toward non-proliferation.

THE TFX DECISION: McNAMARA AND THE MILITARY. By Robert J. Art. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968, 202 p. $5.95.

An excellent case study of civil-military relations in the American government. (Prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard.)

THE FALL OF FORTRESS EUROPE. By Fred Majdalany. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 442 p. $6.95.

A fast-paced, well-written history of the gradual collapse of the *Wehrmacht*.

THE MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By Michael Howard. New York: Praeger, 1968, 82 p. $4.00.

A dispassionate assessment of the Allied failure to adopt British plans to invade Europe through its "soft underbelly," the Balkans.

THE DIRTY WARS. Edited by Donald Robinson. New York: Delacorte Press, 1968, 356 p. $6.95.

A useful collection of essays on guerrilla wars around the globe since World War II.

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE. By Brigadier General Monro MacCloskey. New York: Praeger, 1967, 244 p. $5.95.

A succinct history of American air power.

THE RUSSIANS AND BERLIN: 1945. By Erich Kuby. New York: Hill and Wang, 1968, 372 p. $6.95.

A searing account of life in Berlin in the spring and summer of 1945, by a German journalist.

General: Economic and Social

THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. By Richard N. Cooper. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 302 p. $10.95.

Increased interdependence makes each industrialized country more sensitive than before to what goes on in the others. Does this mean they will have to harmonize their policies? Would it be better to give each more freedom of action by increasing the liquidity of the international monetary system? Or should the adjustments be made by controls over trade and payments? Professor Cooper of Yale, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, explores the alternatives in a stimulating and original book which is part of the Atlantic Policy Series.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE UNITED STATES. By Lawrence B. Krause. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968, 265 p. $6.75.

A major study with the emphasis on measuring the effects of the formation of the Common Market and EFTA on American foreign trade.

AID, INFLUENCE, AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Joan M. Nelson. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 149 p. $1.75 (Paper).

This excellent little book deals very concretely with the limits and possibilities of using aid to influence political and development policies. The author was formerly in the aid agency. (Prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.)

WESTERN ECONOMIC WARFARE 1947–1967: A CASE STUDY IN FOR-

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EIGN ECONOMIC POLICY. By Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. Stockholm: Almqvist, 1968, 319 p. Swedish Kr. 52.

This is by far the fullest study of the American-led effort to restrict exports to the communist countries. Critical in tone, it is careful in its use of evidence. The weak point, as in all other studies, is the analysis of the effects inside the Soviet bloc, but there is an interesting effort to measure the effects on trade.

OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPMENT. By Lauchlin Currie. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968, 139 p. $4.00.

Social and political obstacles as well as deficiencies in economic thinking and practice are analyzed in this collection of papers by an American Keynesian long resident in Colombia.

SOCIETY, POLITICS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, 307 p. $8.95.

When careful quantitative work produces not novelty but support for some widely-held views on the relation between economic and political development, is it the methods or the perceptions that are validated?

THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: AN ASPECT OF THE ATLANTIC CRISIS? London: Michael Joseph (for the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva), 1968, 323 p. 42/.

Exploring possible next steps in European integration, the authors (members of a Study Group of the Institute) like the idea of a broad, rather loose grouping comprising EFTA and the European Community, with politics played down and bridges being built to the East. A solid core of the book surveys the position of each EFTA country.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES. By Benjamin Higgins. New York: Norton, 1968, 918 p. $8.95.

A considerably revised edition of one of the most comprehensive books in the field. (First published in 1959.)

WEST GERMAN AID TO DEVELOPING NATIONS. By Jack L. Knusel. New York: Praeger, 1968, 214 p. $12.50.

Sympathetic, low-keyed, useful description with statistical analysis of a number of points.

DER HANDEL MIT DEM OSTEN: DIE WIRTSCHAFTSBEZIEHUNGEN MIT DEN STAATSHANDELSLÄNDERN. By Klaus-Heinrich Standke. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1968, 245 p. DM. 35.

Thorough, detailed survey which lays out problems well and provides much material to help understand them.

UNA POLITICA AGRICOLA PER L'EUROPA: I PROBLEMI DEL FINANZIAMENTO. By Gian Paolo Casadio. Bologna: Il Mulino (for Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome), 1967, 267 p. L. 3000.

A useful detailed study of the intricate arrangements for financing the European Community's common agricultural policy. Past difficulties and present trends make the author a bit gloomy about the future.

ASPECTS OF THE PATHOLOGY OF MONEY. By Michael A. Heilperin.

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London: Michael Joseph (for the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva), 1968, 296 p. 63/.

A selection from the author's academic and journalistic writings from the late '30s to the mid '60s, including several unpublished papers.

THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK. By Michael Zammit Cutajar and Alison Franks. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1967, 209 p. 30/.

Valuable compendium of facts and condensed statements of issues.

WORLD WITHOUT HUNGER. By Orville L. Freeman. New York: Praeger, 1968, 190 p. $5.95.

In typically hard-hitting fashion, the Secretary of Agriculture poses the world's food problems, reviews what is being done about them and proposes specific greater efforts. He puts the United States in the role of leader, teacher and to some degree financer of these efforts, not that of supplier.

A PRIMER ON FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND PUBLIC POLICY. By Earl O. Heady. New York: Random House, 1968, 177 p. $4.95.

Goes beyond usual surveys in its attention to policies for getting people out of agriculture and keeping food production at economic levels.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INCOME. Edited by Jean Marchal and Bernard Ducros. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, 733 p. $19.00.

Facts, theories, interrelations and policies—in 26 papers presented at a conference held by the International Economic Association.

The United States

JFK AND LBJ: THE INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY UPON POLITICS. By Tom Wicker. New York: Morrow, 1968, 297 p. $5.00.

The author sheds new light on the two Presidents by studying what he considers their greatest failures: Kennedy's disappointing relationship with Congress and Johnson's inability to forge political consensus on his Viet Nam policy.

TO HEAL AND TO BUILD: THE PROGRAMS OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON. Edited by James MacGregor Burns. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968, 506 p. $8.95.

This handsome volume brings together the main programs and speeches of President Johnson.

SAM JOHNSON'S BOY: A CLOSE-UP OF THE PRESIDENT FROM TEXAS. By Alfred Steinberg. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 871 p. $9.95.

In this stinging 871-page biography the author reaches the conclusion that "Sam Johnson's boy could not become more than the President from Texas," and "failed to emerge as a President of the United States."

AMERICA'S STAKE IN ASIA. By Drew Middleton. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968, 240 p. $5.95.

A cogently reasoned argument in favor of a continuing American presence in Asia.

WAIST DEEP IN THE BIG MUDDY: PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON 1968. By Richard H. Rovere. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1968, 116 p. $4.50.

Yet another critique of American foreign policy, focusing primarily on the war in Viet Nam. Deeply felt and well worth reading.

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LAW AND VIETNAM. By Roger H. Hull and John C. Novogrod. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1968, 211 p. $7.50.
A calm defense of the legality of the American involvement.

THE COMMITTEE. By Walter Goodman. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968, 564 p. $10.00.
In this massively researched work, the author renders a negative verdict on the record of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

THE BATTLE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. By Sidney Warren. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968, 426 p. $7.95.
An accurate and most readable account of ten "watershed" presidential campaigns from Jefferson to Goldwater.

THE INFORMATION MACHINE. By Robert E. Elder. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968, 356 p. $10.00.
A scholarly, probably definitive, study of the U.S. Information Agency and its role in American foreign policy.

THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD. By Carl J. Friedrich. Boston: Boston University Press, 1968, 112 p. $4.75.
The author argues that the main American ideas that have had a significant impact abroad have been presidentialism, federalism and the judicial review of human rights.

FULBRIGHT: THE DISSENTER. By Haynes Johnson and Bernard M. Gwertzman. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 321 p. $6.95.
A well-researched, well-written though somewhat worshipful biography of the Senator from Arkansas.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MAKING. By Eleanor Lansing Dulles. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 370 p. $3.95 (Paper).
A workmanlike survey of the foreign policy-making process, including some useful case studies.

ANATOMY OF DIPLOMACY: THE ORIGIN AND EXECUTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Ellis Briggs. New York: McKay, 1968, 248 p. $5.95.
A chatty account of the execution of American foreign policy, by a former Ambassador.

THE CENTER: PEOPLE AND POWER IN POLITICAL WASHINGTON. By Stewart Alsop. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 365 p. $6.95.
A chatty "inside" book of Washington politics.

THE DEGENERATION OF OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. By Jules Abels. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 322 p. $6.95.
An urgent plea for shorter, calmer and less cliché-ridden presidential campaigns. The author's indictment is sweeping, but the remedy seems remote.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1967. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Simon and Schuster (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 464 p. $7.50 (Paper, $3.75).
The upsurge of violence in both domestic and foreign affairs is the central theme in this authoritative review of American foreign relations during the year 1967.

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Successive chapters examine the vicissitudes of the Viet Nam conflict, the Middle East war and its aftermath, and developments in the East-West relationship and in the affairs of the Western community, Africa, the Pacific nations, Latin America and the United Nations.

The Western Hemisphere

NATIONALISTS WITHOUT NATIONS. By Victor Alba. New York: Praeger, 1968, 248 p. $7.00.

A plea for political and economic integration of Latin America and for abolishing the oligarchies which, in the author's opinion, are the chief obstacle to economic, social and political progress in the southern half of the Western Hemisphere.

POLITICS AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. By Victor Alba. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968, 404 p. $12.50.

An updated translation of a work published in 1964. A useful and comprehensive survey with an extensive bibliography.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By John F. McCamant. New York: Praeger, 1968, 351 p. $15.00.

A study of the impact which aid projects have had upon economic and political development in Central America.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION. By Herbert K. May. New York: Praeger, 1968, 252 p. $12.50.

In this review of the establishment and accomplishments of the Alliance for Progress, the author, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, examines the performance of U.S. business and government in the Alliance, urges the Europeans to play a bigger role in the development of Latin America and expresses the conviction that the basic problems of the Alliance can be resolved only by the Latin Americans themselves.

MEXICAN MILITARISM: THE POLITICAL RISE AND FALL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY, 1910-1940. By Edwin Lieuwen. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968, 194 p. $6.95.

Professor Lieuwen, author of the pioneering work "Arms and Politics in Latin America" (1960), describes civil-military relations in Mexico from the years before World War I when the Mexican Army of the Revolution seized power to the election of 1940 when civilians regained control of the government.

THE DYNAMIC OF MEXICAN NATIONALISM. By Frederick C. Turner. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968, 350 p. $8.50.

An analysis and description of Mexican nationalism. The author argues that the 1910 Revolution and the subsequent civil war were the catalysts that helped to develop its contemporary form.

ONE MAN'S MEXICO: A RECORD OF TRAVELS AND ENCOUNTERS. By John Lincoln. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, 238 p. $5.75.

Delightful vignettes of Mexico by a professional writer and traveler.

DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA EN LA ARGENTINA: LOS HECHOS Y LAS IDEAS. By Ricardo Gregorio Parera. Buenos Aires: Editorial Nahuel, 1967, 375 p.

A history of the Argentinian Christian Democratic movement, supplemented with documents and bibliography.

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VENCEREMOS! THE SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA. Edited by John Gerassi. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 442 p. $7.95.

A chronologically arranged compilation of the writings of one of the most influential contemporary Latin American revolutionaries, recently killed in Bolivia. There is a eulogistic biographical essay by the editor.

THE CUBAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF HISTORY. By Lester D. Langley. New York: Wiley, 1968, 203 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.95).

A solid, factual survey.

LES ÉTATS-UNIS ET LA RÉVOLUTION CUBAINE, 1959–1964. By Manuela Semidei. Paris: Colin, 1968, 207 p. Fr. 22.

The author contends that the United States was unable to accept an "independent" Cuba and that its determination to retain "colonial" controls forced Castro to seek new alliances.

THE PANAMA STORY. By Jean Gilbreath Niemeier. Portland (Ore.): Metropolitan Press, 1968, 303 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.95).

This informative history, drawn primarily from the files of the *Star and Herald* of Panama City and its Spanish sister-paper, *La Estrella de Panamá,* covers the period from 1849 to the present.

Western Europe

THE EUROPE I SAW. By Elizabeth Wiskemann. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, 255 p. $4.95; London: Collins, 30/.

Intimate glimpses of Europe before World War II, by a British journalist and historian who, from the early 1930s on, understood and struggled against the Fascist threat.

DEFENSE OF THE REALM: BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR EPOCH. By R. N. Rosecrance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 308 p. $7.50.

A review of Britain's military planning and its political background, principally in the first postwar decade.

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND ELECTIONS: PARTIES AND VOTING IN GREAT BRITAIN. By Peter G. J. Pulzer. New York: Praeger, 1968, 165 p. $5.50.

This lucid introduction to the different aspects of the British electoral process should appeal to many students of politics.

DOUBLE DIPLOMA: THE LIFE OF SIR PIERSON DIXON, DON AND DIPLOMAT. By Piers Dixon. London: Hutchinson, 1968, 321 p. 55/.

Dixon's own accounts of men and events dominate these elegant recollections of a career that began before Munich and ended after de Gaulle's veto of 1963. He served Eden during and Bevin after the war.

FRANCE, DE GAULLE AND EUROPE: THE POLICY OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH REPUBLICS TOWARD THE CONTINENT. By Simon Serfaty. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, 176 p. $6.95.

Another survey of French foreign policy, distinguished chiefly by its brevity. The author differentiates between France in a period of decline before 1958 and in a period of assumed ascendancy after de Gaulle's return to power.

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FRANCE IN THE AGE OF THE SCIENTIFIC STATE. By Robert Gilpin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 474 p. $12.50.

A wide-ranging inquiry into French efforts to organize scientific resources in order to resist American domination. By his close analysis of de Gaulle's policies in the face of traditional French institutions and attitudes, the author has presented a lucid study of the national and international ramifications of the technology gap. An important work of relevance to many fields.

THE FRENCH. By François Nourissier. New York: Knopf, 1968, 309 p. $6.95.

A pleasant, even satisfying apéritif, to be followed by a more substantial course on French culture today.

THE ARMY AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC. By Orville D. Menard. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968, 265 p. $6.95.

The role of the army in restoring de Gaulle to power in 1958 and in attempting to topple him in April 1961. A familiar story.

1940: THE FALL OF FRANCE. By General André Beaufre. New York: Knopf, 1968, 215 p. $5.95.

Recollections and reflections on the catastrophe of 1940 and its background, by a leading French writer on military strategy. (Originally published as "Le Drame de 1940," Paris, 1965; noted here April 1966.)

ELITE IMAGES AND FOREIGN POLICY OUTCOMES: A STUDY OF NORWAY. By Philip M. Burgess. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968, 179 p. $6.25.

Norway's shift from traditional neutrality to membership in NATO, ponderously analyzed against the background of changing élite conceptions of the country's strategic interests. Informative but not entirely successful.

WEST GERMANY. By Michael Balfour. New York: Praeger, 1968, 344 p. $7.50.

The Bonn record set against the background of Germany's dominant historical traditions. Informative and well written.

THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST HITLER IN THE TWILIGHT WAR. By Harold C. Deutsch. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1968, 394 p. $8.95.

A careful and most readable reconstruction, based on new evidence, of conspiratorial efforts against Hitler in the first ten months of the war. Pope Pius XII was marginally but benevolently involved.

DEUTSCHLAND IM BRENNPUNKT. By Ludwig Freund. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1968, 195 p. DM. 18.

A thoroughly unsatisfactory account of what the author considers the unsatisfactory and even unfair record of American political scientists writing on Germany.

PRELUDE TO DOWNFALL: HITLER AND THE UNITED STATES, 1939–1941. By Saul Friedländer. New York: Knopf, 1967, 328 p. $6.95.

An important study of German policy toward the United States, based in part on hitherto unavailable sources, especially German naval documents. (Originally published as "Hitler et les États-Unis (1939–1941)," Geneva, 1963, and noted here October 1964.)

SEECKT. By Hans Meier-Welcker. Frankfurt/Main: Bernard und Graefe, 1967, 744 p. DM. 78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A well-documented biography of one of Germany's foremost political generals, famous for his reticence and success. By a professional soldier turned military historian.

PARTEIELITE IN WANDEL. By Peter Christian Ludz. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968, 438 p. DM. 39.

A formidable study of the changing composition of East German élites and of the attendant changes in ideology. The author, a well-informed West German political scientist, combines empirical data with efforts at new theoretical formulations about totalitarian rule and stresses the emergence of "consultative authoritarianism" as a new and more efficient form of government in Ulbricht's Germany.

UNITY IN DIVERSITY: ITALIAN COMMUNISM AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD. By Donald L. M. Blackmer. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968, 434 p. $15.00.

A thorough, thoughtful study of the evolution of Italian communism in the post-Stalin era, when national and international verities of the past no longer could guide the party's course. The author concludes that "the PCI has in practice become a revisionist party."

THE LAST GREAT CAUSE: THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. By Stanley Weintraub. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968, 340 p. $8.50.

A pro-Loyalist evocation of the "Legend of Spain" and of the writers and artists who created it.

SPAIN'S IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY. By Ronald H. Chilcote. Austin: University of Texas, Bureau of Business Research, 1968, 174 p. $5.00.

A detailed view, with attention to the implications of Spanish experience for the place of steel production in developing nations.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

FROM PRAGUE AFTER MUNICH: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1938–1940. By George F. Kennan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 266 p. $6.50.

These papers written by Mr. Kennan during a period of diplomatic service in Czechoslovakia in the years following Munich are a significant historical source.

PLAN AND MARKET UNDER SOCIALISM. By Ota Šik. White Plains (N.Y.): International Arts and Sciences Press, 1968, 382 p. $12.00.

An attack on administrative planning and management in Czechoslovakia, followed by closely argued proposals for the introduction of certain kinds of market relations in socialist economies. A leader among East European economic reformers, the author is Deputy Premier in the Czech government.

THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION IN SOVIET MILITARY AFFAIRS. Translated and Edited by William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968, 420 p. $6.95.

Translations of articles by Soviet specialists reflecting the important developments in military strategy and concept since Khrushchev.

SOVIET POLITICS SINCE KHRUSHCHEV. Edited by Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 181 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

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A series of essays discussing major areas of Soviet policies and politics in the last half-decade. Three chapters deal with military and foreign affairs.

THE NEW RUSSIA: COMMUNISM IN EVOLUTION. Edited by Denis Dirscherl, S.J. Dayton: Pflaum Press, 1968, 203 p. $5.95.

A collection of pieces, some previously published, on the drift of recent changes in Soviet life, policy and ideology.

FIFTY YEARS OF COMMUNISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1917–1967. By G. F. Hudson. London: Watts, 1968, 234 p. 15/.

A concise, knowledgeable essay on the development of the theory and practice of communism since 1917.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY: MYTH AND REALITY. By Marshall I. Goldman. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 176 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A sequence of chapters, opening with a "myth" and closing with the "reality," dealing with various major questions concerning the performance of the Soviet economy. Some of the myths are perhaps straw men by now, but the method is an interesting one and avoids a black-white polarity.

PLANNING AND PRODUCTIVITY UNDER SOVIET SOCIALISM. By Abram Bergson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 95 p. $4.00.

A leading authority's careful assessment of the productivity of the Russian economic system, with some international comparisons. (A publication of Carnegie-Mellon University.)

THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1927–1932. By Loren R. Graham. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 255 p. $6.50.

A serious, scholarly study of the vicissitudes of the highly important Soviet Academy of Sciences during the crucial turning point of the first five-year plan.

JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE U.S.S.R. Edited by Robert Conquest. New York: Praeger, 1968, 152 p. $5.00.

THE SOVIET POLICE SYSTEM. Edited by Robert Conquest. New York: Praeger, 1968, 103 p. $5.00.

Two further volumes in "The Contemporary Soviet Union Series: Institutions and Policies." (Earlier volumes noted here July 1968.)

ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Erich Goldhagen. New York: Praeger (for the Institute of East European Jewish Studies of the Philip W. Lown School of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, Brandeis University), 1968, 351 p. $8.75.

Essays by an able group, dealing both with general questions concerning the ethnic minorities in the U.S.S.R. and with particular ethnic groups.

MEMOIRS OF A SOVIET AMBASSADOR: THE WAR, 1939–43. By Ivan Maisky. New York: Scribner, 1968, 408 p. $6.95.

In this continuation of his diplomatic memoirs Mr. Maisky covers the last four years of his ambassadorship in Britain. Though interesting because of the man and the period, the book is disappointing as a historical source.

BRITAIN AND THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR: NOVEMBER 1918–FEBRUARY 1920. By Richard H. Ullman. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the Center of International Studies), 1968, 395 p. $10.00.

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This is the second volume of a major study of Anglo-Soviet relations from 1917 to 1920.

THE FINNS AND THEIR COUNTRY. By Wendy Hall. New York: Eriksson, 1968, 224 p. $5.95.

An informal but well-informed general survey of the Finns and Finland.

LATVIJAS SAIMNIECĪBAS VĒSTURE: 1914–1945. By Arnolds Aizsilnieks. Stockholm: Daugava, 1968, 983 p.

The first scholarly economic history of Latvia during World War I, the period of independence, Soviet rule from 1940 to 1941 and the German occupation from 1941 to 1945.

POLAND AND THE WESTERN POWERS, 1938–1939: A STUDY IN THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE. By Anna M. Cienciala. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, 310 p. $9.00.

A penetrating analysis of the crisis confronting Polish diplomacy in the immediate prelude to the Second World War.

DER UNGARISCHE REVISIONISMUS UND DIE ZERSCHLAGUNG DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI. By Jörg K. Hoensch. Tübingen: Mohr, 1967, 323 p. DM. 46.

A study of Hungarian post-Trianon revisionism, with particular reference to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia after Munich.

The Middle East

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Kemal H. Karpat. New York: Praeger, 1968, 397 p. $10.00.

A welcome collection of essays and articles, many of them little known to Western readers and now made available to them for the first time. Arab writings are given the heaviest representation, Turkish much less, Iranian negligible and Israeli none at all.

MIDDLE EASTERN CONSTITUTIONS AND ELECTORAL LAWS. By Abid A. Al-Marayati. New York: Praeger, 1968, 483 p. $17.50.

Useful collection of English translations of constitutions and other major political documents from eleven Middle Eastern countries.

RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. By M. S. Arnoni. Passaic (N.J.): The Minority of One Press, 1968, 191 p. $6.00.

A polemic full of condemnations (of the State Department, the Soviet Union, the Arab governments, the oil industry and some of the leaders of Israel) which nevertheless reaches constructive though presently impractical conclusions on a Middle East settlement.

EGYPT AND SINAI: ETERNAL BATTLEGROUND. By Gregory Blaxland. New York: Funk, 1968, 327 p. $5.95.

Primarily an account of Anglo-Egyptian relations, with accent on military encounters. First published in England in 1966, its story of the Suez affair of 1956 ignores the recent books of Hugh Thomas and Anthony Nutting, and the succeeding decade gets only the most superficial once-over.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING IN EGYPT. By Magdi M. El-Kammash. New York: Praeger, 1968, 408 p. $15.00.

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A comprehensive academic study, with many useful tables, which manages to avoid all political considerations and judgments and to maintain a bland optimism regarding Egypt's economic prospects.

VEREINIGTE ARABISCHE REPUBLIK: WIRTSCHAFTSSTRUKTUR-WANDLUNG UND ENTWICKLUNGSHILFE. By Hans-Jürgen Kornrumpf. Opladen: Leske, 1967, 207 p. DM. 22.

An economic handbook with useful statistical material.

ISRAEL AND WORLD POLITICS: ROOTS OF THE THIRD ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. By Theodore Draper. New York: Viking, 1968, 278 p. $5.75 (Paper, $2.25).

An attempt to put together from published material the events leading up to the six-day war of 1967 against the background of the earlier "rounds" of 1948 and 1956. Until the historians provide more extensive and authoritative sources this little book—only half of it is text, the other half a convenient collection of documents—deserves a careful reading.

THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM: THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1967. By Walter Laqueur. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 368 p. $6.95.

The origins and immediate antecedents of the war of June 1967. The account of the crisis, based largely on the contemporary press and not up to the author's best, is none the less revealing on Israeli attitudes, politics and policies.

DAYS OF FIRE. By Samuel Katz. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 317 p. $5.95.

Personal memoir, with much fascinating detail, of a career devoted to the cause of Irgun Zvai Leumi in its fight against the Arabs, the British and the Jewish "establishment."

SOUTH ARABIA: ARENA OF CONFLICT. By Tom Little. New York: Praeger, 1968, 196 p. $5.00.

A seasoned journalist's straightforward presentation of the main events in the recent history of South Arabia, concluding with the departure of the British and the establishment of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen in November 1967.

South and Southeast Asia

GOVERNMENT AND REVOLUTION IN VIETNAM. By Dennis J. Duncanson. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1968, 442 p. $9.50.

The definitive political history of Viet Nam to date, with emphasis on the post-World War II period.

NOBODY WANTED WAR: MISPERCEPTION IN VIETNAM AND OTHER WARS. By Ralph K. White. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 347 p. $5.95.

An excellent case study of the impact of misperception on the policy-making of the major combatants in the Viet Nam war.

THE SECRET SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM. By David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory. New York: Random House, 1968, 247 p. $5.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A shocking account of missed opportunities to end the war in Viet Nam. The main villain of the story is the fallible leadership in Washington.

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ASIAN FRONTIERS: STUDIES IN A CONTINUING PROBLEM. By Alastair Lamb. New York: Praeger, 1968, 246 p. $5.00.

The background, nature and patterns of evolution of boundary disputes along Asian borders. Professor Lamb includes, in addition to countries of East, Southeast and South Asia, Afghanistan and the Asian republics of the Soviet Union.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. Edited by G. F. Hudson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 117 p. $4.80.

Three scholarly articles on Japanese history and politics, two on China, and one (by the editor) on the final declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. (No. 20 in the series of St. Antony's papers; No. 4 in the series, Far Eastern Affairs.)

THE CONGRESS PARTY OF INDIA: THE DYNAMICS OF ONE-PARTY DEMOCRACY. By Stanley A. Kochanek. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 516 p. $13.50.

This work analyzes the relationship between India's Prime Minister and the National Congress President, the evolution of the role of the Congress' Working Committee, sources of the Congress' recruitment and the nature of leadership élite in party and government.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-ALIGNMENT IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. By Deva Narayan Mallik. Allahabad: Chaitanya Publishing House, 1967, 342 p. Rs. 30.

Discussed here are how India's concept of non-alignment policy emerged, the obstructions that once slowed its growth, its impact on the balance of power among other nations, and why it now commands almost universal recognition and respect.

NON-VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF GANDHI'S MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR. By H. J. N. Horsburgh. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 207 p. $5.60.

A discussion of the ethical and religious presuppositions of Satyagraha (reform through friendly passive resistance), of Gandhi's application of that concept, and the practicability of its substitution for armed force.

I WARNED MY COUNTRYMEN. By Sarat Chandra Bose. Calcutta: Netaji Research Bureau, 1968, 354 p. Rs. 15.

Warnings of a major Indian statesman, fiercely opposed to partition, of the threat to India's national aspirations resulting from the Congress leadership's capitulation to the British on the issues of unity and independence. The volume is made up of the author's collected works of the period 1945–50.

WEST BENGAL AND THE FEDERALIZING PROCESS IN INDIA. By Marcus F. Franda. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 257 p. $7.50.

A case study, based on field research, of central and state leaderships, their working relations and the effect on them of political, economic and social conditions. The author, a Colgate professor, concludes by comparing West Bengal with other Indian states.

BORN IN TIBET. By Chögyam Trungpa, The Eleventh Trungpa Tulku, As Told to Esmé Cramer Roberts. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, 264 p. $5.95.

The early life, religious education and escape of a high-ranking incarnate Lama

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who writes nostalgically of the times when feudal tenure, individual peasant proprietorship and nomadism coexisted contentedly in Tibet.

HO CHI MINH: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Jean Lacouture. New York: Random House, 1968, 313 p. $5.95.

Sketchy on the early years because of lack of facts, but altogether a valuable addition to studies on all phases of the Viet Nam question. (A translation of "Hô Chi Minh," Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967, 253 p. Fr. 6.)

THAILAND: ANOTHER VIETNAM? By Daniel Wit. New York: Scribner, 1968, 205 p. $4.95.

An analysis of the environment and governmental system of this "vigorous proponent of [America's] role as an Asian power and stabilizer" whose future support and stability depend largely, in the author's opinion, on its recalcitrant northeast area.

SOCIALISM AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN EQUATORIAL ASIA: THE CASE OF MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA. By Roger A. Freeman. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968, 130 p. $3.90.

A Hoover Institution economist concludes that Malaysia's capitalistic policy accounts largely for her economic growth and stability while Indonesia's socialistic policy has led to her economic deterioration—this despite similarities in climate, natural resources, population and postwar independence for each.

BREAKTHROUGH IN BURMA: MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTION, 1939–1946. By Ba Maw. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 460 p. $8.75.

The first Prime Minister of Burma, now in prison, records and analyzes his struggle against foreign domination to gain freedom and independence for his country. He had coöperated at first with the Allies but later with the Japanese.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE POLITICS. By Lucian W. Pye. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968, 255 p. $8.95.

This work, subtitled "A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development," is an "interpretive and largely speculative essay" on the unique national and personality traits that have shaped Chinese political culture from the time of the Manchus to Maoism and are likely to affect the future evolution of Chinese Communism.

HOW COMMUNIST CHINA NEGOTIATES. By Arthur Lall. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 291 p. $7.95.

One of the six delegates participating in negotiations at the 14-nation Foreign Ministers' Conference on Laos in 1961–62 relates the intricate story of the negotiations and analyzes them in the context of Communist Chinese theory of international relations.

THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA. Compiled and Edited by the Asia Research Centre. Rutland: Tuttle, 1968, 507 p. $7.50.

Reference materials assembled for studying and assessing the political, ideological, cultural and social consequences of this movement in its early stages, *i.e.* before the emergence of the Red Guards.

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PEKING'S RED GUARDS: THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By Stephen Pan and Raymond J. de Jaegher. New York: Twin Circle Publishing Co., 1968, 462 p. $1.95 (Paper).

The composition, aims, methods and accomplishments of this Mao-supported organization of middle-school pupils who, since early 1966, have been out to liquidate and purge all anti-Mao, anti-Party and anti-socialist elements.

CHINESE COMMUNISM IN CRISIS: MAOISM AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish. New York: Praeger, 1968, 279 p. $6.00.

Two historians give the background to the Cultural Revolution and suggest the uses to which victory on either side of this still unresolved struggle may be put. Extracts from literary works singled out for censure and from official texts are appended. For the general reader.

PA CHIN AND HIS WRITINGS: CHINESE YOUTH BETWEEN THE TWO REVOLUTIONS. By Olga Lang. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 402 p. $7.95.

A carefully researched study of Pa Chin's life and writings and how they prepared the young Chinese intellectuals for their role in society and in revolution.

THE EMERGENCE OF JAPAN AS A WORLD POWER: 1895–1925. By Morinosuke Kajima. Rutland: Tuttle, 1968, 403 p. $5.75.

Principles of Japan's diplomacy as practiced from the Triple Intervention to the restoration of relations with Soviet Russia. The Japanese version, now in its fifth edition, won the Japan Academy award, highest honor for such publications.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN. Edited by Robert E. Ward. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 637 p. $12.50.

Studies which identify and analyze the principal agencies for Japanese political development and their role and interactions with such variables as leadership, nationalism, influences of foreign relations and war, popular political participation and other phenomena.

BEHIND JAPAN'S SURRENDER: THE SECRET STRUGGLE THAT ENDED AN EMPIRE. By Lester Brooks. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968, 428 p. $8.95.

How, very narrowly, Japan's peacemakers overcame terrorism, assassinations and an armed coup d'état in the fight within Japan between the bombing of Hiroshima and surrender.

JAPAN'S LONGEST DAY. Compiled by the Pacific War Research Society. Palo Alto: Kodansha International, 1968, 339 p. $5.75.

A detailed, hour-by-hour record of the 24 hours beginning at noon on August 14, 1945, when the Imperial Conference met and decided on surrender, and ending at noon on August 15, when the Emperor broadcast the catastrophic news to his people.

KOREA: THE POLITICS OF THE VORTEX. By Gregory Henderson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 479 p. $11.95.

Mr. Henderson, long with the American Embassy in Korea, studies Korean political culture and development. He urges the decentralization of authority and encouragement of autonomous centers of power at the local level.

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AGAIN KOREA. By Wilfred G. Burchett. New York: International Publishers, 1968, 188 p. $5.95.

An Australian left-wing journalist, notable for his close contacts with communist sources, recounts his 1967 return visit to North Korea, where he found almost complete reconstruction and recuperation from the 1950 war which, he claims, was started by the South Koreans.

THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND WORLD: A PHYSICAL, CULTURAL, AND REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY. By Frederick L. Wernstedt and J. E. Spencer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 742 p. $20.00.

A comprehensive, authoritative work on the land and people of the 7,000 islands making up the Philippines, mostly from first-hand observations. Generous illustrations, maps, charts and tables.

Africa

UNITY OR POVERTY? THE ECONOMICS OF PAN-AFRICANISM. By Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman. Baltimore: Penguin, 1968, 363 p. $1.95. (Paper)

Two Americans argue that economic rationality and a stronger bargaining position in the international economy both require the ultimate economic unification of the African continent.

L'AFRIQUE COMMERCE AVEC L'AFRIQUE. By Bernard Vinay. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1968, 213 p. Fr. 18.

The author argues that Africa has more need of genuine economic coöperation and joint planning to create complementary economies than institutional structures such as payments unions.

INDUSTRY IN AFRICA. By A. F. Ewing. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 189 p. $4.25.

An economist with the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa argues for industrialization projects with linkages which will lead to structural changes in African economies. Primarily addressed to policy-makers and planners.

THE POPULATION OF TROPICAL AFRICA. Edited by John C. Caldwell and Chukuka Okonjo. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 457 p. $10.00.

A selection of papers, largely by African scholars, on demographic problems of the continent. The papers were presented at the First African Population Conference at Ibadan in 1966.

THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT. By Mohamed Omer Beshir. New York: Praeger, 1968, 192 p. $7.50.

A balanced, scholarly treatment of the ever-present division between North and South. Generous in his criticism of both sides, this northerner concludes that some form of accommodation within a single state must be the ultimate solution.

INDUSTRIAL LABOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL. By Guy Pfeffermann. New York: Praeger, 1968, 325 p. $15.00.

An attempt to apply contemporary economic standards to the performance of the Senegalese economy. The author finds that the family system, the colonial past and current agreements with France render government labor policies ineffective. The work supports a neo-colonialist view of the Senegalese political system.

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THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF SIERRA LEONE. By Ralph Gerald Saylor. Durham: Duke University Press (for Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1968, 231 p. $10.00.

A scholarly study with particular emphasis on the impact of government policies on the course of economic development. The author is an economist at Western Michigan University.

PAWPAW, FOOFOO, AND JUJU: RECOLLECTIONS OF A PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER. By Marvin H. Unger. New York: Citadel Press, 1968, 210 p. $4.95.

A both light-hearted and serious account of one man's experiences as a teacher in a Teacher Training Institute in Liberia from 1964 to 1966.

KOMMUNISTISCHE MODELLE FÜR AFRIKA? GHANA UND GUINEA. By Eberhard Stahn. Hanover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1967, 192 p. DM. 19.80.

The author argues that while the party organizations and terminologies of the PDG (Parti Démocratique de Guinée) and CPP (Convention People's Party, Ghana) owe much to communist theory, they should be seen essentially as pragmatic adaptations to the tasks of national unification and rapid industrialization, prerequisites to democratization.

NIGERIA. By Walter Schwarz. New York: Praeger, 1968, 328 p. $7.50.

This volume is largely concerned with post-independence Nigeria. It is unique in its stress on the factors leading up to the 1966 coups and to the civil war beginning in July 1967. The author is now with the Manchester *Guardian*.

INDUSTRIEARBEIT UND KULTURWANDEL IN NIGERIA. By Hans Dieter Seibel. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968, 503 p. DM. 40.

Using interviews and questionnaires, a Monrovia professor studied southern Nigerian factory workers and villagers to discover the relationships between social change and industrialization. A major piece of systematic, empirical research.

KENYA. By A. Marshall MacPhee. New York: Praeger, 1968, 238 p. $6.50.

A concise descriptive analysis of Kenya's embattled path from British colony to independent state, by a British journalist formerly associated with the East African Standard Group.

RHODESIA: CRISIS OF COLOR. Edited by Theodore Bull. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968, 184 p. $4.50.

Under the direction of their old editor, contributors to the former *Central African Examiner* collaborate in a competent survey of Rhodesia's history and politics. Regarding the events surrounding UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence), British diplomats in Salisbury and their superiors in London are taken to task for deficiencies in their information, planning and tactics.

THE SEEDS OF DISASTER. By John Laurence. New York: Taplinger, 1968, 333 p. $5.95.

A survey of contemporary South African society and the attempts of the government to hide the facts of social and political life both at home and abroad.

AGAINST THE WORLD: ATTITUDES OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA. By Douglas Brown. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 253 p. $4.95.

The assistant editor of the London *Sunday Telegraph* has written a sensitive analysis of the predicament of being a white South African.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 10022. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 10027. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20006. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 90th Congress, 2nd Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Public sector investment, 1968–71: presented to the Parliament of Rhodesia, April, 1968. Salisbury, Government Printer, 1968. 36 p.

Armed Forces

World-Wide military expenditures and related data: calendar year 1965. Washington, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1967. 24 p. (Research Report 67-6.)

Asia and Pacific Ocean

Asian Development Bank Act amendments of 1968. Hearing, Subcommittee on International Finance, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, on H.R. 13217, Feb. 27, 1968. Washington, 1968. 200 p.

——. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 2479, Feb. 27, 1968. Washington, 1968. Pt. 2.

——. Report, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, to accompany H.R. 13217, Apr. 29, 1968. 12 p. (H. Rept. 1320.)

The Future United States role in Asia and in the Pacific. Hearings, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Feb. 29–April 4, 1968. Washington, 1968. 320 p.

Indonesia: sick man on the mend. Report by Sen. Joseph S. Clark on a study mission to Indonesia, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, May 2, 1968. Washington, 1968. 9 p. (Com. Print.)

Taiwan's agricultural development: its relevance for developing countries today. Washington, Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1968. 92 p. (Foreign Agricultural Economic Reports, 39.)

AID administration to the rural sector: the JCRR experience in Taiwan and its application in other countries, by R. L. Hough. Washington, Agency for International Development, 1968. 58 p.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, to accompany S.J. Res. 106, May 28, 1968. Washington, 1968. 16 p. (S. Rept. 1153.)

Promoting the economic development of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, to accompany S. 3073, May 27, 1968. Washington, 1968. 8 p. (S. Rept. 1149.)

Providing for the continuance of civil government for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, to accompany S. 3207, May 27, 1968. Washington, 1968. 15 p. (S. Rept. 1151.)

Present situation in Vietnam. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Mar. 20, 1968. Washington, 1968. 51 p.

Civilian casualty, social welfare, and refugee problems in South Vietnam. Hearings, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., May 10–Oct. 16, 1967. Washington, 1968. 332 p.

——. Findings and recommendations, May 9, 1968. Washington, 1968. 64 p. (Com. Print.)

Atomic Power

AEC authorizing legislation fiscal year 1969. Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Jan. 30–Feb. 21, 1968. Washington, 1968. 2 pts.

——. Report, Apr. 2, 1968. Washington, 1968. 60 p. (H. Rept. 1266.)

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——. Report, Apr. 3, 1968. Washington, 1968. 60 p. (S. Rept. 1074.)
——. Act, approved Apr. 19, 1968. Washington, 1968. 3 p. (90-289—H.R. 16324.)

Commercial Policy and Trade

International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. 1578, May 27, 1968. Washington, 1968. 8 p. (S. Rept. 1148.)

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